Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just Compensation Equation by Oswald, Lynda J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 1
3-1-1991
Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging
Factors in the Just Compensation Equation
Lynda J. Oswald
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation






MARCH 1991	 NUMBER 2
GOODWILL AND GOING-CONCERN VALUE:
EMERGING FACTORS IN THE JUST
COMPENSATION EQUATIONt
LYNDA J. OSWALD *
INTRODUCTION
A few decades ago, a flurry of law review articles appeared that
sharply criticized the time-honored practice in American law of
denying compensation to business owners whose business interests
were damaged or destroyed by a condemnation of the underlying
land.' These commentators called for reform in the law, for a
recognition of the devastation and loss such a policy inflicts upon
business owners. Once the problem was exposed and solutions pro-
Copyright © 1991 Lynda J. Oswald,
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1982, University of
Michigan; M.B.A. 1986, University of Michigan; J.D. 1986, University of Michigan. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the University of Michigan School
of Business Administration.
' See generally Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses
in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1968); Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property
Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57 (1969); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain—Policy and Concept,
42 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954); Spies McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437 (1962); Comment, "Just Compensation" for the Small Businessman,
2 COLIMA. J .L. & Soc. PROBS. 144 (1966); Comment, An Act to Provide Compensation for Loss of
Goodwill Resulting from Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 445 (1965); Comment,
Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957)
[hereinafter Comment, Incidental Losses].
For a comprehensive and annotated list of publications on this topic through 1982, see
Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises
are Condemned, 15 SzroN HALL L. REV. 483 app. (1985).
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posed, though not implemented, the scholars shifted their focus
elsewhere. Little attention has been paid to business losses since. 2
Interestingly, however, the reforms urged so vehemently twenty
and thirty years ago are now starting to materialize, not in a tidal
wave of change, perhaps, but certainly in a groundswell. A number
of state courts3 and legislatures4 have begun to recognize that losses
of goodwill, going-concern value, or profits are real losses for which
the property owners should be compensated.
As urban centers in the United States endeavor to reindustrial-
ize, public and private entities are increasingly condemning urban
land for redevelopment in an effort to spur economic renewal. 5 As
a result, the issue of business losses is growing in importance. Even
a single urban renewal project or private industrial scheme can
displace hundreds of businesses and thousands of people, 6 causing
millions of dollars in damages,' much of which will not, because of
2 The most recent article is Risinger, supra note 1, which discusses business losses only
in the context of federal law.
• See infra notes 259-401 and accompanying text.
• See infra notes 174-258 and accompanying text.
5 Many of these projects are joint publidprivate endeavors. See generally Freilich &
Nichols, Public/Private Partnerships in joint Development: The Legal and Financial Anatomy of
Large-Scale Urban Development Projects, 1986 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN ch.
1; Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URB. LAw. 193 (Spring 1987); Man-
delker, Public Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, 15 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1987).
f' For example, the General Motors Poletown Project in Michigan resulted in the taking
of "1,176 buildings, homes, apartments, and businesses, including 16 churches, 3 schools,
and a hospital." Comment, Corporate Prerogative, "Public Use" and a People's Plight: Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 907, 909-10 (footnote omit-
ted); see also Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 825-26, 543 P.2d 905,
914, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473, 482 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976). The court stated:
We judicially notice the following as facts "of generalized knowledge that
are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute":
The conditions of modern American life, including the increased concentration
of people in urban centers and the need for increased governmental activity in
the areas of transportation and urban redevelopment, have resulted in the
disruption and displacement of increased numbers of people and businesses by
government projects. Moreover, the peculiar nature of urban redevelopment
programs, which act upon large areas of contiguous property, often involves
the uprooting of entire neighborhoods and the consequent dispersal of their
business and residential occupants to other areas.
15 Cal. 3d at 825-26, 543 P.2d at 914, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 482. (citations omitted).
For example, the projected public sector costs for the Poletown Project were over $200
million, including acquisition costs of $62 million and relocation costs of $25.75 million. See
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 656 n.7, 304 N.W.2d 455,
469 n.7 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 280, 177
N.W.2d 380, 385 (1970). The Luber court noted:
Due to the fact people are often congregated in given areas and that we have
reached a state wherein re-development is necessary, commercial and industrial
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the vagaries of the law, be compensable. Thus, the time is ripe for
not only reexamining the historical basis and theoretical underpin-
nings of the business losses rule, but also for analyzing the nascent
trend toward allowing recovery of business losses.
Part I of this article describes, by way of example, the business
losses rule and the issues it presents, and defines the key terms and
concepts. 8 The business losses rule arose from the economic circum-
stances of the early republic, and from the early definitions given
to the terms "property" and "taking." Part II traces the evolution
of these legal terms and the historical background of eminent do-
main law in general, and the business losses rule in particular. 8 Part
III analyzes both the rationales offered by courts in denying recov-
ery for such losses and the two major exceptions to the general rule
that have emerged.'° The current status of the business losses rule
is examined in Part IV, and legislative, judicial, and constitutional
reforms that have led to a rejection or restriction of the rule in
some jurisdictions are evaluated." Finally, Part V presents the pol-
icy, economic, and equity arguments in favor of rejecting the tra-
ditional business losses rule.' 2
I. THE PROBLEM DEFINED
The most effective means for conveying the very real and
deleterious consequences that the business losses rule has upon
business owners is to begin the discussion with an example of the
rule in operation. Let us suppose that a sixty-four year old man has
been a pharmacist for over forty years; he, in fact, has never prac-
ticed another profession. For the past twenty-seven years, he has
owned and operated a pharmacy in a low-income, inner-city neigh-
borhood. He draws his clientele from the surrounding area, has
earned the trust and respect of the community, and has become, in
a sense, a neighborhood "fixture."
The city then determines that the area is decaying and is in
need of redevelopment. It formulates an urban renewal project and
property is often taken in condemnation proceedings. When such property is
taken, incidental damages are very apt to occur and in some cases exceed the
fair market value of the actual physical property taken.
47 Wis. 2d at 280, 177 N.W.2d at 385.
A
 See infra'notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 44-119 and accompanying text.
1 ° See infra notes 120-72 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 173-452 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 453-515 and accompanying text.
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condemns a twenty square block area. In so doing, the city not only
takes the pharmacy, it destroys the entire neighborhood. The city
offers the pharmacist the fair market value of the real estate upon
which the pharmacy is located and of his fixtures—an amount to-
taling, say, $50,000.
"But wait!" Our hypothetical pharmacist argues. "I am not
receiving full compensation here. 1 did not own 'real property and
fixtures.' 1 owned a pharmacy business. Yesterday, before the con-
demnation, I could have sold that business for $75,000. Today, the
city has condemned my property, destroyed the neighborhood in
which I operate, and dispersed my client base, yet it offers me only
$50,000 in exchange. I have lost $25,000, the value of the business
I built over the last twenty-seven years, and I have no compensation
to show for it. Moreover, I am sixty-four years old and I have
rheumatoid arthritis. There is no way I can reestablish or relocate
my business. How can this be the (just compensation' the Constitu-
tion mandates?"'s
Unfortunately for our pharmacist, that is precisely the result
that most courts would reach today. This is the business losses rule.
It states that when the government condemns the real property
upon which a business is operated, the owner recovers only the
value of the real property and the fixtures taken." But what of the
numerous other losses associated with the taking of property on
which a business is located? What recovery is allowed for items such
as loss of profits during the relocation period, permanent reduction
in profits because of the loss of an advantageous location, or the
complete destruction of goodwill or going-concern value where a
15 With a few embellishments, these are the facts of Community Redevelopment Agency v.
Abrams. See 15 Cal. 3d at 817-18, 543 P.2d at 908, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 476. For the tale of a
pharmacist who fared somewhat better in similar circumstances, see infra notes 343-47 and
accompanying text (discussing City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions, 143 Mich. App. 808,
373 N.W.2d 219 (1985)).
14 See generally 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 13.3, at p. 13-
182 (rev. 3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter NIcHotsl.
Some states allow evidence concerning a business carried on at the condemned property
to be admitted to show the market value of the property involved, even though they do not
allow recovery for the actual loss of business. E.g., Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Wilmington,
274 A.2d 137, 138 (Del. 1971); City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Constr. Co., 394 S.W.2d
300, 305-06 (Mo. 1965); State ex rel. Dept of Highways v. Robb, 454 P.2d 313, 315-16 (Okla.
1969); State v. Sungrowth VI, Calif. Ltd., 713 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). Not all
states, however, allow such evidence. E.g., A.G. Davis Ice Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 934,
937 (1st Cir. 1966); Kayo Oil Co. v. State, 340 So. 2d 756, 759 (Ala. 1976); Bailey v. Boston
& P. R.R., 182 Mass. 537, 539, 66 N.E.,203, 204 (1903); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n
v. Rogers, 236 Miss. 800, 807, 112 So. 2d 250, 252-53 (1959).
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business cannot be relocated because the owner lacks the capital,
credit, education, or physical health to start anew? The news for
most business owners is grim: they may not recover for such losses,
even though they may find it prohibitively expensive, or even im-
possible, to relocate their businesses in other locations.
Depending upon the definition used by the court involved,
business losses can take a number of forms, including loss of profits,
whether temporary or permanent, loss of goodwill or going-concern
value, and relocation or removal expenses. Perhaps the most trou-
blesome losses, at least in terms of condemnation law, are loss of
goodwill and loss of going-concern value, for these are the losses
that most directly reflect the inherent value of the business. Good-
will and going-concern value are frequently viewed as ephemeral
concepts, however, and therefore undeserving of a remedy. The
failure of many courts and commentators to distinguish between
these two closely-related, but separate, components of business
value contributes to the confusion that marks this area of the law.
"Goodwill" refers to the "'value which inheres in the fixed and
favorable consideration of customers, arising from an established
and well-known and well-conducted business." 5 As one court
noted, "[s]uch excess of value is nothing more than the recognition
that, used in an established business that has won the favor of its
customers, the tangibles may be expected to earn in the future as
they have in the past."'s Because "goodwill" is the value attributable
to the favorable consideration of the customers,' 7
 it can exist even
where the business does not make a profit. 's In recent years, how-
" Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S 287, 313 (1933) (citations
omitted). Judge Story defined "goodwill" as:
(The advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in con-
sequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives
from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other
accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or
prejudices.
STORY, PARTNERSHIP ch. VI, § 99, at 170 (6th ed. 1868).
16
 Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1929),
mid on other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
17
 Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893); In re Brown,
242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926) ("Men will pay for any privilege that gives a reasonable
expectancy of preference in the race of competition. Such expectancy may come from
succession in place or name or otherwise to a business that has won the favor of its customers,
It is then known as good will.") (citation omitted).
'" See, e.g., Engstrom v. Larson, 77 N.D. 541, 560, 44 N.W.2d 97, 108 (1950). The court
stated:
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ever, the definition of "goodwill" has evolved beyond this simple
notion of patronage." For example, for purposes of tax law, good-
will is often defined as the excess earning power of a business, 20 i.e.,
the value of elements such as trade names, trade brands, market
acceptance, and established location that together create an expec-
tancy of earnings in excess of the normal returns on the tangible
assets. 21
"Going-concern value," on the other hand, refers to "the many
advantages inherent in acquiring an operating business as compared
to starting a new business with only land, buildings and equipment
in place."22
 Although goodwill can be measured by "capitalization
[N]either the fact that the business is very profitable or successful, nor that it is
not a very profitable and even a losing business, is the only test of good will .. .
in view of the fact that good will may be said to be a desire of old clients to
resort or return and continue business relations where the clients have been
accustomed to do business.
Id. (quoting Macfadden v. Jenkins, 40 N.D. 422, 444-45, 169 N.W. 151, 156 (1918)). See also
Matthews v. Division of Admin., 324 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The Iowa
Supreme Court distinguished "profits" from "goodwill" as follows:
Profits are the gains realized from trade; good-will is that which brings trade.
A favorable location of a mercantile establishment, or the habit of customers to
resort to a particular locality, will bring trade. This advantage may be designated
by the term "good-will." What the trader gains from the trade so acquired are
profits.
Carey v. Gunnison, 17 N.W. 881, 885 (Iowa 1883).
" See generally Courtis, Business Goodwill: Conceptual Clarification via Accounting, Legal and
Etymological Perspectives, 10 ACCTG. HISTORIANS J., Fall, 1983, at 1.
2° See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241, which states:
The presence of goodwill and its value, therefore, rests upon the excess of net
earnings over and above a fair return on the net tangible assets. While the
element of goodwill may be based primarily on earnings, such factors as the
prestige and renown of the business, the ownership of a trade or brand name,
and a record of successful operation over a prolonged period in a particular
locality, also may furnish support for the inclusion of intangible value.
Id.; see also Danzig & Robinson, Going Concern Value Reexamined, 11 TAX ADVISER 32, 33
(1980) (defining goodwill as "the expectation of earnings in excess of fair or normal return
on the capital invested in tangible assets and certain other means of production").
21 According to one commentator:
[T]he phenomenon of customer loyalty, or habitual return, unaccompanied by
some measure of economic success or potential for excess earnings, does not
indicate the presence of goodwill .... It is only when public confidence, financial
and commercial credit, and the other elements of competitive advantage pro-
duce earnings, or their potential, in excess of normal returns that the element
of goodwill can be isolated.
Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 81
HARV. L. REV. 859, 860 (1968) (footnote omitted). See generally Blaine, Valuation of Goodwill
and Going Concern Value, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1979, at 4, 4-5; Paulsen, Goodwill
and Going Concern Value Reconsidered, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1980, at 10, 10-12;
Danzig & Robinson, supra note 20, at 33-34.
22 Gray Line Bus Co. v. Greater Bridgeport Transit Dist., 188 Conn. 417, 422, 449 A.2d
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of business earnings in excess of a normal industry-wide rate of
return" on the capital assets," going-concern value reflects the en-
hanced value of assets arising from their combination within an
operating business. 24 Going-concern value is created by such factors
as "avoidance of start-up costs, increased operating efficiency, and
increased marketing and administration efficiencies."25 Unlike
goodwill, which reflects the existence or expectation of excess earn-
ings, going-concern value reflects only the ability of a going business
to realize a higher rate of return than a newly established firm. 28
Although the two concepts are intellectually distinct and are
recognized as such in taxation and accounting literature," the courts
often view the distinction as a minor one in the area of eminent
dornain. 28
 In theory, the distinction between goodwill and going-
1036, 1039 (1982) (citations omitted); see also City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S.
180, 202 (1910),
23 Comment, Depreciability of Going Concern Value, 122 U. PA. L. REV, 484, 485 (1973)
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
" In 1933, the United States Supreme Court distinguished between the two concepts
as follows:
This Court has declared it to be self-evident "that there is an element of value
in an assembled and established plant, doing business and earning money, over
one not thus advanced," and that this element of value is "a property right"
which should be considered "in determining the value of the property upon
which the owner has a right to make a fair return." The going value thus
recognized is not to be confused with good will, in the sense of that "element
of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of customers,
arising from an established and well-known and well-conducted business ...."
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Conun'n, 289 U.S. 287, 313 (1933) (citations omitted).
25 Paulsen, supra note 21, at 12. Other commentators noted that "going concern value
is associated with the process of assembling a management and labor organization, acquiring
and assembling an efficient productive plant, conducting preliminary research and devel-
opment, acquiring a source of capital, and developing a marketing operation." Danzig &
Robinson, supra note 20, at 34.
20
 See Conies, Excess. Earnings, Competitive Advantage, and Goodwill Value, J. OF SMALL Bus.
Whir., July 1988, at 22, 29.
" See, e.g., Doernberg & Hall, The Tax Treatment of Going-Concern Value, 52 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 353, 355-57 (1984); Schnee & Cargile, Going Concern Value—A New Intangible?, 15
Tax ADVISER 386, 387 (1984); Wiener, Going Concern Value: Goodwill by Any Other Name?, 33
TAX LAW. 183, 184 (1979); Comment, supra note 23, at 484.
" For example, Justice Marshall of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted:
The difficulty created by trying to distinguish between going value and
good will might well be avoided: Why indulge in a technical difference, which,
from a broad standpoint, is a mere play on words? In a broad sense, good will
is, after all, the value which attends and characterizes a business as a going
industry and has developed and become attached thereto in the course of time.
Why discard an element of property under one name which must he taken back
into another as a matter of justice and of constitutional right?
Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 154 Wis. 121, 155-56, 142 N.W. 476, 487
(1913) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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concern value should vary only the calculations used to determine
the compensation available. 29 If the court or legislature admits that
compensation is available for one of these intangible assets, pro-
vided, of course, that the evidentiary requirements are met, it
should allow recovery for both, because the concepts are analytically
so similar. In practice, however, the courts" and legislatures3 ' often
allow recovery for one of these items without addressing the avail-
ability of recovery for the other. It is often unclear whether they
intend such a dichotomous and inconsistent result, or whether they
consider the two terms to be interchangeable. 32
The terminology used to label these losses can also be confus-
ing. In the literature, business losses may be referred to as either
"consequential damages"33 or "incidental damages."34 The term
"consequential damages" itself is a somewhat ambiguous term in
the eminent domain field." Historically, "consequential damages,"
in the context of condemnation law, denoted losses suffered by a
property owner when either direct government action or private
action authorized by the government resulted in injury unaccom-
29
 The two concepts are valued differently. See generally Blaine, supra note 21; Danzig &
Robinson, supra note 20; Desmond, Valuing the Loss of Business Goodwill, 45 APPRAISAL I 193
(1977) (discussing only valuation of goodwill); Paulsen, supra note 21.
" See, e.g., infra notes 281-311 and accompanying text (Minnesota); infra notes 312-47
and accompanying text (Michigan).
31 See, e.g., infra notes 226-58 and accompanying text (California and Wyoming).
12 In analyzing the cases, I simply adopt the label given the losses by the court involved,
without inquiring into the accuracy of the classification.
33 E.g., Searles & Raphael, Current Trends in the Law of Condemnation, 27 FORDHAM L.
Rev. 529, 546-47 & n.62 (1958-59); Spies & McCoid, supra note 1, at 441; Comment, The
Doctrine of Consequential Loss as Affected by Valuation Formulas, IV LAND & WATER L. REV. 539,
539-40 (1969); Comment, Consequential Damages and "just Compensation" in Federal Condem-
nations, 18 U. Ctn. L. Rev. 349, 349-50 (1950-51).
" E.g., Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The Need for Legislative
Action, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 587, 622 n.l 16 (1967); Comment, Non-Compensable Business Losses in
Eminent Domain Proceedings: A Time for Re-evaluation, 46 Temp. L.Q. 72, 73 (1972); Comment,
Incidental Losses, supra note 1, at 61-62. Some commentators use these two terms interchange-
ably. See, e.g., McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain, 17 MINN. L. Rev.
461, 476, 480-81 (1933).
33 As NICHOLS states:
[consequential damage] means both damage which is so remote as not to be
actionable, and damage which is actionable. Sometimes the term is used to
denote damage which, through [sic] actionable, does not follow in point of time
upon the doing of the act complained of. The term has been characterized as
consequential damage to an actionable degree. The distinction seems to be
between less and more remote damage, and, in the last analysis, seems to be
purely a matter of degree.
4A NrcHots, supra note 14, § 14,01, at p. 14-6 (footnote omitted).
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panied by a physical "taking" of property. 36 The term has since
evolved to include damages occurring when the condemnor takes
only a part of the condemnee's real property, even though such
losses might more properly be called "severance damages."" "In-
cidental damages," on the other hand, "describe nonphysical prop-
erty losses to the condemnee, usually occurring when the entire fee
is taken,"38
 such as removal costs, losses caused by an inability to
relocate a business, interruption of business, or a complete loss of
business altogether. Although these injuries may impose a substan-
tial financial burden on the property owner, he or she generally
does not receive reimbursement for them."
Some cornmentators 4° and courts" do distinguish between con-
sequential and incidental damages and carefully place business
losses in the latter category. The distinction is an important one,
because it acknowledges that business losses do arise from an actual
taking of physical property and are not merely an unintended
consequence of some other type of government action, such as the
use of the police power.42
 The psychological barriers raised by the
term "consequential" should not be underestimated—it is much
easier to deny recovery for unintended losses flowing from a legit-
imate government action that did not rise to the level of a taking
than it is to say that intangible losses resulting from what is unden-
iably a taking are somehow noncompensable. To the extent scholars
and the judiciary misuse or confuse the terms, they obscure the
true nature of the loss. Because the terms often are used inconsis-
36
 See 3 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 1113 (9th ed. 1920);
Rogers, Partial Taking, APPRAISAL J. 393, 394 (1957) (quoting G. SCHMUTZ, CONDEMNATION
APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 127 (1949)). For example, consequential damages historically included
losses resulting from government activities such as removal of lateral support or obstruction
or relocation of highways. See A. JAIIR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUATION AND PROCEDURE
§§ 50-58 (1953). The distinction, however, is by no means clear. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has referred to damages such as future loss of profits and removal
expenses as "consequential losses." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379
(1945).
s' See Comment, Incidental Losses, supra note 1, at 82 n.96. On severance damages, see
generally 4A 141cl-tots, supra note 14, § 14.01[3], at pp. 14-37 to 14-42.
m' Comment, Incidental Losses, supra note 1, at 61 n.4.
36 A. JAHR, supra note 36, 111.
46 See, e.g., l L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN Ch. v n.1 (2d
ed. 1953); Comment, Incidental Losses, supra note 1, at 61-62 & n.4.
4 ' See, e.g., State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823 n.2 (Alaska 1976).
43
 Business losses, thankfully, can be analyzed without delving into the morass known
as "regulatory takings." For a discussion of regulatory takings, see generally Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I: A Critique of Current Takings Clause
Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 (1989).
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tently in the literature and court opinions, it is important to analyze
carefully the actual type of loss the court or commentator is describ-
ing, and not to rely solely upon the label given it.
The law is clear that a physical appropriation of tangible prop-
erty results in a direct taking for which the government owes direct
damages.° Business losses, on the other hand, because of their
intangible nature, pose much more difficult issues. Although these
losses arise directly out of a physical taking, they themselves are
nonphysical in nature, and hence are considered noncompensable
in most jurisdictions. The hodgepodge of imprecise and confusing
terms used in this field makes analysis of these conflicting rules
difficult. It is hardly surprising that, given the lack of intellectual
clarity regarding the fundamental definitions of the key concepts,
the legal rationales underlying the business losses rule are also so
murky.
II.. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE BUSINESS LOSSES RULE
Generally, the two major constraints on the sovereign's use of
the eminent domain power are the public use doctrine and the just
compensation requirement. The public use doctrine, however, has
seldom functioned as a significant safeguard against abuses of the
eminent domain power. A century ago, a cautious judiciary was
hesitant to invoke the public use doctrine to restrain a nation intent
on industrializing. Today, when large-scale takings intended to fos-
ter economic redevelopment and renewal and to bolster decaying
urban centers are common, the public use doctrine provides even
less protection for business owners. Courts have not been sympa-
thetic to business owners' arguments that mass takings designed to
encourage private investment do not satisfy the public purpose
requirement." Thus, aggrieved property owners seeking legal re-
form and redress for their business losses must instead focus atten-
tion upon the nature of the "just compensation" they receive, rather
than the use to which their property will be put by the sovereign.
The problem they face, of course, is that business losses historically
have been excluded from the just compensation equation.
43
 2 NICHOLS, Supra note 14, 6.05.
44 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 910 Mich. 616, 631-35,
304 N.W.2d 455, 458-60 (1981).
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A. The Historical Background of Eminent Domain Law
Most of the early cases involving eminent domain disputes arose
in the state courts, under state constitutional or statutory law. In-
deed, it was not until 1875 that the United States Supreme Court
definitively established that the federal government had an eminent
domain power of its own. 45
 Moreover, until the fifth amendment
limitation on federal takings" was extended to the states under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in 1896, state
takings were seldom reviewed in the federal forum. 47
 The state law
origins of eminent domain law resulted in considerable variety in
the early legal rules. Nonetheless, by the early nineteenth century,
the fundamental principles that form the framework of eminent
domain law today had emerged."
From the outset, the courts recognized that the government's
ability to take private property was an inherent attribute of sover-
eignty.49 The government's right to do so, however, was limited by
45 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 368, 372 (1875) (holding that postal power
includes power to obtain sites for post offices by eminent domain). See generally 1 NICHOLS,
supra note 14, § 1.24 (discussing history and development of federal government's eminent
domain power).
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
47
 See Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Oa. L. REV. 203, 207
(1978); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 599-600 & n.4 (1949).
" See generally Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by the Govern-
ment, 1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (L. Friedman & H.
Scheiber, eds. 1978); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis.
L. REv. 67 (1931); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553
(1972).
49
 None of the early state constitutions explicitly granted the eminent domain power to
the states. Even the fifth amendment to the federal constitution creates a restraint upon
power that is nowhere granted to the federal government. See supra note 46. For a discussion
of the adoption of this clause, see E.F. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 73-77
(1987) and Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 695 (1985).
The condemnation power was well-known in English law at the time, however, and oft-
used in the American colonies as well. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 554-66. Early
proponents of the natural law theory, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Bynkershoek, and
Montesquieu, articulated the notion of eminent domain as an inherent power. See generally
E.F. PAUL, supra, at 74-77; Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 596, 596-601 (1942); Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 559-60. According to the United
States Supreme Court's classic statement, the taking power is a "political necessity," because
Isluch an authority is essential to [the sovereign's] independent existence and perpetuity."
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
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the requirement that the taking be for a "public use" or "public
purpose." Originally, courts interpreted this requirement narrowly
and literally. A legitimate exercise of the eminent domain power
required that the public have an actual right to use the property
after it was taken. 5° The government used early exercises of the
eminent domain power to foster improvements such as the devel-
opment of roads and mills or the drainage of land, 5 ' few of which
gave rise to serious concerns about a lack of public use.
As the nation developed and industry expanded, the eminent
domain power became an increasingly popular tool for obtaining
the land required to build transportation networks and commercial
centers, 52 and the eminent domain power was increasingly delegated
to private enterprises, such as railroad and coal companies. 53 In
order to satisfy the perceived need for public improvements, the
courts began to chip away at the narrow view of public use. 54 They
redefined public use as a "public advantage" or "public benefit,"
and concluded that anything that promoted the growth of industry
contributed to the general welfare of the community and so was a
public use. 55
50
 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.02[1]; Comment, supra note 47, at 603. For example,
the courts upheld mill acts that allowed mill owners to Hood adjacent lands because the acts
required the mills to be kept open to the public. See Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 329, 371-72 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
" 1 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 1.22; 2A id. § 7.01; Horwitz, The Transformation in the
Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 270-78 (1973);
Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 Eavirrt.. L. 1, 13-15
(1980); Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615,
617 (1940).
52 See Meidinger, supra note 51, at 23-41; Comment, supra note 47, at 601-02. Much of
nineteenth century condemnation was carried out by private corporations, such as railroads,
to foster transportation networks. See Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in Early
American Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1263, 1263; Comment, Incidental Losses,
supra note 1, at 65-66.
" See generally Bennett, Eminent Domain and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie,
31 DE PAUL L. REV. 115, 119-22 (1981). The expansion of the use of the eminent domain
power during the Industrial Revolution resulted in a restricted definition of "public use."
See Nichols, supra note 51, at 617-18. Nichols stated:
In the preindustrial America, any fear that eminent domain might be abused
was sufficiently met by the requirement that just compensation be paid. When
great enterprises began to emerge, with masses of capital at their command,
the fear that some legislature's conception of public advantage might lead it to
authorize wholesale expropriation of farms and homes was not so academic.
Id. at 618.
54 See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.02[2]; Horwitz, supra note 51, at 273.
55 For example, in rejecting the "narrow view" of public use, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated:
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The transfer of private property from one individual to an-
other under the eminent domain power became increasingly com-
mon throughout the nineteenth century as the country industrial-
ized and developed.58 The United States Supreme Court ultimately
adopted this broader approach to public use as well." The Court
has repeatedly narrowed the scope of its authority to review a
legislative decision that a taking is for a public use through its
statements that such decisions are entitled to judicial deference. 58
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff that a taking must be upheld if it is "rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose"59 is commonly viewed as
having driven the last nail into the coffin of the public use doctrine."
The prevailing wisdom now is that the "public use" limitation no
longer serves as a substantial restriction on the government's power
to take. 8 '
The second important rule that evolved out of early condem-
nation cases was the requirement that a property owner receive
"just" or "fair" compensation when his or her property was con-
demned. Because the government's right to take was accepted as a
pit is enough if the taking tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial
energies and promote the productive power of any considerable part of the
inhabitants of a section of the state, or leads to the growth of towns and the
creation of new channels for the employment of private capital and labor, as
such results indirectly contribute to the general prosperity of the whole com-
munity.
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 785, 88 P. 426, 431 (1906). See also Note,
Public Use, Private 'Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U.L, REV. 409, 413
(1983) (stating that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "public use" was
generally equated with "public advantage").
" For example, the courts upheld grants of extensive eminent domain powers to railroad
companies, even though the companies were constructing private lines, on the theory that
the construction of transportation networks served the public interest. Bennett, supra note
53, at 119-20.
57 See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (repudiating the "use by the public" test as applied to state takings); see
also Comment, supra note 47, at 609.
58 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("The role of the judiciary in
determining whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is
an extremely narrow one."); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)
(a congressional "act is presumed to be valid unless its invalidity is plain and apparent").
59 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
59 See E.F. PAUL, supra note 49, at 99; Aladjem, Public Use and Treatment as an Equal: An
Essay on Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 677-80 (1988).
el See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 64-71 (of 89 Supreme Court cases on eminent
domain law from 1932 to 1962, only five challenged the public use component).
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given, and because the "public use" requirement was soon emas-
culated by perceived societal exigencies, the requirement of just
compensation became the primary protection for the property own-
er's rights. The business losses issue arises under this rule. What
compensation is due a business owner when the real property on
which the business is located is taken?
Eighteenth-century colonial legislatures most often invoked the
power of eminent domain by means of statutes authorizing the
construction of public roads, 62
 though the power was also delegated
in some instances to private parties for the construction of private
mills or roads or the drainage of lowlands. 65
 In the early years,
however, compensation was generally provided only for enclosed
or improved land.64
 In an undeveloped, unindustrialized nation,
unimproved land was not considered a valuable property right for
which compensation had to be paid. After all, land was readily
available and easily replaced, and improved access was likely to
render the property owner's remaining land much more valuable.
The concept that just compensation was required whenever a
taking for a public use occurred thus developed slowly in American
law. Only three of the original states even addressed the ability of
the government to take private land in their first constitutions; 66
none of them referred to the necessity for compensation. Rather,
" See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 1.22 [1], at p. 1-78; Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 579—
83.
" See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 1.22 [7], [8], [13], [14].
"4
 Note, supra note 49, at 695. Massachusetts did compensate landowners for unimproved
land taken to build state roads. See id. at 695 n.5 (citing relevant acts). Massachusetts, however,
seems to be the exception to the general rule that no compensation was given for unimproved
land. See id. at 695 & n.6 (citing relevant cases and acts); see also Bender, The Takings Clause:
Principles or Politics, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 752-53 (1985); Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 582—
83.
Only the colony of Virginia appears to have regularly taken improved land for roads
without compensation. See Note, supra note 49, at 695 n.6 (citing relevant acts). Virginia did
not provide such payment "until a very late period." Stokes & Smith v. Upper Appomatox
Co., 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 318, 337 (1831). For a description of colonial practices, see also M.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 63-64 (1977); 1 NICHOLS,
supra note 14, § 1.22; Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 579-83.
" These states were Maryland, New York, and North Carolina. See MARYLAND CONST.
of 1776, art. XVII, reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1688 (1909); NEW YORK
CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra, at 2632; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art.
XII, reprinted in 5 F. THORPE, supra, at 2788. Their takings clauses were based on the Magna
Carta, which states: "No free man shall be . . . disseised . . . except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA art. 39; see also Grant, supra note 48,
at 69-70.
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takings were authorized by the legislatures, and compensated only
to the extent those bodies deemed necessary.66 The courts, however,
soon established that the government was required to pay for what
it took, as a matter of "natural law." 67 Today, every state considers
compensation a mandatory accompaniment to condemnation ac-
tions,68 and the United States Supreme Court has read a compen-
sation requirement into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.69
The goal of eminent domain law is to indemnify the condemnee
for the property loss caused by the condemnation-to put the owner
in the same position monetarily as he or she would have been in if
the property had not been taken. 7° This objective is usually accom-
66 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was the first ratified American constitution
to contain a compensation clause. See MASS. CoNsT. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 F.
THORPE, supra note 65, at 1891 ("[W]henever the public exigencies require that the property
of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable com-
pensation therefor."). It was soon followed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which
provided that "should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation,
to take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall
be made for the same." NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787, art. II, reprinted in 2 F. THORPE,
supra note 65, at 961. Several pre-1789 state constitutions had clauses providing that one
could not be deprived of property without the consent of the law of the land. See Stoebuck,
supra note 48, at 568 n.57 (Maryland (constitution of 1776), New York (1777), North Carolina
(1776), and New Hampshire (1784)). Five state constitutions, however, made no mention of
the taking issue at all. See Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 568 n.57 (Delaware (constitution of
1776), Georgia (1777), New Hampshire (1776), New Jersey (1776), and South Carolina
(1776)). Although all but two of the states admitted into the Union later provided for
compensation in their first constitutions, when the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution was enacted, in 1868, five of the original states still had no constitutional provision
regarding takings. See generally I NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 1.3.
The Vermont Constitution of 1777 was the first state constitution to require compen-
sation for takings. See Note, supra note 49, at 702. It provided that "whenever any particular
man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent
in money." VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. 11, reprinted in 6 F. THORPE, supra note 65, at 3740.
See generally Note, supra note 49, at 702-04 (discussing Vermont's 1777 constitution). The
1777 Vermont constitution was passed by the legislature, but was never ratified by the people
of Vermont, although the compensation clause was included in a later constitution, which
was ratified in 1786. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. II, reprinted in 6 F. THORPE, supra note
65, at 3752.
69 See, e.g., In re Mount Washington Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134, 142 (1857); Gardner v.
Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 7.01.
66 This is true even in North Carolina, which has no eminent domain clause in its
constitution, but which nonetheless applies the rules judicially. See Gray v. City of High Point,
203 N.C. 756, 765, 166 S.E. 911, 916 (1932); see also 1 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 1.3.
69 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
T° Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74
(1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (footnote omitted) (the owner is to
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plished by providing the owner with the fair market value of the
property at the time of the taking,'' which is typically measured by
"what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller," 72 taking
into account the uses for which the land is suited." However, the
courts have focused upon compensating the property owner for the
loss of physical property; although incidental losses are acknowl-
edged as real losses that rational owners would factor into their
sales prices, most courts find that these losses are noncompensable. 74
Goodwill and going-concern value are omitted from the fair market
value calculation in most jurisdictions today. As a result, business
owners do not receive true 'just compensation" when the land on
which their businesses are located is condemned.
receive the "full monetary equivalent of the property taken"); see United States ex rel. T.V.A.
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1943).
See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); Almota, 409
U.S. at 473; Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 16-17; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943);
City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915); see also 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 40, § 11-
17 (discussing fair market value as a measure of compensation); E.F. PAUL, supra note 49, at
85 (same). Although the fair market value standard seems to prevail in compensation cases,
the Supreme Court has never held that it is the only constitutionally permissible standard.
See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). In fact, the Court
has deviated from that standard at times. See generally 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 12.01;
Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A Critique of the Fair Market Value Model,
1984 UTAH L. REV. 429, 430-39.
72 United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (quoting Miller,
317 U.S. at 374). Market value is intended to be an objective measure, "not the value to the
owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use." United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946). Fair market value is generally shown through
one of three methods: (1) market data about comparable sales, (2) capitalization of income,
or (3) replacement cost, less depreciation. See generally 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 12.02[1].
" See 4 NicitoLs, supra note 14, § 12.02[1].
74 For example, in United States v. General Motors Corp., the United States Supreme Court
noted that if the owner were actually engaging in a free-market, uncoerced sale to someone
other than the sovereign, the owner would consider losses such as "future loss of profits, the
expense of moving removable fixtures and personal property from the premises, [and] the
loss of good-will which inheres in the location of the land" in setting the price. 323 U.S. 373,
379 (1945). Although the Court recognized that "if the owner is to be made whole for the
loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these elements should properly
be considered," it nonetheless characterized as "sound" the rule prohibiting such compen-
sation when the sovereign takes the fee:
Even where state constitutions command that compensation be made for prop-
erty "taken or damaged" for public use, as many do, it has generally been held
that that which is taken or damaged is the group of rights which the so-called
owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing, and that damage to those
rights of ownership does not include losses to his business or other consequential
damage.
Id. at 379-80 (footnote omitted). Although the Court acknowledged that the consequences
of such a rule are often "harsh," it believed that "whatever remedy may exist lies with
Congress." Id. at 382.
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The rule denying recovery of incidental losses stems from the
restrictive definitions that the courts originally ascribed to the terms
" property" and "taking." The perplexing question is why, when
these terms have evolved over the last century to reflect more ac-
curately the economic realities of property interests and govern-
ment takings, does the business losses rule still persist?
B. The Historical Evolution of the Business Losses Rule
The evolution of the rule denying compensation for business
losses mirrors the economic development of the United States, and
can best be understood within that historical framework. In pre-
revolutionary America, the power of eminent domain was seldom
needed. Very little land was improved or even privately owned, and
"businesses"! were scarce indeed. Thus, whenever condemnation was
necessary, for the building of a road, for example, a literal "taking"
of the land occurred; nonphysical injuries were few, and business
losses rare." Given such a simple economic environment, it is not
surprising that the courts adopted a view of taking. that was based
upon the "physical" nature of property and that denied recovery
of incidental or consequential damages for injury to intangible
property. The rules that developed during these early years have
persisted to the present, coloring still our notions of compensable
injury, despite drastic changes in our economic landscape and a
dramatic increase in the use of the eminent domain power by gov-
ernment entities.
1. The Meaning of "Property"
The federal and most state constitutions address eminent do-
main in terms of private "property" being taken for public use. The
few writings that existed at the time these constitutions were first
drafted addressed the "taking" of "property" without ever defining
what that "property" might be, 76 leaving open the question of
whether the term included noncorporeal property interests, or only
physical property. A few very early cases did allow compensation
for loss of nonphysical property, such as the diversion of water from
75 See Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 279-80, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384-85
(1970); Comment, supra note 47, at 600.
Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 599-600 & n.152.
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land," or the taking of a bridge franchise. 78 However, cases allowing
compensation for noncorporeal property interests were the excep-
tion, rather than the rule. Generally, early takings involved the
physical invasion of lands for projects such as roads and bridges. 79
As a result, the courts developed a narrow definition of "property"
that included within its scope only land or other types of tangible
property. 8°
As economic relationships grew more complex and urban land
became more developed and more valuable throughout the nine-
teenth century," courts began to expand their definition of property
to include the various types of property interests already recognized
in other areas of the law. The courts began to acknowledge that
"property" does not refer to the mere physical res, but rather de-
fines the entire bundle of rights associated with the res. The term
"property" no longer included just the land itself, but encompassed
all of the rights, powers, privileges, and communities that together
form the ownership of land. 82 The transformation to this expanded
" Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
" Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. Proprietors of New-Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H.
35, 69 (1834). The plaintiff in Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Connecticut River Co. also argued for
compensation for the taking of an incorporeal property interest, but the court decided the
case without reaching the issue. 7 Conn. 28, 38-40, 51 (1828).
" See Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 600.
50 See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 434 (1823); Commissioners of
Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21, 32 (1855) (property must be of a "specific, fixed,
and tangible nature, capable of being had in possession and transmitted to another, as houses,
lands, and chattels"), aff'd sub nom., Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84 (1858); Radcliff's Ex'rs
v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195, 206 (1850). As expressed by Chief Justice Gibson of
Pennsylvania:
A constitution is made, not particularly for the inspection of lawyers, but for
the inspection of the million, that they may read and discern in it their rights
and their duties; and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most
familiar to them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that they
are. used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious, and
natural meaning .
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 114 (Pa. 1843). See also Cormack,
Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1931) (discussing how early
state and federal courts thought of "property" in tangible terms); Note, supra note 49, at 708
(noting how James Madison, the author of the fifth amendment, intended that it apply only
to physical takings).
a' See Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 215, 5 N.W.2d 361, 371 (1942).
" See Eaton v. Boston C. & M. A.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). As the same court
recognized in a water overflow case just two years later:
Property in land must be considered, for many purposes, not as an absolute,
unrestricted dominion, but as an aggregation of qualified privileges, the limits
of which are prescribed by the equality of rights, and the correlation of rights
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conception of property occurred in fits and starts, rather than in a
rapid revelation, however."
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
General Motors Corp.,84 recognized the dual meanings of "property,"
and resolved the definitional confusion. In discussing the scope and
meaning of the word "property" as used in the takings clause of
the federal Constitution, the Court rejected the notion that the term
should be "used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized
by law."85 Rather, the Court found that the term is used "in a more
and obligations necessary for the highest enjoyment of land by the entire
community of proprietors .... Property is taken when any one of those
proprietary rights is taken, of which property consists.
Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545, 551-52 (1874) (citation
omitted). See also Old Colony & Fall River R.R. v. Inhabitants of the County of Plymouth,
80 Mass. (14 Gray) 155 (1859). The court noted:
The word "property" in the tenth article of the Bill of Rights, which provides
that "whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual
should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compen-
sation therefor," should have such a liberal construction as to include every
valuable interest which can be enjoyed as property and recognized as such.
Old Colony, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) at 161. See also State ex rd. Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash.
278, 286, 66 P. 385, 388 (1901) (Property "is used in the constitution in a comprehensive
and unlimited sense, and so it must be construed	 It need not be any physical or tangible
property which is subjected to a tangible invasion."); 11 LEWIS, LAw or EMINENT DOMAIN
63 (3d ed. 1909). Bentham identified four particular rights that together make up the
concept of property:
(1) Right of occupation. (2) Right of excluding others. (3) Right of disposition;
or the right of transferring the integral right to other persons. (4) Right of
transmission, in virtue of which the integral right is often transmitted after the
death of.the proprietor, without any disposition on his part, to those in whose
possession he would have wished to place it.
3 WORKS OF BENTHAM 182 (1843).
83 Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 21-22 (1913); see also 2 Nicnots, supra note 14, § 5.01[1] at pp. 5-5 to 5-9. Professor
Hohfeld summarized the imprecise definition given to "property" in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries thus:
Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has no definite or stable conno-
tation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to which various
legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again—with far greater discrimination
and accuracy—the word is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of
legal relations) appertaining to such physical object. Frequently there is a rapid
and fallacious shift from the one meaning to the other. At times, also, the term
is used in such a "blended" sense as to convey no definite meaning whatever.
Hohfeld, supra, at 21-22.
a' See 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
83 Id. at 377.
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accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose
of it." 88 Although the General Motors Court recognized the non-
physical nature of "property," the Court essentially defined the term
in tautological terms in another case handed down the same year:
"But not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those
economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them,
and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to
forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion."B 7
The progression toward a definition of "property" based more
upon legal realities of ownership and less upon the physical nature
of the land was not necessarily an orderly one. The progression
nonetheless did occur, and fundamentally altered the underpin-
nings of eminent domain law. "Property" now refers not only to the
physical res, but also to the bundle of rights that the owner possesses
with respect to that physical res. 88 Property interests are now viewed
as being flexible, as being able to expand and grow in response to
changing societal norms, 89 and as including intangible economic
interests and government entitlements. 9° Although the Supreme
Court has failed to articulate a comprehensive definition of "prop-
erty," 9 ' it has recognized that compensation may be required for
the taking of a number of intangible interests, such as aerial ease-
ea Id. at 378. As the Court went on to explain:
When the sovereign exercises the power of eminent domain it substitutes itself
in relation to the physical thing in question in place of him who formerly bore
the relation to that thing, which we denominate ownership. In other words, it
deals with what lawyers term the individual's "interest" in the thing in question.
That interest may comprise the group of rights for which the shorthand term
is "a fee simple" or it may be the interest known as an "estate or tenancy for
years," as in the present instance. The constitutional provision is addressed to
every sort of interest the citizen may possess.
Id.
87 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,502 (1945).
1" See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8,11-12 (1927) ("Anyone
who frees himself from the crudest materialism readily recognizes that as a legal term
property denotes not material things but certain rights."); Hohfeld, supra note 83, at 22-24.
See generally Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938).
89 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972) ("Property interests . .
are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law
. . ."). See generally Horwitz, supra note 51 passim; Powell, The Relationship Between Property
Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135,139-40 (1963).
90 See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,785-86 (1964).
91 See Peterson, supra note 42, at 1308-16,1344-51.
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ments,92 trade secrets, 95 liens," and contracts." Nonetheless, as dis-
cussed below, the courts generally have not extended this protection
to business interests such as goodwill or going-concern value, de-
spite their status as "property rights" in other areas of the law.
2. The Meaning of "Taking"
Originally, the courts applied a very rigid, narrow definition of
"taking" as well. Both a physical invasion of land and an appropri-
ation of the land by the government to the public use were re-
quired.96 Many courts initially focused upon what the taker had
gained, not what the owner had lost, and so held consequential and
incidental losses noncompensable. 97 Although commentators were
disturbed by the inequities inherent in denying recovery for these
types of injuries," the courts nonetheless found that such losses
were compensable only through legislative grace, not through con-
stitutional mandate. 99 Professor Sedgwick, writing in 1857, sum-
marized the current state of the law thus:
92 See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-68 (1946).
93 E.g., Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
94 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44;46 (1960).
9!
	
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
96 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: "It has ever been confined, in
judicial application, to the case of property actually taken and appropriated by the govern-
ment." Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 430 (1823).
" See, e.g., Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.V. 533, 542-43, 148 N.E. 668, 671, cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925); Spies & McCoid, supra note 1, at 442-43. Many of these early
takings actually involved consequential losses, rather than incidental losses. For example, in
Callender, the city had leveled a street adjoining plaintiff's house in such a way as to weaken
the foundation, thus putting plaintiff to "great expense" in repairing the damage. 18 Mass.
(1 Pick.) at 418. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state constitution
required compensation only in "the case of property actually taken and appropriated by the
government." Id. at 430. Here, the government had taken nothing, even though the injuries
it had inflicted were severe.
" Justice Story registered his doubt that the Callender rule was "easily maintainable,"
upon either "principle or authority." Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 638 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting). His concern was
echoed by Chancellor Kent. See 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN Law *339 n.h. (1848)
(citing, inter alia, Gardner v. Trustees of Newbuigh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)); see
also A. SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462-63 (2d. 1874) (arguing that an
owner should be compensated for consequential damage that diminishes the value of real
estate even though the property is not taken).
" For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1840 that a consequential
injury to property was "no taking at all." In re "The Philadelphia & Trenton H.R.," 6 Whart.
25, 46 (Pa. 1840). Although the state's usual practice was to compensate for consequential
damages, it was done "of favour, not of right;" thus, "the citizen must depend on the forecast
and justice of the legislature" in receiving compensation. Id. (footnote omitted). Although
304	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:283
It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to
protection under [the takings] clause, the property must
be actually taken in the physical sense of the word, and
that the proprietor is not entitled to claim remuneration
for indirect or consequential damage, no matter how se-
rious or how clearly and unquestionably resulting from
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, too
Sedgwick went on to criticize this rule, however, noting that if an
indirect damage diminished the value of real estate, the owner was
deprived of property even if no property was actually taken.'°' Yet
the demand for economic progress and the concern that compen-
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged in a later case that individuals might be
forced to contribute involuntarily private property to the public good, it dismissed the
problem by blithely labeling such losses as "accidental, but unavoidable," and offering the
cold comfort that such "plaintiffs have at least the miserable good luck to know that they
have companions in misfortune: would that it were in our power to afford them more solid
consolation!" Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101, 115 (Pa. 1843). If
a remedy was to be found, it would have to be provided by the legislature, not the courts.
As the Coons court stated:
It is not, therefore, enough to set before us a case of moral wrong, without
showing us that we have legal power to redress it. Beyond constitutional restraint
or legislative power, there is none but the legislative will, tempered by its sense
of justice, which has happily been sufficient, in most cases, to protect the citizen.
Id. at 115.
100
 A. Seocwictt, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519-20 (1857).
101
 According to Sedgwick:
To differ from the voice of so many learned and sagacious magistrates,
may almost wear the aspect of presumption; but I cannot refrain from the
expression of the opinion, that this limitation of the term taking to the actual
physical appropriation of property or a divesting of the title is, it seems to me,
far too narrow a construction to answer the purposes of justice, or to meet the
demands of an equal administration of the great powers of government.
The tendency under our system is too often to sacrifice the individual to
the community; and it seems very difficult in reason to show why the State
should not pay for property of which it destroys or impairs the value, as well
as for what it physically takes. If by reason of a consequential damage the value
of real estate is positively diminished, it does not appear arduous to prove that
in point of fact the owner is deprived of property, though a particular piece of
property may not be actually taken. Objections of the same kind might be urged
to our system of assessment for local improvements, by which, in too many
cases, the only compensation for real estate actually taken, is in an hypothetical
and imaginary benefit conferred. It may be true that if the benefit conferred
by an improvement on adjacent proprietors were not taken into consideration,
some inequality would result; but it seems more conformable to equity, and
indeed to the language of the constitutional clause, that an individual advantage
should be conferred in a few cases on a citizen, than that in many he should be
a direct and certain loser, in consequence of public improvements.
Id. at 524-25 (emphasis in original). Sedgwick noted that "the matter can only be now
remedied by the insertion of carefully drawn clauses in our legislative acts, which shall give
to property the full protection that the constitutional guarantee has failed to secure." Id. at
525.
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sation requirements would forestall development and hinder Amer-
ica's economic expansion fostered this narrow definition of "tak-
ing,"' 02 which had substantial implications for the recovery of
incidental losses. When presented with business losses cases, the
courts theorized that only the land on which the business was located
had been taken, not the business itself, and so no compensation was
due.m3
The broad definition of "property" that evolved in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, necessitated a
broad definition of "taking." If "property" constitutes more than
mere physical res, then "taking" must refer to something more than
mere acquisition of title or occupancy by the government.'" And,
indeed, the courts came to recognize that the term "taking" should
not be construed too narrowly. As the number of uncompensated
losses grew,m the courts began to change their stance,'° 6 spurred
on by two separate legal developments.
'"2 See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 64, at 66, 70-74; Cormack, supra note 80, at 226.
1 °3 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
10, This point was artfully made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in ruling that a
liquor license was "property" that could be "taken:"
"Mo take' means simply to acquire possession or custody when "property" is
viewed from the physical object concept. When "property" is viewed from the
standpoint of the mental or abstract concept, the meaning of "to take" is that
expressed by Shakespeare, when, after the judgment of the court, the Merchant
of Venice says:
"You take my house when you do take the prop That doth sustain by [sic]
house; you take my life When you do take the means whereby I live."
The condemnee in this appeal expressed the same sentiments when testifying
about his liquor license:
"The value of the liquor license represented to me the ability to do business
there. Without it there was nothing there at all, So that the value of the liquor
license became the amount of money I could get for the sale of the business
less whatever equipment was worth."
Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia v. Lieberman, 461 Pa. 208, 214, 336 A.2d 249, 252-
53 (1975) (quoting The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I, line 375). See also I J. LEWIS, supra
note 82, 65. According to Lewis:
Mt may be laid down as a general proposition, based upon the nature of
property itself, that, whenever the lawful rights of an individual to the posses-
sion, use or enjoyment of his land are in any degree abridged or destroyed by
reason of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, his property is, pro
tont°, taken, and he is entitled to compensation,
Id. § 65, at 56 (footnote omitted).
I " Many of these cases arose in the context of flooding and street access cases. See
Cormack, supra note 80, at 226-31; Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 1, at 600; Lenhoff, supra
note 49, at 605-08; Spies & McCoid, supra note I, at 443.
105 See, e.g., Eaton v. Boston C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). The New Hampshire
Supreme Court noted:
To constitute a "taking of property," it seems to have sometimes been held
necessary that there should be "an exclusive appropriation," "a total assumption
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First, the United States Supreme Court began to expand its
definition of "taking." In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,'" the Supreme
Court held that a physical appropriation was not required to sup-
port a taking, but that a destruction of property also gave rise to a
compensable taking, even though the government had not actually
taken title to the land. 1 °8
 Although the Supreme Court ultimately
limited the holding in Pumpelly,i°9
 the case did reduce the physical
of possession," "a complete ouster," an absolute or total conversion of the entire
property, "a taking lof] the property altogether." These views seem to us to be
founded on a misconception of the meaning of the term "property," as used in
the various State constitutions.
Id.
1 °7
 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). In this case, the Court interpreted Wisconsin's consti-
tutional provision on eminent domain, which, like the fifth amendment, provided that "[t]he
property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor." Id.
(quoting Wisconsin's constitution). The Green Bay Company, in constructing a dam autho-
rized under a Wisconsin statute, flooded 640 acres of Pumpelly's land. Id. at 167. In defense
to Pumpelly's action for trespass on the case, the company cited several cases that held that,
because of the state's superior rights to regulate and improve navigation, landowners along
navigable rivers could not recover consequential damages. Id. at 172-74. The Court, however,
noted that although these cases were valid in their proper application, the cases had "gone
to the uttermost limit of sound judicial construction . . . and, in some cases, beyond it." Id.
at 181.
'° Id. As the Court noted, it would produce a:
very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of constitu-
tional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and security
to the rights of the individual as against the government . . . it shall be held
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable
and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction
without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word,
it is not taken for the public use.
Id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original). The Court went on to state:
Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction
upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead
of the government, and make it an authority for invasion of private right under




 The Court limited the holding to cases "where real estate is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial
structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness." Id. at 181. In
later cases, the Supreme Court further limited the scope of recovery by stating that there
was no taking unless the overflow was "the direct result of the structure, and constitutes] an
actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely
an injury to the property." Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146,149 (1924). Although
the Supreme Court briefly flirted with this concept of consequential damages in the navigable
waters area, see United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (reaching the same result as
Pumpelly on similar facts, but under the fifth amendment), it soon developed a complex
mosaic of rules governing when consequential damages would or, more likely, would not be
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connotations of the word "taking" that had predominated until this
time. The transformation did not occur rapidly or evenly, however.
For example, in 1925, in Mitchell v. United States,"° the Supreme
Court held that the federal government was not required to pay
for plaintiff's business losses, even though it had condemned all of
plaintiff's land, which was specially adapted to the growing of corn
of a special grade and quality, and even though plaintiff was unable
to relocate. The Court reasoned that any special value of the land
had already been included in the compensation award, and that the
going-concern value was not "taken" because the condemnor only
needed, and only •eceived, the physical property. in the eyes of the
Court, "[i]f the business was destroyed, [it] was an unintended in-
cident of the taking.""t
Today, courts recognize that property has substantial intangible
aspects, and the word "taking" is now descriptive—a "taking" in-
volves a compensable property interest. Where there is such an
interest, there is a taking. Where there is no such property interest,
there can be no "taking," despite the costs to the owner. Thus, the
existence of a "taking" will depend upon the definition given to
"property."
A second development that emerged at the same time as Pum-
petty had an equally important impact on the expansion of the
recovery for losses by property owners. As the nation industrialized
throughout the nineteenth century, state and local governments
undertook increasing numbers of public projects in an effort to
spur development of the requisite infrastructure. In the latter part
of the nineteenth century, some states, recognizing the deleterious
impact that these public improvement projects could have on pri-
vate landowners, enacted constitutional amendments providing that
private property should be neither taken nor damaged for public use
allowed. See generally E.F. PAUL, supra note 49, at 84-89. For example, the Supreme Court
held in several cases, some decided under state constitutions, see, e.g., Meyer v. City of
Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 95 (1898) (Virginia constitution); Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 U.S. 380, 384, 390 (1894) (Pennsylvania constitution), some under the federal constitu-
tion, see, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897), that, in the absence of
specific legislation, consequential damages did not constitute a taking. The Court distin-
guished Pumpelly on the grounds that it involved "a physical invasion of the real estate of the
private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession." Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99
U.S. 635, 642 (1879). Where the damage complained of "was not the result of the taking of
any part of [the] property ... or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental consequence
of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power," the fifth amendment did not
require compensation. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 275.
110 267 U.S. 341, 343, 346 (1925).
Id. at 545.
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without compensation." 2
 Rapid urban expansion in Chicago
sparked Illinois's adoption of the first such amendment in 1870," 3
and within the next decade, several states followed its lead." 4 The
wisdom of such a provision was hotly debated; 115
 nonetheless, today
approximately one-half of the states have a similar provision." 6
Thus, in addition to compensation for land actually taken, recovery
in eminent domain actions had been expanded to provide compen-
sation where an injury was directly attributable to government ac-
tion even though land had not actually been appropriated."" Yet
" 2
 2A [Victims, supra note 14, § 6.26; see also 18 Am. Jute. Eminent Domain § 136 (1938)
(discussing addition of "or damaged" clauses to state constitutions).
" 3
 2A Nictrots, supra note 14, § 6.26. The amendment was prompted by widespread
dissatisfaction with denial of compensation to landowners damaged by changes in street
grade. See Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, 72-74 (1881). For a review of the history
and purpose of the Illinois provision, see Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1888);
Reardon v. City & County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 501-02, 6 P. 317, 322-23 (1885);
Blincoe v. Choctaw, 0. & W. R.R., 16 Okla. 286, 293-94, 83 P. 903, 906 (1905).
" 4
 These states were: West Virginia (1872), Arkansas (1874), Pennsylvania (1874),
Alabama (1875), Missouri (1875), Nebraska (1875), Colorado (1876), Texas (1876), Georgia
(1877), California (1879), and Louisiana (1879). 2A Nicnots, supra note 14, § 6.26.
" 5
 In deciding a case under the Illinois provision, the Supreme Court summarized the
arguments against allowing such provisions in Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888), as
follows:
It may be [that such a provision), in regard to compensation to owners of private
property "damaged" for the public use, has proved a serious obstacle to mu-
nicipal improvements; that the sound policy of the old rule, that private prop-
erty is held subject to any consequential damages that may arise from the
erection on a public highway of a lawful structure, is being constantly vindicated;
and that the constitutional provision in question is "a handicap" upon municipal
improvement of public highways. And it may, also, be, as is suggested, doubtful
whether a constitutional convention could now be convened that would again
incorporate in the organic law the existing provision in regard to indirect or
consequential damage to private property so far as the same is caused by public
improvements. We dismiss these several suggestions with the single observation
that they can be addressed more properly to the people of the State in support
of a proposition to change their constitution.
Id. at 170.
16
 The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,.
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 6.26.
See, e.g., Reardon, 66 Cal. at 502-04, 6 P. at 323-24; Chicago & W.I. R.R. v. Ayres,
106 III. 511, 518 (1883); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Colonial Inn, Inc., 246 Miss.
422, 431-32, 149 So. 2d 851, 855 (1963); Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 31-32, 72 P.
140, 141 (1903); City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 493, 41 N.W. 295, 296 (1889).
According to Ntcnots:
Under this provision property is damaged when it is made less valuable;
less useful, or less desirable, and it is immaterial whether such damage occurs
by reason of the construction or the maintenance of the project, so long as it is
directly attributable to such causative factor and irrespective of whether or not
there has been an actual physical taking of any part of such property.
2A NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 6.31[2], at pp. 6-218 to 6-219 (footnotes omitted).
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the courts were still concerned that public improvements would be
discouraged by excessive damage awards, and they quickly estab-
lished that recovery would be permitted only where the injury was
significant, peculiar to the affected property, and different in kind
than that suffered by the public as a whole.' 18
 Moreover, the courts
also determined that "damaged" did not refer to injuries to busi-
ness,'" and so business losses continued to go uncompensated.
III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE BUSINESS LOSSES
RULE
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
then, the legal concepts of "property" and "taking" expanded to
provide greater protections for property owners. Yet this expansion
of protected interests explicitly excluded protection of business in-
terests such as going-concern value, goodwill, or profits. A variety
of legal theories left business losses outside the broadening scope
of constitutionally-mandated forms of recovery.
A. Theories for Denying Recovery of Business Losses
Courts that have denied recovery for business losses have es-
poused a number of reasons for doing so. It is difficult to categorize
the vaguely-worded reasoning articulated by some courts. Indeed,
many courts deny recovery for business losses without ever having
clearly explained their reasons for doing so. The traditional ration-
ale given is that a damage to a business is damnum absque injuriain-
"" See Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 1, at 611-12.
19 See, e.g., People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 902, 226 P.2d 702, 710 (1951);
Hohmann v. City of Chicago, 140 III. 226, 230-31, 29 N.E. 671, 672 (1892); Reymond v.
State, 217 So. 2d 488, 492 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Gillespie v. City of South Omaha, 79 Neb.
441, 445, 112 N.W. 582, 584 (1907); Sheridan Drive-1n Theatre, Inc. v. State, 384 P.2d 597,
599 (Wyo. 1963); see also 2A Nicnot.s, supra note 14, IR 6.27 & n.2, 6.31 & n.20 (citing cases
holding that "damaged" did not refer to injury to businesses).
1 " See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,
482-85 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 383 (1945); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925); City of Oakland v.
Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915); Auraria
Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 183 Colo. 441,
445--47, 517 P.2d 845, 847-48 (1974); see also 4 Nictior..s, supra note 14, § 13.3. According
to the California Supreme Court:
['That doctrine [damnum absque infurial means merely that a person may suffer
damages and he without remedy because no legal right or right established by
law and possessed by him has been invaded, or the person causing the damage
owes no duty known to the law to refrain from doing the act causing the damage.
Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 729, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942).
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a harm without an injury-and hence noncompensable. Many
courts are content to limit their analysis to this singularly unenlight-
ening phrase. Closer examination, however, reveals that denial of
recovery is typically based on one of four underlying theories,' 21 all
of which are relics of earlier days when legal theory was less devel-
oped and 'less able to deal with injury to and valuation of noncor-
poreal interests.
First, some courts have held that business damages are not
compensable because the condemnor has actually taken only the
land, not the business.' 22
 These courts reason that the business can
still be carried on elsewhere, and the goodwill or going-concern
value transferred with it without loss of value. 123 Some of the courts
that adopt this rationale theorize that title to all property is held
subject to an implied condition that it must be surrendered when-
ever the public interest requires it, so any unavoidable loss suffered
in See generally 4 Nicnots, supra note 14, § 13.3.
122 See, e.g., Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. McCardle, 243 Miss. 111, 119, 137
So. 2d 793, 796-97 (1962); Ranlet v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 561, 564 (1883); In re People
v. Isaac G. Johnson & Co., 219 A.D. 285, 288-89, 219 N.Y.S. 741, 744-45 (N.Y. App. Div.),
aff'd without op., 245 N.Y. 627, 157 N.E. 885, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927)); Boynton v.
State, 28 Misc. 2d 12, 14-15, 215 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1961); State Airport
Comm'n v. May, 51 R.I. 110, 112, 152 A. 225,225-26 (1930); State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah
2d 442, 445, 491 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1971); see also 1 L. ORGEL, Pra note 40, § 162, at 661
("The fundamental reason for the exclusion of evidence of profits lies in the rule of sub-
stantive law that the condemner takes only the real property, not the business located
thereon.") (footnote omitted).
This theory reached its zenith in 1925, in Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925),
discussed supra notes 110 & 111  and accompanying text. See also United States ex rel. T.V.A.
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282 (1943) ("the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not
for opportunities which the owner may lose"); 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, §§ 13.3, 13.31
(discussing courts' treatment of business interests on land taken); cf. Bothwell v. United
States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920). Bothwell and his partners owned a large tract of land on which
they stored hay and kept cattle. The United States built a dam which flooded the land,
destroyed the hay, and required the partners to sell the cattle "at prices below their fair
value." Bothwell, 254 U.S. at 232. The Supreme Court, in a short, one and one-half page
opinion, stated that "nothing could have been recovered for destruction of business or loss
sustained through enforced sale of the cattle. There was no actual taking of these things by
the United States, and consequently no basis for an implied promise to make compensation."
Id. at 233.
j" See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1949); City & County
of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 183, 493 P.2d 348, 351 (1972) ("[T]he business itself is
not being condemned and the business can be relocated elsewhere."); Gray Line Bus Co. v.
Greater Bridgeport Transit Dist., 188 Conn. 417, 421, 449 A.2d 1036, 1039 (1982); Improved
Parcel of Land v. State, 57 Del. 454, 457, 201 A.2d 453, 454 (1964); City of Trenton v.
Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 477, 109 A.2d 409, 415 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 972 (1955); Banner
Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 540, 148 N.E. 668, 670, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925);
see also Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 Cot.oss. L. Rev. 660, 674 (1953).
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incident to the surrender of that land is not compensable.' 24 Other
courts believe that goodwill or going-concern value cannot be dam-
aged, even though the business has been dislocated.' 25 In the simple
view of these courts, only the physical assets have been taken, and
the owner of the business can simply relocate, taking his or her
goodwill or going-concern value to the new location. 126 They em-
phasize that no compensation is due for any special value of the
property to the owner, thus implying that goodwill and going-
concern value are not transferable, but are of value only to the
owner' 27 and ignoring the fact that such business interests are rou-
tinely bought and sold in the marketplace. These courts typically
deny recovery even if the business owner can clearly show that the
business cannot be reestablished elsewhere.' 28
A second theory holds that business losses are noncompensable
because of their speculative nature. This theory also takes two sep-
arate forms. Some courts believe that the injury itself is specula-
tive—that there is only a "remote possibility that the owner will be
unable to find a wholly suitable location for the transfer of going-
concern value." 129 Likewise, these courts consider profits as being
dependent more upon the owner's efforts than the land itself, and
thus they regard the loss of profits resulting from a taking as being
speculative.' 30 These courts firmly believe that the great majority of
124 E.g., Ranlet v, Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 561, 564 (1883); see also 4 NIcitots, supra note
14, § I 3.32[11 & nn. 1 & 2, at p. 13-228. This argument, of course, ignores the constitutional
mandate that just compensation be given for a taking.
125 This is, in fact, precisely the rationale espoused by the United States Supreme Court
in Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 11-12. See infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 12 ("In the usual case most of it can be
transferred . . . ."); Banner Milling, 240 N.Y. at 540, 148 N.E. at 670 ("The owner of the
business may remove to another place, establish his business and carry his good will with
him."). In In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
"A good plumber should be able to continue his business in almost any location and do as
well as he formerly did in a neighborhood where in many homes there was a lack of adequate
plumbing facilities." 306 Mich. 638, 651, 11 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1943). Michigan law has since
recognized some claims for business losses. See infra notes 312-47 and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co,, 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946) ("Since
'market value' does not fluctuate with the needs of condemnor or condemnee but with
general demand for the property, evidence of loss of profits, damage to good will, the expense
of relocation and other such consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation pro.
ceedings.") (citations omitted); see also Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 12 (citations omitted); I
L. ORwtL, supra note 40, § 75, Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 634 (citing 2 J. LEWIS, supra
note 82, § 706; 1 L. ORCEL, supra note 40, § 75).
ism See, e.g., Amoskeag-Lawrence Mills, Inc. v. State, 101 N.H. 392, 399, 144 A.2d 221,
226 (1958) (citing United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 283 (1943)).
' 29 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 15.
00 See, e.g., 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 13.3[21; I L. ORCEL, supra note 40, § 162.
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diligent business owners will be able to relocate with little or no loss
of value.'3 '
The second variant of this theory postulates that business losses,
though admittedly likely to occur, are so difficult to value and so
speculative and uncertain in amount that the court cannot award
recovery for them.' 32
 This argument frequently arises in the context
of compensation for loss of goodwill or loss of profits. Some courts
adopting this theory find that the components that together create
goodwill or profits, such as consumer demand and supplies of labor
and raw materials, are too difficult to value individually, and there-
fore cannot be valued in the aggregate.'" In cases denying recovery
15' Statistics suggest that this assumption is false. A study conducted in the early 1960s
revealed that 35.3% of displaced businesses discontinued their operations, largely because of
"Nile inability of many small (one or two person) tenant businesses to transfer their 'good
will' to a relocation site . . . ." U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS, RELO-
CATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BUSINESSES DISPLACED BY GOVERNMENTS 54
(1965). A congressional study of the effects of urban condemnation in Washington, D.C.
during the same time period revealed that 83 of 211 businesses in one project site were
permanently discontinued after condemnation. Of the remaining businesses, 53 suffered
large losses of income, usually 25% or more of former net income. Not surprisingly, small
businesses suffered the most: 60% of them discontinued operations permanently, and many
of them suffered disproportionately greater out-of-pocket losses. Small businesses that rented
their premises rather than owning them experienced the greatest losses. STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMPENSATION & ASSISTANCE FOR
PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS IN FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED PROGRAMS
473-85 (Comm. Print. 1964).
12 See, e.g., Powelson, 319 U.S. at 285; Jacksonville & S.E. Ry. v. Walsh, 106 Ill. 253,
255-56 (1883); State v. Heslar, 257 Ind, 307, 314-15, 274 N.E.2d 261, 266 (1971); Ryan v.
Davis, 201 Va. 79, 82, 109 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1959). The New York Court of Appeals stated:
While it may be as in this case that removal from one place to another may
cause some loss, yet the elements making up that loss are so highly speculative
that the courts have not considered it an appropriation or damage for which
the State should pay as commanded by the Constitution.
Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 540, 148 N.E. 668, 670, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582
(1925). See also 4 NIcHot.s, supra note 14, f 13.3121; Note, The Unsoundness of California's Non-
compensability Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 675,
681-85 (1969); Comment, Incidental Losses, supra note I, at 71.
1 " See, e.g., A.G. Davis Ice Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 934, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1966);
Stockton & C. R.R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139, 140 (1874); Pause v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92,
105, 26 S.E. 489, 493 (1895); Braun v. Metropolitan W.S. Elevated R.R., 166 Ill. 434, 440,
46 N.E. 974, 976 (1897); Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n,
258 Iowa 897, 904, 140 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1966); City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Constr.
Co., 394 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Mo. 1965); Verzani v. State Dep't of Rds., 188 Neb. 162, 164-65,
195 N.W.2d 762, 765 (1972); Ranlet v. Concord R.R., 62 N.H. 561, 564 (1883); State ex rd.
State Highway Comm'r v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 587, 202 A.2d 401, 403 (1964); Boynton v.
State, 28 Misc. 2d 12, 14, 215 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1961); City of Tacoma v.
Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 434, 107 P. 199, 204 (1910); cf. City & County of Denver
v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 183, 493 P.2d 348, 351 (1972) ("Financial success in business is also
too ephemeral and is tied to considerations involving the type of business which is being
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of loss of profits, other courts state that because income is depen-
dent upon the skill of the business owner or operator, it is too
speculative to make the loss capable of reasonable ascertainment, 134
or that proof of loss of future profits or future business "is too
remote, uncertain, and speculative to be allowed." 36 Awarding re-
covery for such uncertain damages could create a chink in the
elaborate armor that courts have erected around the exercise of the
eminent domain power, raising the possibility of excessive and un-
warranted recovery in the future. 186
Commentators have routinely and roundly lambasted this ra-
tionale, noting that courts have little difficulty in valuing goodwill
in litigation between private parties or for tax purposes."' More-
over, because courts regularly value such ephemeral damages as
pain and suffering or emotional distress, it is difficult to understand
why they cannot value goodwill,' 38 particularly given the recent
developments in comprehensive accounting guidelines for doing
so.'" Nonetheless, courts still employ this theory as a reason for
denying recovery.
conducted,. management, and a variety of other factors which are not tied to the land."); 1
L. ORGEL, supra note 40, 162, at 662 ("[T]he courts have generally stated that business
profits are the result of so many factors and that their repercussion on the market value of
the real estate is so remote, that the evidence is more likely to mislead than to aid in the
determination of market value.") (footnote omitted).
"4 A.G. Davis Ice Co., 362 F.2d at 937; Commonwealth v. Eubank, 369 S.W.2d 15, 17
(Ky. 1963); Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 459, 99 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1951); cf.
Norman's Kill Farm Dairy Co. v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 578, 582, 279 N.Y.S.2d 292, 297 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating that the factors of skilled management and goodwill were not affected
by the appropriation of claimant's property).
laa Cincinnati Iron Store Co. v, Trustees, Cincinnati S. Ry., 9 Ohio C.C. Dec. 103, 104
(1906); see also In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 174 Ohio St. 441,
447, 190 N.E.2d 446, 450-51 (1963); City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash.
App. 364, 369, 512 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1973); Gauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 493,
100 S.E. 290, 292 (1919).
"a See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945) (Douglas,
J., concurring in part) ("promises swollen verdicts"); Housing Auth. v. Green, 200 La. 463,
474, 8 So. 2d 295, 299 (1942); Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245, 247, 65 N.E.2d 52,
53 (1902); Natick Gas Light Co. v. Natick, 175 Mass. 246, 252, 56 N.E. 292, 294 (1900); In
re Slum Clearance, 332 Mich. 485, 496, 52 N.W.2d 195, 200 (1952); Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 240 N.Y. 533, 540, 148 N.E. 668, 670, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925); Cleveland Boat
Serv., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 165 Ohio St. 429, 430, 136 N.E.2d 274, 275 (1956).
"7 See, e.g., Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 1, at 628-29; Kanner, supra note 1, at 67-68;
Comment, Incidental Losses, supra note 1, at 71. For a discussion of the recovery of lost profits
in tort and contract litigation, see generally R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS
(3d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1990); 16 PROOF OF FACTS 2D, Forensic Economics-Valuation of Business
and Business Losses (1978 & Supp. 1990).
"8 See Kanner, supra note 1, at 72.
w See generally D. KIESO & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 544-53 (6th ed.
1989); Blaine, supra note 21; Paulsen, supra note 21; Schnee & Cargile, supra note 27.
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The third theory argues that "a business is less tangible in
nature and more uncertain in its vicissitudes than the rights which
the Constitution undertakes absolutely to protect.""° This theory
originally arose out of the notion that the rights of the property
owner did not inhere in intangible interests, such as goodwill or
going-concern value. In a sense, courts relying upon this theory
view the entire business, as opposed to merely the business losses,
as speculative and uncertain in value. To them, goodwill and going-
concern value are not "property" in the "constitutional sense,""'
i.e., the property interests to which incidental losses pertain are not
property rights vis-a-vis the government. 142
 Some of these courts
acknowledge that these types of losses do occur and can inflict severe
hardships on the owners, but nonetheless find the losses to be
noncompensable. 143
 These courts draw a distinction between the
relationship between the individual property owner and the gov-
ernment and the relationship among private individuals;' 44
 conse-
"° Sawyer, 182 Mass, at 247, 65 N.E. at 53; see also Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams,
15 Cal. 3d 813, 819-20, 543 P.2d 905, 909-10, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477-78 (1975) (quoting
4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 13.3), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976); 27 AM. Jim. 2n Eminent
Domain 285 (1962) ("The diminution of [a business's] value is a vaguer injury than the
taking or appropriation with which the Constitution ordinarily deals.").
14 i As one court phrased it, "[a] business is not 'property' in the constitutional sense;
and the value of a business is not material to the issue of just compensation, except insofar
as it may tend to establish the market value of the real property." State ex rel. Secretary of
Dep't of Highways & Transp. v. Davis Concrete of Delaware, Inc., 355 A.2d 883, 886 (Del.
1976); see also Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1898); Sullivan v.
Associated Billposters & Distrib., 6 F.2d 1000, 1011 (2d Cir. 1925); Jamesson v. Downtown
Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1975) (citing Backus); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240
N.Y. 533, 542, 148 N.E. 668, 671, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925); cf. State ex rel. LaPrade
v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 429, 433, 114 P.2d 891, 893 (1941) ("[I]njury to a business is not property,
within the meaning of the statutes relating to eminent domain, unless there is some express
statutory provision allowing it . . ."); Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141,
146, 113 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1960); 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 13.3 n.1, at pp. 13-180 to 13-
181; cf. Kayo Oil Co. v. State, 340 So. 2d 756, 759 (Ala. 1976) ("Business profits are so remote
from the market value of the land on which the business is located, that they are not proper
indicia of the value of the land.").
142
 Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 1, at 603-04. As noted by this pair of commentators,
"Lain individual's economic claim that is given legal protection in conflicts with other individ-
uals is a property right as against them, but the same economic claim may not be entitled to
protection against the government, and as against the government it may not be a property
right at all." Id. at 603 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S.
499, 502-03, 510 (1945)); see also 1 L. ORM, supra note 40, § 2, at p. 11-112.
145 See, e.g., Sawyer, 182 Mass. at 247, 65 N.E. at 53 ("There are many serious pecuniary
injuries which may be inflicted without compensation . . . No doubt a business may be
property in a broad sense of the word, and property of great value . . . But a business is
less tangible in nature and more uncertain in its vicissitudes than the rights which the
Constitution undertakes absolutely to protect.").
144
 See, e.g., Willow River Power, 324 U.S. at 509-10; City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J.
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quently, they find that although losses in the latter instance may be
compensable, losses in the first instance are not. 15
The fourth theory states that such losses are not within the
contemplation of the eminent domain clause of the constitution,
whether state or federal. The federal constitution, according to this
view, does not require compensation for the taking of purely per-
sonal property, because such property can be moved from the con-
demned site and used elsewhere by the owner. 145 According to this
argument, if no compensation is due for tangible personal property,
then surely no compensation is due for losses to intangible property
incidental to a relocation of a business."'
B. Exceptions to the Business Losses Rule
Clearly, the denial of recovery for business losses can work
grave injuries on business owners. To ameliorate these injuries, the
courts have formulated two major exceptions to the rule that busi-
ness losses are not compensable: cases involving temporary takings
and cases involving businesses taken to be operated as such under
public control. The Supreme Court created the former and de-
Eq. 527, 536-38, 133 A. 875, 879 (1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 757, aff 'd sub nom. City of
Newark v. Cook, 100 NJ. Eq. 584, 135 A. 916 (1927).
14,
 For example, the California legislature and Supreme Court acknowledged that good-
will is recognized as a property interest under California statutory law. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 655 (West 1982) ("[t]here may be ownership of all inanimate things which are capable of
appropriation or of manual delivery[:] . . . the good-will of a business"); CAL. Bus. & PaoF.
CODE § 14102 (West 1987) ("The good will of a business is property and is transferable.");
see also In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584-85, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53-54
(1974) (marital law); Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 527-28, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-
34 (1966) (contract); Carrey v. Boyes Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 618, 622-
23, 54 Cal. Rptr. 199, 202 (1966) (allowing damages for loss of goodwill in private tort action).
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court stated that goodwill "is not the form of property
to which constitutional provisions requiring just compensation refer." Community Redev.
Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 545 P.2d 905, 909, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
I " See Becker v. Philadelphia & R.T. R.R., 177 Pa. 252, 258, 35 A. 617, 620 (1896). But
see 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 13.3 n.17 (quoting Kanner, Business Damages in Eminent
Domain, ALI/ABA Eminent Domain Study Course 369, 369 (1978)). Kanner noted:
(The notion that "property" means real property is linguistically as well as
logically and historically fallacious; there is ample historical evidence that the
draftsmen of the Fifth Amendment's just compensation clause were overtly
concerned with protecting personal property from uncompensated governmen-
tal seizure (i.e., they were concerned about such things as taking of horses,
fodder and provisions for the army).
Id.
147 See Cauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 494, 100 S.E. 290, 292 (1919).
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scribed the latter in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States' 48 and, iron-
ically, in so doing, gave one of the clearest explications to date of
the general rule denying recovery for business losses.
In Kimball, the Laundry, a family-owned business, had operated
for many years and had a large, modern plant. During World War
II, the United States government temporarily condemned the plant
on a year-to-year basis for use by the Army. It ultimately held the
plant from November 1942 to March 1946. The Army retained
most of the Laundry's employees to run the plant, and one of the
owners remained as operating manager. Without the use of its
facility, the Laundry was unable to serve its own customers, and was
forced to suspend its business while the Army was in possession.
The Laundry contended that it was entitled to compensation for
destruction of the Laundry's "trade routes," 149 because that destruc-
tion had diminished the value of its business. The trial and appeals
courts rejected this claim, the latter noting: "The Government did
not take or intend to take, and obviously could not use, the Com-
pany's business, trade routes or customers."'"
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the defi-
nition of "going-concern value." Because the Laundry had already
been compensated for the loss of its physical property, "any separate
value that its trade routes may have must therefore result from the
contribution to the earning capacity of the business of greater skill
in management and more effective solicitation of patronage than
are commonly given to such a combination of land, plant, and
equipment." 151
 The intangible nature of going-concern value alone
was not sufficient grounds for denying compensation. As Justice
Frankfurter explained, intangible property, like tangible property,
is capable of being "taken" and, if so taken, should be compensa-
ble.'52
 Having thus determined that going-concern value can be a
"8 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
"9 These trade routes consisted of "the lists of customers built up by solicitation over
the years and for the continued hold of the Laundry on their patronage." Id. at 8.
15°
 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 166 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 338
U.S. 1 (1949).
"' 338 U.S. at 9.
"2 Id. at 11. The Supreme Court cited three cases in support of its contention that
going-concern value is a compensable property right, each of which involved the computation
of a fair rate of return on a public utility or service. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.,
272 U.S. 400, 415 (1926) (going-concern value is a property right and must be considered
in determining rate water company may charge); Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston,
258 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1922) (although going-concern value must sometimes be compensated
for if taken, it does not affect computation of fair rate of return for street car company);
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compensable property right, the Court went on to discuss the cir-
cumstances under which compensation is required.
The Kimball Court first considered the case in which the fee
title to business property has been taken. In such an instance, the
going-concern value has not been taken; only the physical property
is condemned, and the owner is free to relocate his or her busi-
ness.'" The Court conceded that the owner might suffer losses
because of the difficulty of finding a suitable new location, and that
such losses are noncompensable.' 54 The Court believed, however,
that a buyer of the business would not pay for the dissipation of
goodwill caused by removal, "except perhaps to the extent that the
prospect of its loss would induce the owner to hold out for a higher
price for his land and building." 55
 Thus, the Court reasoned:
When a condemnor has taken fee title to business prop-
erty, there is reason for saying that the compensation due
should not vary with the owner's good fortune or lack of
it in finding premises suitable for the transference of
going-concern value. In the usual case most of it can be
transferred; in the remainder the amount of loss is so
speculative that proof of it may justifiably be excluded.' 56
Furthermore, the Court noted, the same result occurs even when
it is known that no other premises are available.'"
The Kimball Court then discussed the situation in which the
government has taken a business enterprise for continued opera-
tion.' 58 The Supreme Court had first addressed this issue in 1892,
in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States. 159 In Monongahela, a
company had been granted a state charter to construct and operate
locks on the Monongahela River. The federal government took the
locks and continued to operate them as an ongoing operation, but
the legislation authorizing the taking explicitly stated that the com-
pany was to receive no compensation for the loss of its franchise to
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915) (going-concern value is
a property right and should be taken into account in determining value of property on which
gas company has a right to make a fair return).
155
 338 U.S. at 11; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the theory that goodwill and going-concern value can be transferred without a loss in value.
1 " 338 U.S. at 11-12 (citing Joslin Mfg. Co. v, City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676
(1923)).
1" Id, at 12 (citation omitted).
1" Id, (citation omitted).
'" Id. (citing Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 343, 346 (1925)).
156
	 at 12-13.
159 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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collect tolls.' 6° The Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment
required that the owner be provided with the "full and perfect
equivalent" of appropriated private property. 161 The Monongahela
Court emphasized that under these facts, the owner was entitled to
recover compensation for the loss of its franchise to collect tolls,
because that franchise was an integral part of the property's value
to the owner.' 62
By the time the Kimball Court addressed this issue, a half cen-
tury later, it could examine a number of precedents, particularly in
the public utility area. 163 The Kimball Court emphasized that because
of the monopolistic nature of public utilities, the going-concern
value is necessarily lost when the business is taken.'" The condem-
nor has taken over the control and operation of the business, which
includes not only the physical assets of the business, but the goodwill
or going-concern value as well.' 6' The fiction that the condemnee
is able to take its goodwill or going-concern value and relocate
elsewhere cannot be maintained under these circumstances. 166
Thus, when a business itself is taken by the public to be operated
under public control, the business owner may recover for loss of
goodwill or going-concern value of the business.' 67
The Laundry's circumstances, the Court decided, more closely
resembled the public utility cases than the cases where a fee interest
160 Id at 313.
161
 Id. at 326.
165
 Id. at 329.
'83
 338 U.S. at 12 (citing City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1910); City
& County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 191 (1918)).
164 Id. at 12-13.
166 Id. at 13 ("The owner retains nothing of the going-concern value that it formerly
possessed; so far as control of that value is concerned, the taker fully occupies the owner's
shoes."); see also 4 NIcttcns, supra note 14, 13.31, at p. 13-221.
'w As noted by the New York Court of Appeals, "[[]here is a marked distinction between
the instances where the State appropriates a public service corporation and all its business
and good will as a going concern intending to continue its operations as a public enterprise,
and those instances where the State desires the land and not the business." Banner Milling
Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 539-40, 148 N.E. 668, 670 (citations omitted), cm. denied, 269
U.S. 582 (1925); see also Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. at 191-92; Omaha Water Co., 218
U.S. at 202-03; In re Park Street (Lido Blvd.), Town of Hempstead, 71 Misc. 2d 554, 561—
62, 564, 336 N.Y.S.2d 566, 574-75, 576-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 43 A.D.2d 45, 349
N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff'd sub. nom., Colony Beach Club, Inc. v. County of
Nassau, 39 N.Y.2d 958, 386 N.Y,S.2d 886, 353 N.E.2d 849 (1976).
' 67 As the Kimball Court stated:
The rationale of the public-utility cases, as opposed to those in which circum-
stances have brought about a diminution of going-concern value although the
owner remained free to transfer it, must therefore be that an exercise of the
power of eminent domain which has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner
of the going-concern value of his business is a compensable "taking" of property.
338 U.S. at 13 (citations omitted). See also Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. at 202-03,
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in business property had been taken. 168 Even if the Laundry had
had sufficient funds to set up a new plant without selling the old
plant, it would have been left with two facilities when the temporary
taking ceased. The trade routes themselves could not have been
sold from year-to-year, nor could they have been transferred for a
limited time and then regained by the Laundry. Thus, the govern-
ment's temporary taking effectively eliminated the Laundry's ability
to profit from its trade routes during the government's occupancy
of its premises. 169
The Court therefore concluded that a distinction should be
drawn between a permanent taking of a fee simple to business
property and a temporary taking of the same.'" The Court viewed
it as highly probable that the owner would be able to transfer the
going-concern value in the first instance, and believed that any losses
resulting from the owner's inability to do so would be "specula-
tive."'" The likelihood that the owner would be able to effect a
temporary transfer of going-concern value during a temporary tak-
ing, however, was so remote as to give rise to a requirement for
compensation: "The temporary interruption as opposed to the final
severance of occupancy so greatly narrows the range of alternatives
open to the condemnee that it substantially increases the condem-
nor's obligation to him. It is a difference in degree wide enough to
require a difference in result."'"
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE BUSINESS LOSSES RULE: THE TREND
TOWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION
The general rule, then, is that business losses are noncom-
pensable. This rule has been subject to harsh criticism, however,' 73
168 338 U.S. at 14.
169 Id.
"0 Id. at 14-15.
I" Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
172 Id. at 15 (citations omitted). Although compensation was allowed in Kimball Laundry,
the Court was sharply divided, with four justices dissenting. Justice Douglas, writing for the
dissent, found it "a mystery" why compensation would be allowed in a temporary taking that
diminished the value of trade routes, but would be prohibited where such value was destroyed
by a permanent taking. Id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his view, because the government
did not want, and could not use, the laundry's trade routes, it was not required to pay for
them. Id. at 23-24. He believed that the majority's rule forced the government to pay not
for what it received, but for what the owner had lost. That, however, was precisely the result
that the majority had intended: "Since what the owner had has transferable value, the
situation is apt for the oft-quoted remark of Mr. justice Holmes, 'the question is what has
the owner lost, not what the taker has gained.'" Id. at 13 (quoting Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
'78
	 e.g., sources cited supra, note I.
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and that criticism has intensified dramatically in recent years. As a
result, several jurisdictions have started to temper, or even elimi-
nate, the business losses rule, through either legislative or judicial
means, or, in the case of Louisiana, through constitutional reform.
These new developments are described below, and serve as the
foundation for the analysis in Part V.
A. Legislative Reform
Many of the courts denying recovery for business losses have
sharply criticized the rule, but have concluded nonetheless that any
remedy must be legislative, rather than judicial, in nature. 14 State
legislatures clearly are empowered to authorize recovery for busi-
ness losses created by the acquisition of land by the state or any of
its entities, 175 and several of them have chosen to do just that. In
the early part of the century, such legislation took the form of
special statutes designed to alleviate specific intrusions; in recent
years, several states have enacted more comprehensive legislation
designed to address a broader range of problems. 16 Yet all of these
174 See, e.g., Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal
Auth., 183 Colo. 441, 446, 517 P.2d 845, 847-48 (1974); Department of Transp. v. Fortune
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 532 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1988).
1" See, e.g., Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63 N.E. 10 (1902). In Earle. the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted:
The test of what may be required to be paid for if destroyed or damaged under
the power of eminent domain, is not whether the same thing could have been
sold, nor is it whether the destruction or harm could have been authorized
without a provision for payment. Very likely the plaintiff's rights were of a kind
that might have been damaged if not destroyed without the constitutional
necessity of compensation. But some latitude is allowed to the Legislature. It is
not forbidden to be just in some cases where it is not required to be by the
letter of paramount law.
Id. at 582-83, 63 N.E. at 10. See also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973)
("Congress may ... provide in connection with condemnation proceedings that particular
elements of value or particular rights be paid for even though in the absence of such provision
the Constitution would not require payment."); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262
U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923) ("[W]hile the legislature was powerless to diminish the constitutional
measure of just compensation, we are aware of no rule which stands in the way of an
extension of it, within the limits of equity and justice, so as to include rights otherwise
excluded."); People ex rel. Burhans v. City of New York, 198 N.Y. 439, 446, 92 N.E. 18, 20
(1910) ("'That, as the right to exercise the power of eminent domain must proceed from
legislative authority, the Legislature may require more liberal compensation than that which
would satisfy the constitutional requirement, but it cannot direct that anything less than just
compensation shall be made.") (quoting In re Water Front in New York, 190 N.Y. 350, 354,
83 N.E. 299, 300 (1907)).
17'1 In the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4602-55 (1988) (the "Act"), Congress sought to afford aggrieved
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statutes reflect legislative compromises. None of them provide com-
prehensive recovery for business owners. Rather, in each instance,
we see the legislatures picking and choosing among categories of
aggrieved landowners, offering compensation (usually quite limited
in scope) to some and denying it to others.
1. The Water Supply Acts
Around the turn of the century, several eastern states built
large reservoirs to provide adequate water supply to their popula-
tions. Many of these projects flooded entire towns or villages. The
states naturally compensated the property owners for their land in
accordance with state constitutional provisions, but the losses suf-
fered went much further than that. Not only was the business
owner's business physically destroyed, but his or her goodwill and
going-concern value were undeniably destroyed as well, because the
clientele's land was also taken and the customer base scattered.m
Although the constitutions of these states did not mandate
compensation for these business losses, many plaintiffs nonetheless
property owners at least some recompense in federal takings. The stated purposes of the
Act were to put the property owner in the same economic position as he or she would have
been in absent the condemnation, see id. § 4621, and to encourage the property owner to
settle voluntarily with the United States government, thereby reducing the federal courts'
caseload in determining just compensation. Id. § 4651.
The Act gives a "displaced person," defined as one who moves from real property, or
moves personalty from real property, as a result of the acquisition of the real property for a
program undertaken by the federal government or undertaken with federal financial assis-
tance, id. § 4601(6), two options. The business owner can recover actual expenses, consisting
of: (1) reasonable moving expenses; (2) direct losses of tangible personal property, limited
to the amount it would have cost to relocate such property; and (3) reasonable expenses
incurred in searching for a replacement business. Id. § 4622(a). Alternatively, the owner may
recover a fixed amount (of not less than $2,500 or more than $10,000) equal to the average
annual net earnings, defined in 4622(c) of the Act, of the business, provided the federal
agency involved determines:
(I) The business cannot be relocated without a substantial loss of its existing
patronage;
and
(2) The business is not part of a commercial enterprise having at least one other
establishment that is not being acquired by the United States, which is engaged
in the same or similar business.
Id. § 4622(b). A number of states have enacted similar statutes allowing the same limited
recovery. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13a-73, 13a-76a (West 1988 & Supp. 1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1203 to –1205 (1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-6.1 to –6.3 (1984); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 32.19 (West 1989). See generally 6A Nicnots, supra note 14, §§ 341-34.3;
Annotation, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 33
A.L.R. Fan. 9 (1977 & Supp. 1990).
197 See generally Sackman, Business Damages—New Concerns, 1977 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING,
& EMINENT DOMAIN 255, 278-79.
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were able to seek relief under statutory provisions enacted to alle-
viate the extreme hardship inflicted upon business owners.' 78 The
legislatures tended to provide rather broad forms of recovery to
business owners, and the courts tended to be generous in meting
out recoveries.' 79 The governmental entities required by these stat-
utes to pay compensation protested, arguing that the payment of
these damages exceeded the constitutional requirements of just
compensation. The courts quickly established, however, that the
state constitutions set minimum, not maximum, requirements for
just compensation, and that the legislatures were free to mandate
higher compensation if they so desired.' 8°
Thus, early precedent existed for statutory provisions provid-
ing recovery for business losses suffered as a result of condemnation
actions. These statutes provided for compensation for business
losses arising only out of relatively specific, narrow circumstances,
however, limited in both geographic application and in duration.
Much more interesting are the statutes that several states have
enacted in recent years. Although these new statutes apply to some-
what broader circumstances, they tend to provide less comprehen-
sive relief than these early water supply statutes.
2. Florida
In 1933, Florida became the first state to pass a statute allowing
recovery of business losses that was not project-specific. 181 The Flor-
1 " See, e.g.,Joslin Mfg., 262 U.S. at 675 (Rhode Island statute); City of Oakland v. Pacific
Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915) (not allowing damages
for goodwill because California statute did not recognize such losses); Whiting v. Common-
wealth, 196 Mass. 468, 470, 82 N.E. 670, 671 (1907) (Massachusetts statute); In re Board of
Water Supply, 211 N.Y. 174, 179-81, 105 N.E. 213, 215-16 (1914) (New York statute); see
also 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 40, 79.
179 For example, the courts found that "business" within the meaning of the statutes
would extend to include a farmer, Allen v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 59, 61, 74 N.E. 287,
288 (1905), a doctor, Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 583, 63 N.E. 10, 10 (1902); In
re Board of Water Supply, 81 Misc. 19, 22-23, 142 N.Y.S. 83, 85-86, aff'd, 159 A.D. 279,
144 N.Y.S. 373 (1913), and boarding-house keepers, People ex rel. Burhans v. City of New
York, 198 N.Y. 439, 447, 92 N.E. 18, 20 (1910). The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court
held that a woman who kept occasional boarders, but who was not engaged in the regular
business of keeping boarders, was not entitled to compensation. Gavin v. Commonwealth,
182 Mass. 190, 191, 65 N.E. 37, 37 (1902).
"i° Legislatures remain free to award compensation in excess of that constitutionally
mandated. See cases cited in note 175 supra. See generally 3 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 8.9 &
nn. 83 & 84 and cases cited therein. They are, of course, forbidden to reduce the compen-
sation available below the minimum required by the constitution. See id. & n.82 and cases
cited therein.
"31
 1933 Fla. Laws ch. 15927 (No. 70), amending 5089 of the Compiled General Laws
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ida statute is hardly an expansive grant of legislative relief to all
business owners injured by condemnation actions. Rather, it pro-
vides compensation for business damages accruing to an established
business where a public condemning authority takes a part of the
property for a right-of-way. 182 Florida courts, like those of most
states, consider recovery of business losses to be "strictly a matter
of legislative grace, not constitutional imperative."'" They regard
business losses as "intangibles" that "do not constitute 'property' in
the constitutional sense"-and are hence noncompensable. 184 There-
of Florida, previously § 3281 of the Revised General Statutes of Florida. This provision became
Florida Statute § 73.10(4), and was renumbered in 1965 to Florida Statute § 73.071(3)(b).
This provision states:
(3) The jury shall determine solely the amount of compensation to be paid,
which compensation shall include:
(b) Where less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated, any
damages to the remainder caused by the taking, including, when the action is
by the Department of Transportation, county, municipality, board, district or
other public body For the condemnation of aright-of-way, and the effect of the
taking of the property involved may damage or destroy an established business
of more than 5 years' standing, owned by the party whose lands are being so
taken, located upon adjoining lands owned or held by such party, the probable
damages to such business which the denial of the use of the property so taken
may reasonably cause; any person claiming the right to recover such special
damages shall set forth in his written defenses the nature and extent of such
damages . .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071(3)(b) (West 1987).
182 Id. The Florida constitution mandates that severance damages be paid as a part of
the full compensation for damages to the remainder caused by a partial taking of land. See
Division of Admin. v. Ness Trailer Park, Inc., 489 So. 2d 1172, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(citing Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1964)), review denied, 501 So. 2d
1281 (Ha. 1986). Business damages, on the other hand, are created by statute and compensate
for damages, such as loss of goodwill or profits, to a business indirectly caused by a taking
of adjoining, adjacent, or contiguous land. See Matthews v. Division of Admin., 324 So. 2d
664, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); LeSuer v. State Rd. Dep't, 231 So. 2d 265, 268 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1970). Although recovery of both types of damages is available in appropriate cases,
Ness Trailer Park, 489 So. 2d at 1180-81, where the condemnee's business damages and
severence damages are identical, the courts will not permit dual recovery. See Glessner v,
Duval County, 203 So. 2d 330, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
189 Florida Power & Light Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 448 So, 2d 1141, 1142
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 537 So, 2d 92, 93
(Fla. 1989); Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K.E. Morris Alignment Serv.,
Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 1983); Jamesson v. Downtown Dcv. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510,
511 (Fla. 1975).
184 Jamesson, 322 So. 2d at 511 (citing Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557
(1898)). The Florida courts, however, do not generally employ a restrictive definition of
"property:"
The rationale for granting compensation, although not always expressed in
judicial pronouncements, is that "property" is something more than a physical
interest in land; it also includes certain legal rights and privileges constituting
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fore, unless the taking falls within the relatively narrow confines of
the statute, the general rule that business losses are noncompensable
will apply.
Recovery of business losses is permitted only where the business
is located upon land adjoining, adjacent, or contiguous to the land
taken. 185 If the business is located entirely upon the land taken, no
relief may be had.' 88 The legislative rationale apparently is that
where a total taking of the land has occurred, the property owners
will receive the "full compensation" required by the Florida consti-
tution,'" thus obviating the need for business damages. 188 Further-
more, the property must be actually appropriated; no recovery is
allowed for consequential damages arising from governmental ac-
tions such as a change of grade in the road' 89 or construction of a
mediano° or an overpass,' 9 ' nor may business owners recover for
temporary loss of business resulting from a construction project' 92
or from loss of traffic flow past a business.'"
The business owner's property must have been condemned
by a governmental agency or political subdivision of the
State of Florida. The statute does not require
compensation where a "private" condemnor 194 takes prop-
appurtenants to the land and its enjoyment. This is part of a gradual process
of judicial liberalization of the concept of property so as to include the "taking"
of an incorporeal interest . .
Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Department of
Transp. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973)).
1 " Guarria v. State Rd. Dep't, 117 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); see also State
Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1966); Douglass v. Hillsborough County,
206 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
196 Texaco, 537 So. 2d at 94; see Amerkan v. City of Hialeah, 534 So. 2d 796, 797 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 544 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1989).
' 93 The Florida Constitution states: "No private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit
in the registry of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CoNsr. art. 10, § 6(a).
'" See Koval & Sasso, The Bottom Line on Eminent Domain Business Damages, FLA. B.J.,
June 1986, at 59, 60.
1 " State Rd. Dept v. Lewis, 170 So, 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1964).
1 " Division of Admin. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1981); Division
of Admin, v. Palm Beach West, Inc., 409 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per
curiam).
19 ' Lewis, 170 So. 2d at 819.
192 Howard Johnson Co. v. Division of Admin., 450 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
' 93 Capital Plaza, 397 So. 2d at 683; Meltzer v. Hillsborough County, 167 So. 2d 54, 55
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
1" A number of non-governmental entities are empowered under Florida law to con-
demn property, including electric utilities, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 361.01 (West 1968 & Supp.
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erty.' 95 Likewise, the property must be taken for a right-of-way;
takings for any other public purpose do not suffice. The statute
further requires that the business have been established for more
than five years before the taking of the land. The courts have
interpreted "business" to mean more than just a "place of business;"
that is, more than just a physical location from which a business can
be operated. According to one court, "[b]usiness . . . does not,
generally speaking, mean property. It means the activity, the energy,
the capacity, the opportunities by which results are reached—a con-
dition rather than fixed tangible objects from which conditions
arise." 196 Thus, it is not necessary that the current owner have
operated the business for a full five years; it is only necessary that
the business itself have been operated at that location for at least
five years.' 97
Although the strict requirements outlined above suggest that
the legislature wished to limit recoveries, the statute defines business
damages broadly. In addition to lost profits attributable to the re-
duced profit-making ability of the business caused by the taking,'"
a business owner may recover items such as loss of business oppor-
tunity or loss of goodwill.' 99 Even a business that is losing money is
entitled to compensation for any business damages that the owner
can prove flow from denial of use of the property, such as moving
expenses or loss of goodwill. 20° Business losses must be pleaded
1990), gas companies, id. § 361.05, water works companies, id. § 361.04, and railroads, id.
fr 361.025.
195 See Florida Power & Light Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 448 So. 2d 1141,
1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). This provision has been criticized as unfairly discriminating
against business owners based upon the identity of the condemning authority. See Turk,
Entitlement to Business Damages in Condemnation Actions, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1984, at 540, 541, The
Florida courts, however, have repeatedly stated that "the remedy belongs within the legislative
domain." Florida Power & Light Co., 448 So. 2d at 1142; see also Sasnett v. Tampa Elec. Co.,
513 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
195 Hodges v, Division of Admin., 323 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting
Atlanta Realty Co. v. Sloan, 91 Ga. App. 370, 372, 85 S,E.2d 635, 637 (1955)); see also Hicks
v. Department of Transp., 541 So. 2d 1309, 1310-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Division of
Admin. v. Lake of the Woods, Inc., 404 So. 2d 186, 187-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1981).
195 Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K.E. Morris Alignment Serv„ Inc.,
444 So. 2d 926, 929 (Fla. 1983).
198 See Matthews v. Division of Admin., 324 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
199 See LeSuer v. State Rd. Dept, 231 So. 2d 265, 268 (Fla. App. 1970); Douglass v.
Hillsborough County, 206 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (Fla. App. 1968); Matthews, 324 So. 2d at 666-
67.
200 Matthews, 324 So. 2d at 668 ("Goodwill need not be valued with reference to profit
and loss. Goodwill can exist as a valuable asset even in a business which only shows a lose
[ski.").
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specifically, however, and the burden of proof is on the property
owner.20 '
To recover under Florida law, therefore, the property owner's
land must be partially, not wholly, taken by a governmental unit for
a right-of-way, and the business must be located on the remaining
land and have been in existence for more than five years. Obviously,
a lot of takings resulting in business losses fall outside of these
narrow confines and thus are not compensable. Florida's statute can
hardly be said to be a broad legislative recognition of the need to
provide recovery for business losses.
3. Vermont
In 1957, Vermont enacted a statute permitting recovery for
business losses accruing as a result of the construction of high-
ways. 202
 This provision is much simpler than the Florida statute,
providing merely that property owners should be compensated for
"the direct and proximate decrease in the value" of a business
located on property that is to be taken. 203
Before this statute was enacted, Vermont law computed con-
demnation damages by the market value rule, i.e., the difference
between the value of the whole tract before the condemnation and
its value afterwards, with no compensation for business losses. 2°4
The state constitution205
 did not mandate compensation for business
losses, even though the business enterprise might be invaded and
the income of the business diminished or destroyed because of a
2°1 See Whitehead v. Florida Power & Light Co., 318 So. 2d 154, 157-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
"2
 Act of June 21, 1957, 1957 Vt. Laws 242 (currently codified, as amended, at VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 501 (1987)).
2°' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 501(2) (1987). This provision states:
Damages resulting from the taking or use of property under the provisions
of this chapter shall be the value for the most reasonable use of the property
or right in the property, and of the business on the property, and the direct
and proximate decrease in the value of the remaining property or right in the
property and the business on the property. The added value, if any, to the
remaining property or right in the property, which accrues directly to the owner
of the property as a result of the taking or use, as distinguished from the
general public benefit, shall be considered in the determination of damages.
Id.
204
 See, e.g., Demers v. City of Montpelier, 120 Vt. 380, 387, 141 A.2d 676, 681 (1958);
Nelson v. State Highway Bd., 110 Vt. 44, 52, 53, 1 A.2d 689, 692 (1938); Essex Storage Elec.
Co. v. Victory Lumber Co„ 93 Vt. 437, 448, 108 A. 426, 430 (1919).
20' The Vermont constitution provides, in relevant part: "That private property ought
to be subservient to public uses when necessity requires it, nevertheless, whenever any
person's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent
in money." VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2.
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taking of the land on which the business was located. 206
 The legis-
lature was aware, however, of the inequities and uncompensated
injuries caused by condemnation actions, particularly those actions
undertaken to facilitate highway construction. 207
 The statute thus
represents the legislature's attempt to balance the rights of the
individual proprietor against the needs of the sovereign to provide
public improvements. 2°8
The Vermont Supreme Court has carefully delineated the
scope and effect of the statute since its enactment over three decades
ago. Business owners can recover for the value of the land taken,
the value of the loss of business, and the damage suffered by the
remaining land when only a part of the parcel is taken, i.e., sever-
ance damages. 209
 A business owner thus can recover for both the
loss of the land and the loss of the business, though double recovery
is not allowed. 210
According to the pronouncements of the Vermont Supreme
Court, an award for business losses is appropriate only where "a
business is inextricably related to the property on which it is carried
on so that the taking results in subjecting the business to a loss,
which would not be compensated for by paying for the value of the
land alone." 2 " Often, a taking of land will have only a slight impact
on the business, and the impact may not necessarily be a negative
one. 212
 In such an instance, the Vermont courts would not award
recovery for business losses. The Vermont Supreme Court recently
clarified the procedure for computing business losses in Sharp v.
Transportation Boarc1. 213 The Sharp court defined the business loss
suffered by the condemnee as the amount remaining, if any, when
the value of the business' as a whole214
 is subtracted from the value
20




 Penna v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 290, 292, 170 A.2d 630, 632 (1961).
21° Id. at 292-93, 170 A.2d at 633.
211
 Colson v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 392, 395, 173 A.2d 849, 852 (1961) (citing
Record, 121 Vt. at 237, 154 A.2d at 480), overruled on different grounds, Pidgeon v. Vermont
State Transp. Bd., 147 Vt. 584, 522 A.2d 248 (1987).
212 Record, 121 Vt. at 237, 154 A.2d at 480.
21]
	 Vt. 480, 491-93, 451 A.2d 1074, 1079-80 (1982).
21' According to the Vermont Supreme Court:
The value of the business as a whole includes (a) the contribution made by ,the
land to the business, (b) the personal property used by the business, (c) the
going concern value of the business, (d) the increased value derived from the
fact that tangible assets are combined in a single unit and are already functioning
in the marketplace. and (e) where appropriate, goodwill.
Id. at 491, 451 A.2d at 1079.
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of the highest and best use of the land." 5 If nothing remains, the
condemnee has not suffered any business loss. 216 Although loss of
profits may be shown to help establish the business losses sustained,
no separate recovery may be had for lost profits; rather, they are
subsumed in the recovery for loss of business. 217
A business owner can receive an award for business losses even
if the business is not totally destroyed. 218 An award for a partial
business loss cannot exceed the measure of a total loss, however,
nor may a business loss award exceed the proven market value of
the business. 219 If the business must be relocated in whole or in part
as a result of the taking, the court must look to see what, if any,
loss the business has suffered as a result of the relocation. 220 Again,
an award of relocation costs cannot exceed the value of the going
business at the original location. 2"
The Vermont courts have had little trouble dismissing the old
chestnut that business losses are too speculative to permit recovery.
In drafting the statute, the legislature undoubtedly recognized the
difficulty in determining whether business yield has been affected
by a taking, whether such effect was adverse, and how to place a
dollar value upon the injury if it was adverse. 222 Nonetheless, the
issue is merely a factual one, and the courts must make their deter-
minations as best they can, based upon whatever evidence is given,
be it proof of profits, 225 valuation by the proprietor, 224 or otherwise.
Mere difficulty in determining the exact amount owing is not suf-
ficient to bar recovery ordained by the legislature. 225
The Vermont statute provides for recovery of a broad range
of business losses, including, as it does, both going-concern value
215 Id.
216 Id. It is irrelevant if the actual use is different from the highest and best use. The
condemnee in Sharp used his land for a. dairy operation. Although his dairy business was
destroyed by the taking of his land, he could not recover for business losses because the
value of the land if used for its highest and best use—subdivision for residential purposes—
exceeded the value of his business. Id. at 488, 451 A.2d at 1077.
217 Id.
210 Gibson Estate v. State Highway Ed., 128 Vt. 47, 53, 258 A.2d 810, 813 (1969).
2 ' 9 Id.
220
 Record v. State Highway Bd., 121 Vt. 230, 237, 154 A.2d 475, 480 (1959).
221 Gibson Estate, 128 Vt. at 53, 258 A.2d at 813-14.
222 See Fiske v. State Highway Bd., 124 Vt. 87, 91, 197 A.2d 790, 792 (1964).
2" Id. at 92, 197 A.2d at 793.
224 Id. at 91, 197 A.2d at 793 (citing O'Brien v. State Highway Bd., 123 Vt. 414, 417,
190 A.2d 699, 701 (1963)).
225 Id. at 92, 197 A.2d at 793 (citing Penna v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 290, 292, 170
A.2d 630, 632 (1961)).
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and goodwill. Nonetheless, like the Florida statute, the Vermont
statute is severely restricted in scope, allowing recovery only for
business losses resulting from takings for highway construction, and
no other purpose. There is no analytically valid reason why the use
to which the land is to be put after the taking should determine
whether compensation is available. A business loss incurred as a
result of a taking for non-highway uses is just as real and just as
injurious, and therefore is just as deserving of compensation.
4. California and Wyoming: Adoption of Section 1016 of the
Uniform Eminent Domain Code
Section 1016 of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code provides
for recovery for loss of goodwill. 226
 Only two states have adopted
the uniform language thus far: Wyoming and California. Little can
be said as yet about Wyoming's interpretation of the provision.
Before its adoption of the uniform language in 1981, 227
 Wyoming,
like most states, denied recovery for business losses. 228
 Because the
Wyoming courts have not yet had occasion to rule on the new
statutory relief, it is difficult to predict how they will interpret the
language.
Section 1263.510 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 229
however, provides some indication of the types of issues that the
226
 This section states:
(a) In addition to fair market value determined under Section 1004, the
owner of a business conducted on the property taken, or on the remainder if
there is a partial taking, shall be compensated for loss of goodwill only if the
owner proves that the loss (1) is caused by the taking of the property or the
injury to the remainder, (2) cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of
the business or by taking steps and adopting procedures that a reasonably
prudent person would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill, (3) will not
be included in relocation payments under Article XIV, and (4) will not be
duplicated in the compensation awarded to the owner.
(b) Within the meaning of this section, "goodwill" consists of the benefits
that accrue to a business as a result of its location, reputation for dependability,
skill, or quality, and any other circumstances resulting in probable retention of
old or acquisition of new patronage.
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS 1016 (1974). "Business,"
for the purposes of the Code, is defined as "a lawful activity, whether or not for profit, other
than a farm operation, conducted primarily for the purchase, sale, lease, rental, manufacture,
processing, or marketing of products, commodities, or other property, or for providing
services." Id. § 103(3).
227 Wvo. STAT. § 1-26-713 (1988),
22° See Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 435 (Wyo. 1982); State Highway
Comm'n v. Scrivner, 641 P.2d 735, 739 (Wyo. 1982).
222
 This section states'
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Wyoming statute may present. This provision, virtually identical to
that found in Wyoming, renders loss of goodwill compensable, at
least to a certain extent, in takings occurring in California on or
after July 1, 1976.230 Although the California Supreme Court has
had only one occasion to rule on section 1263.510 to date, 23 ' we
can nonetheless get a better sense of the strengths and weaknesses
of the uniform language in that jurisdiction.
Historically, California courts held that loss of goodwill was not
recoverable in condemnation actions. The California Supreme
Court first articulated its position on this issue in 1915, in City of
Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., in which it stated: "it is
the universal rule of construction that an injury or inconvenience
to a business is damnum absque injuria and does not form an
element of the compensating damages to be awarded." 232 As re-
cently as 1975, the California court declined to hold goodwill com-
pensable as a matter of state or federal law. 233 Thus, goodwill - is
compensable in California only as a matter of legislative grace and
only to the extent provided for in section 1263.510.
The California legislature's extensive review and reform of
eminent domain law in 1975 resulted in the adoption of the new
statute permitting recovery for loss of goodwill. 234 This Act is inter-
.,
(a) The owner of a business conducted on the property taken, or on the
remainder if such property is part of a larger parcel, shall be compensated for
loss of goodwill if the owner proves all of the following:
(1) The loss is caused by the taking of the property or the injury to the
remainder.
(2)The loss cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business
or by taking steps and adopting procedures that a reasonably prudent person
would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill.
(3) Compensation for the loss will not be included in payments under
Section 7262 of the Government Code.
(4) Compensation for the loss will not be duplicated in the compensation
otherwise awarded to the owner.
(b) Within the meaning of this article, "goodwill" consists of the benefits
that accrue to a business as a result of its location, reputation for dependability,
skill or quality, and any other circumstances resulting in probable retention of
old or acquisition of new patronage.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 1263.510 (West 1982).
l'o See id.
ni See People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Muller, 36 Cal. 3d 263, 268-72, 681 P.2d 1340,
1343-46, 203 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775-78 (1984). See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Muller.
"2 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915) (citations omitted).
2" Community Redev. AgenCy v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 830-31, 543 P.2d 905, 917-
18, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473, 485-86 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
254 CAL. Qv. Pxoc. CODE 3i 1263.510 (West 1982) (quoted in supra note 229).
March 1991]	 GOODWILL & GOING-CONCERN 	 331
esting for a number of reasons. First, the provision actually defines
"goodwill," stating that it "consists of the benefits that accrue to a
business as a result of its location, reputation for dependability, skill
or quality, and any other circumstances resulting in probable reten-
tion of old or acquisition of new patronage." 255 Because other pro-
visions of California statutes also define "goodwill" in terms of the
"expectation of continued public patronage,"238 this raises the initial
question of whether goodwill under the statute relates only to pa-
tronage. This question was answered in People ex rel. Department of
Transportation v. Muller, 257 which provides the only substantive in-
terpretation of this statute to date.
Muller and his wife had rented property to Muller and several
other veterinarians for use as a veterinary hospital. After the De-
partment of Transportation took the land, Muller was able to re-
open his practice at a nearby location without loss of patronage or
gross income. Because of higher purchase costs, however, his annual
rent doubled, and his business's net income was reduced. The De-
partment of Transportation argued that a compensable loss of
goodwill occurred only when the taking resulted in a loss of pa-
tronage. 258 Here, the Department contended, the loss present was
attributable only to the increase in rent resulting from a change in
location, and therefore the government owed no compensation for
goodwill.239
The Muller court, recognizing the expansive remedial purpose
of the statute, rejected the argument that the statute required such
a limited definition of "goodwill." 2" It noted that the statute au-
thorizes compensation for the "benefits" of "location," and that
"Where are other benefits to a particular location besides patron-
age."241 In giving an expansive definition to "goodwill," the Muller
court eliminated one problem associated with the statute and estab-
lished that recovery is to be broadly granted.
The statute does not indicate how goodwill is to be valued. The
Muller court explicitly stated that goodwill could be valued by any
235 CAL. CIV, PROC. Cone § 1263.510(b) (West 1982). For an argument that California's
statutory definition of "goodwill" is economically incorrect, see Udinsky, The Economics of
"Goodwill" With An Application to the Eminent Domain Code Definition, 6 Bus. L. NEWS (State Bar
of Cal. Bus. L. Sect.), Spring 1983, at 33.
235 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 14100 (West 1987).
237
 36 Cal. 3d 263, 681 P.2d 1340, 203 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1984).
235 Id. at 269, 681 P.2d at 1343, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
233 Id.
345 Id. at 270, 681 P.2d at 1344, 203 Cal. Rpm. at 776.
241 Id. at 269, 681 P.2d at 1343, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
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means appropriate to the nature of the business and the purpose
for which the evaluation was conducted. 242 The capitalized excess
earnings approach used in Muller is the method most commonly
used by accountants243 and the Internal Revenue Service. 244 Because
other valuations methods are permitted,245 however, and because
different methods can result in wide variance in the valuation fig-
ure,24° the lack of a standard in the act makes it difficult for either
party to predict in advance the amount of the damages owing in
any particular taking.
The statute attempts to limit the amount of compensation due
to a property owner. It provides compensation for loss of goodwill
regardless of whether the land is taken in whole or in part, 247 but
any special benefits to the remaining property must be offset against
the owner's compensation for loss of goodwill. Dual recovery is not
permitted; to the extent that loss of goodwill is duplicated in another
loss for which compensation is granted, no recovery is allowed. 248
The statute also places an affirmative duty on the business
owner to mitigate his or her losses. The property owner must show
that the loss could not be prevented by relocation or by other efforts
to mitigate. 249 Though the mitigation requirement seems to be a
sound one at first glance—after all, why should a business owner
be allowed to collect for losses that he or she could have avoided—
at least one commentator has noted that the statute leaves a number
of questions unanswered. 25°
Dr. Muller was able to relocate with only a reduction in his net
income. But what if that new facility had been so expensive that the
business would have been unable to operate at a profit? Would he
still be required to mitigate? What if Dr. Muller had not been able
242 Id. at 271 n.7, 681 P.2d at 1345 n.7, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 777 n.7.
243 See generally H. HUGHES, GOODWILL IN ACCOUNTING (1982); G. CATLETT & N. OLSON,
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL (1968).
244 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241.
243 Typical valuation methods include capitalized excess earnings, gross income multi-
pliers, and market value. See Desmond, supra note 29, at 196-202; Maleck, Loss of Business
Goodwill in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 53 CAL. Sr. B.J. 32, 33 (1978).
243 See Skolnik, New Vitality in Eminent Domain, CAL. LAW, March 1985, at 55, 57 ("In
one recent case, the two experts' opinions of compensible [sic] loss of business good will were
$0 and $230,000; in another, $100,000 and $700,000; in a third, $70,000 and $525,000.").
247
	
CIV. PROC. CODE 1263.510(a)(1) (West 1982).
243 Id. § 1263.510(a)(3), (4).
249 Id. § 1263.510(2). In disputes over the valuation of real property, the property owner
has no such burden of proof.
2'0 See Rinehart, Compensation for Loss of Goodwill: The California Experiment, 1989 INST.
ON PLAN., ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 9, § 9.04I2lib].
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to relocate within a mile of his old business as he did, but had had
to move so far away that his loss of his old patronage was inevitable
and unpreventable? Could he still recover for the loss of his old
patronage even if he were able to quickly acquire new patronage of
equal or greater value? The state could argue that the owner had
not suffered any loss under those circumstances. Yet, absent the
taking, the owner could have sold the goodwill at his former location
and have established new goodwill (through the creation of new
patronage) at the new location as wel1. 2" In real economic terms,
the taking has caused the owner to suffer a loss.
What if the business is unable to relocate within the area of its
existing patronage because of zoning restrictions or other con-
straints? For example, a pawnshop can easily find that it has become
a nonconforming use; 252 likewise, a liquor store may well find that
it cannot obtain a new license within its old locale. A loss of patron-
age appears inevitable for such businesses, for they can either re-
locate to a new area without such constraints, which may well be
too far away to allow them to retain their existing patronage, or
they can establish a new type of business within the old locale, which
will also require the generation of new patronage.
Finally, the statute allows recovery only for loss of goodwill,
and not for other types of business damages, such as loss of profits
or going-concern value. The California Law Revision Commission
Comment on section 1263.510 does not reveal the reasons for the
distinction. 253 It may be that the legislature did not intend to make
a distinction. As discussed above, "goodwill" and "going-concern
value" are viewed by many as synonymous terms; 254 perhaps the
California legislature and drafters of the uniform provision viewed
them that way as well. Certainly, the statute contemplates recovery
of goodwill where a business cannot be relocated. 255 Although the
language refers specifically to goodwill, a business that cannot be
relocated has also lost going-concern value as well, because it is now
a "dead" plant rather than a "live" one. 256 Although the statute,
read literally, refers to loss of goodwill, one wonders, given the
251 See id.
252 See id.
255 13 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM O N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 1975-76,
Comment, at 218-19.
254 See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
255 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510(a)(2) (West 1982).
256 See Malek, supra note 245, at 35; see supra note 22 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the meaning of "going-concern value."
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confusion surrounding the two terms, just what compensation the
legislature did intend. 257
 If the legislature did intend a distinction,
however, it was likely based on the common fear of the California
courts that awarding recovery for such losses would result in irre-
parable harm to the public fist and would impede public projects. 258
Thus, this most recent statutory grant of compensation for
business losses, like all of the earlier legislative reforms, provides
only limited recovery for business owners. The statute recognizes
that business losses can result from takings, but creates a seemingly
arbitrary limit on their recovery. Why should goodwill be compens-
able, but other types of business losses not be?
B. Judicial Reform
The legislative reform that has occurred to date has tended to
be haphazard and weak. The legislatures have drawn arbitrary lines
between categories of landowners and classes of injury, creating a
crazy-quilt pattern of recovery. Their decisions to afford limited
relief to aggrieved property owners, although interesting from a
policy stance, reveal little about changes in- the theoretical under-
pinnings of the business losses rule. Much more interesting from a
theoretical viewpoint are the recent changes wrought by the judi-
ciary in the area of business losses. Courts in Georgia, Minnesota,
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Alaska have all determined that, as a
matter of state constitutional law, business losses are compensable,
to varying degrees. Because these states start with constitutional
provisions similar to those of the states denying compensation, and
with comparable judicial histories of denying such recovery, their
determinations in the last two decades that recovery is not only
permitted, but mandated by law, evidence a fundamental shift in
the legal reasoning underlying the business losses rule.
1. Georgia
In Bowers v. Fulton County, decided in 1966, the Georgia Su-
preme Court became the first state court to require compensation
for business losses as a matter of state constitutional law.259 In so
doing, the court rejected its own precedent, established in 1895, in
257 See Malek, supra note 245, at 35.
259 See Kanner, supra note I, at 76-85, for a discussion of California cases raising this
issue.
259 221 Ga. 731, 740, 146 S.E.2d 884, 891 (1966).
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Pause v. City of Atlanta, 26° which had held that the 'just and adequate
compensation" required by the Georgia constitution 261 did not re-
quire compensation for loss of profits and removal expenses as
separate and independent items of damages. The Bowers court ex-
plicitly overruled Pause and other Georgia cases which had followed
the Pause line of reasoning. 262
According to the Bowers court, Pause and its progeny misde-
fined the word "property." These pre-Bowers cases had construed
the Georgia takings provision as applying only to physical or cor-
poreal property, a view the Bowers court rejected as "too narrow. 1,263
Rather, the Bowers court found that the constitution included all
species of property within its scope, whether real or personal, cor-
poreal .or incorporeal. 264 The court explicitly rejected the notion
26° 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1895).
261 The Georgia constitution states that "private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid." GA. CONST.
art. I, § 3, If 1(a).
2" 221 Ga. at 738, 146 S.E.2d at 890. The Bowers court found that the "rules" announced
in these cases were "obiter dictum" because the cases:
either did not involve the taking or directly damaging of the condemnee's
physical property by the condemnor, but were suits in which damages were
claimed because improvements made by the condemnor rendered less valuable
the condemnee's premises or in which no claim for damages was made on
account of damage to the condemnee's business or for expenses incurred by
him.
Id, at 736-37, 146 S.E.2d at 889. Thus, these cases did not require a construction of the
takings clause of the Georgia constitution. Id. The court cited specifically: Nelson v. City of
Atlanta, 138 Ga. 252, 253-54, 75 S.E. 245, 246 (1912) (diminution of value of adjacent
property caused by construction of viaduct); Howard v. County of Bibb, 127 Ga. 291, 291,
56 S.E. 418, 418 (1907) (seeking damages for death of cows caused by construction of dam);
Barfield v. Macon County, 109 Ga. 386, 386-87, 34 S.E. 596, 596 (1899) (damages to adjacent
land caused by alteration in roadbed); Austin v, Augusta T. Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 672, 34 S.E.
852, 853 (1899) (diminution in value of building caused by construction of railroad); Pause,
98 Ga. at 93-95, 26 S.E. at 490 (diminution in value of business caused by construction of a
viaduct); Peel v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138, 139, 11 S.E. 582, 583 (1890) (damages to land
adjacent to opening at public street); Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 420, 11 S.E. 850,
850 (1890) (damages to residential lot from building of bridge).
263 221 Ga. at 737, 146 S.E.2d at 889.
2a4
	 The court stated:
The term "property" is a very comprehensive one, and is used not only to
signify things real and personal owned, but to designate the right of ownership
and that which is subject to be owned and enjoyed. The term [property] com-
prehends not only the thing possessed, but also, in strict legal parlance, means
the rights of the owner in relation to land or a thing; the right of a person to
possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude
others from the use.
Id. at 737, 146 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75, 83, 103 S.E.2d
108, 114-15 (1958) (citations omitted)).
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that the loss of the business would be reflected in the value of the
real estate, because the value of an established business can greatly
exceed that of the real property on which it is located. 265 The Bowers
court noted that if a valuable business is located within a shabby
building worth only a fraction of the value of the business, the value
of the business can hardly be said to be included in the appraisal
of the building. 266
 Thus, the court concluded that the destruction
of an established business must be a separate item of recovery from
the value of the real estate, and that the condemnee could recover
for all damage to the condemnee's property and expense caused by
the condemnation proceeding. 267
Although Bowers established that business losses, including loss
of profits and diminution of the business, are compensable under
the Georgia constitution, subsequent cases have restricted the rule.
A "uniqueness" rule now applies: "Generally stated, the rule is that
the fair market value of the property will be the fair measure of
compensation, and claimed loss of business will not be considered,
unless the condemnee has proved that the condemned property
has some unique or peculiar relationship to the condemnee and his
business."268
 The Georgia courts adopted the rule as "a highly prac-
tical assumption" that simply states, as a matter of law, that business
losses can only be attributed to the taking where the property had
some unique quality that benefitted the business. 269
 According to
the Georgia Supreme Court, "unique property is simply property
which must be valued by something other than the fair market
value standard" because the property is not of the type commonly
bought and sold in the open market. 2" Where both the property
and the business are owned by one person, they are considered one
property, and unless the business is totally destroyed by the taking,
the partial business loss is not a separate item of damage, but rather
26' Id. at 739, 146 S.E.2d at 891.
265 Id.
267 Id. at 738, 739, 146 S.E.2d at 890, 891.
2" Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Ply-Marts, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 482, 483-
84, 241 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1978) (citing Department of Transp. v. Dent, 142 Ga. App. 94, 235
.S.E.2d 610 (1977); City of Gainesville v. Chambers, 118 Ga. App. 25, 162 S.E.2d 460 (1968)).
259 Id.
2" Housing Auth. v. Southern Ry., 245 Ga. 229, 230, 264 S.E.2d 174, 175 (1980). Market
value is typically determined by one of three methods: replacement cost less depreciation,
income, or comparable sales. Id. (citation omitted). The value of "unique" property is mea-
sured by a variety of other methods, such as the cost and income methods. Id. (citation
omitted).
March 1991]	 GOODWILL & GOING-CONCERN	 337
goes to the diminution in the value of the property. 2" But where
the business interest is separate from the property interest, as in a
lease, damage or destruction to the business interest is a separate
item of recovery. 272
The courts appear to be fairly liberal in allowing proof of
uniqueness. For example, a condemnee who showed that he had
leased one of the choicest locations for a liquor store within the
county, and that he had lost business as a result of the forced
relocation, was allowed to recover business losses as a separate item
of recovery,273 as was a condemnee who owned and operated an
auto body repair shop. 274 In any event, uniqueness of the property.
is a question for the jury.275 Only the "slightest evidence" is necessary
to support its determination. 276 The business operator need not
show that the business had been profitable before the taking to
recover for loss of business, 277 but the operator is under a duty to
mitigate his or her business losses. 278
57I Department of Transp. v. Kendricks, 148 Ga. App. 242, 245-46, 250 S.E.2d 854,
857 (1973) (citation omitted).
272 Id. at 245-46, 250 S.E.2d at 857-58. The Georgia Supreme Court clarified the rule
in partial taking cases in 1980. In Department of Transp. v. Dixie Highway Bottle Shop,
Inc., 245 Ga. 314, 265 S.E.2d 10 (1980), the court reconciled two seemingly conflicting
opinions of the court of appeals, Department of Transp. v. Dent, 142 Ga. App. 994, 235
S.E.2d 610 (1977), and Department of Transp. v. Kendricks, 148 Ga. App. 242, 250 S.E.2d
854 (1973), by drawing a distinction between owners and lessees of property in partial takings:
When the business belongs to the landowner, total destruction of the busi-
ness at the location must be proven before business losses may be recovered as
a separate element of compensation. On the other hand, when the business
belongs to a separate lessee, the lessee may recover for business losses as an
element of compensation separate from the value of the land, whether the
destruction of his business is total or merely partial, provided only that the loss
is not remote or speculative. In either event, business losses are recoverable as
a separate item only if the property is "unique."
Dixie Highway Battle Shop, 245 Ga. at 314-15, 265 S.E.2d at 10 (citations omitted).
273 Kessler v. Department of Transp., 142 Ga. App. 170, 170, 235 S.E.2d 636, 637
(1977).
"4 Cobb County v, Crain, 172 Ga. App. 594, 595, 323 S.E.2d 890, 891 (1984).
275 Department of Transp. v. Dixie Highway Bottle Shop, Inc., 245 Ga. 314, 315, 265
S.E.2d 10, 11 (1980) (citation omitted).
275 See Department of Transp. v. 19.646 Acres of Land, 178 Ga. App. 287, 287, 342
S.E.2d 760, 761 (1986) (quoting Department of Transp. v. 2.734 Acres of Land, 168 Ga.
App. 541, 542, 309 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1983)).
277 Department of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 637, 642, 385 S.E.2d
746, 751 (1989).	 ..
275
 Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Ply-Marts, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 482, 484-
85, 241 S.E.2d 600, 602 (citing Garber v. Housing Auth., 123 Ga. App. 29, 179 S.E.2d 300
(1970)).
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The Georgia courts based their determination that business
losses are compensable upon a broad interpretation of "property"
under the Georgia constitution. 279 In so doing, they simply adopted
the broad definition of "property" that has evolved over the last
century. The restrictions that they have placed upon recovery gen-
erally are not overly onerous. Although the requirement that the
business have been profitable ignores the economic values inherent
in nonprofitable businesses, 28° the requirement that the business
owner mitigate his or her losses is certainly a reasonable one. More-
over, although the courts could have applied the "uniqueness" re-
quirement in burdensome ways calculated to deprive owners of
recovery, they do not appear to have done so in practice. Rather, it
appears that recovery is available wherever a lessee can show, after
a good-faith effort to mitigate, that the taking will result in an
undeniable loss of profits. The requirement that the property owner
show an actual destruction of business is more troublesome, how-
ever, because it ignores the losses suffered by a business owner
when the value of his or her business is diminished or damaged.
2. Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court had an opportunity to reex-
amine the business losses rule in 1969, in State v. Saugen.28 ' The
state condemned the property upon which the appellants had op-
erated a liquor lounge. The stipulated value of the land, building,
and fixtures was $39,500; the stipulated value of the business op-
erated on the premises was $17,500. 282
 The appellants tried to
transfer their liquor license to a new location several times, but were
unable to do so because of the state licensing laws. 283 The issue
presented to the court was whether, under the state constitution, 284
the appellants could recover for the going-concern value of the
lou nge . 285
478 It is interesting to note that the "or damaged" provision of the constitution seemed
to play no part in the decision to expand the scope of recoverable damages.
288 See supra note 18 (noting that goodwill can exist even where a business is not
profitable).
"' 283 Minn. 402, 169 N.W.2d 37 (1969).
4"4
	 at 403, 169 N.W.2d at 39.
28s
2" The Minnesota constitution states that "[Orivate property shall not be taken, de-
stroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured."
MINN. CONST. art. 1, li 13.
285 Saugen, 283 Minn. at 403-04, 169 N.W.2d at 39.
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The Saugen court stated that the mere intangible nature of
going-concern value did not preclude compensation for its taking. 286
The court acknowledged the general rule that loss of going-concern
value was not recoverable in condemnation actions, 287
 but it noted
that other courts had created exceptions to this general rule, allow-
ing recovery of incidental damages where the government expro-
priated a public utility intending to continue furnishing the ser-
vices,288
 or where the government intended a temporary taking. 289
The Saugen court believed that an exception was also warranted
"where, as here, the condemnee's business is one which cannot be
pursued without a license, and where that license, while transferable
between persons, must relate specifically to particular premises
which are designated in the license itself." 2" The exception to the
general rule of nonrecovery for going-concern value, however, was
narrowly drawn. The court emphasized that the amount of the loss
was not "speculative," but rather had been stipulated by the parties.
Furthermore, the loss had actually occurred, 29 ' rather than there
being a 'remote possibility that the owner [would] be unable to find
a wholly suitable location for the transfer of going-concern
value.'"292
 The appellant made three attempts to transfer its liquor
license to a new location, 2" but was unable to do so because of the
"restricted liquor patrol limits and other peculiarities of the 'Min-
neapolis licensing situation." 294
 Thus, over the objections of two
266
 Id. at 404, 169 N.W.2d at 39. Moreover, "though the right vested in the owners [of
a liquor license) is created through a revocable license, so long as the right exists it cannot
be taken away without just compensation." Id. at 907-08, 169 N.W.2d at 41. The court noted
that:
While it is true that liquor businesses are appropriately subject to more
scrutiny and control than most businesses when the government is acting pur-
suant to its police power, they have the same rights as any other businesses
when the government is not acting pursuant to such police power, but rather
in the exercise of eminent domain.
Id. at 409, 169 N.W.2d at 42.
282 Id. at 409-10, 169 N.W.2d at 42 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925); 2 [Victims, supra note 14,
§ 5.76)).
288
 Id. at 411, 169 N.W.2d at 43 (citing City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S.
180 (1910); 2 Nmnot.s, supra note 19, 5.76)).
289 Id. (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); Eyherabide v.
United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965)).
2" Id. at 410, 169 N.W.2d at 43 (citations omitted).
291 Id. at 412, 169 N.W.2d at 44.
292
 Id. (quoting Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 15).
MI
 Id. at 409, 169 N.W.2d at 42.
294 Id. at 415, 169 N.W.2d at 46.
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dissenters, who believed that the recovery of going-concern value
should be a legislative, rather than judicial, determination, 295 the
Saugen court created a very limited exception to the general rule
that business losses are not compensable.
The majority was aided in its decision by the broad language
of the state constitution, which provides that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use," 296 and by a
supporting statute, which specifically provides: "The word 'taking'
and all words and phrases of like import include every interference,
under the right of eminent doinain, with the ownership, possession,
enjoyment, or value of private property." 297 Thus, the Minnesota
statute explicitly rejects the notion that "taking" meaning "taking
over," as in Mitcham The Saugen court noted that here the state
admitted that it had not considered the value of the business in
setting the award, 299 and that the licensing law, rather than merely
peculiar factual circumstances as in Mitchell," prevented the con-
demnee from relocating.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has declined on two occasions
to expand the narrow holding of Saugen. In City of Minneapolis v.
Schutt,"' the appellant leased a parking ramp, twenty percent of
which was condemned. The owner was compensated for the loss of
the fee, but the appellant's claim for loss of going-concern value
was denied. 3" The court refused to extend the Saugen rule, stating
that the appellant's interest was not as well-defined as the interest
in the liquor license in Saugen. 3" Moreover, because the parties in
Schutt had not stipulated to the amount of damages for the loss of
going-concern value, as had the parties in Saugen, the court was
"3 Id. at 416-18, 169 N.W.2d at 46-47 (Peterson, J., dissenting); id. at 418, 169 N.W.2d
at 47 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
2" MINN. CONST. art. I, 13 (emphasis added).
Saugen, 283 Minn. at 404, 169 N.W.2d at 39 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 117.02(2),
current version at MINN. STAT. § 117.025(2) (1987)). The Saugen court stated: "The state
unequivocally stipulated that 'absent the taking by the state in these proceedings, there is no
evidence that the condemnee could not have continued to operate its lounge at the premises
in question."' Id. at 414, 169 N.W.2d at 45.
1.98
 267 U.S. 341 (1925). See supra notes 110 & 1 I 1 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mitchell.
Saugen, 283 Minn. at 912-15, 169 N.W.2d at 44-46.
300
"1 256 N.W.2d 260, 261 (Minn. 1977).
'04 Appellant also sought recovery of loss of "efficiency value" caused by loss of space
and competition from the new municipal ramp that was being constructed. Id. The court
rejected this claim, because all business owners bear the risk of new competition. Id. at 265.
"3 Id at 263.
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concerned that the damages might be speculative. 3" In addition,
the appellant's business was not totally destroyed; the parking ramp
could continue to operate as a going concern, albeit with reduced
profitability. 305 The Schutt court clarified the rule on loss of going-
concern value by stating that compensation was available where the
condemnee could show: "(1) that his going-concern value will in
fact be destroyed as a direct result of the condemnation, and (2)
that his business either cannot be relocated as a practical matter, or
that relocation would result in irreparable harm to the interest." 306
Thus, the appellant in Schutt was entitled to no compensation, de-
spite the resultant "inequities." 307
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, Housing &
Redevelopment Authority v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co.,308 the court
held that a condemnee that had not shown that it would be unable
to transfer its liquor license to another location could not recover
for the going-concern value of its on-sale liquor business. The Nae-
gele court distinguished Saugen on the grounds that in Saugen the
parties had stipulated that the appellant went out of business be-
cause it was unable to transfer its liquor license to a new location. 309
In addition, the Naegele court specifically stated that the two-
pronged test of Schutt applied to condemnation of liquor establish-
ments, further restricting the potential scope of Saugen. 51 °
Although the court has yet to address the issue, it appears that
the Minnesota Supreme Court intends going-concern value to be
interpreted broadly as including a number of business interests. 3 "
The court's concern in Schutt that the parties had not stipulated to
the amount of lost going-concern value is disturbing, because it
suggests that such damages will be considered too speculative to
permit recovery absent such a stipulation. One can well imagine the
potential for abuse if condemnors could avoid payment of going-
concern value by simply refusing to stipulate to amounts. Moreover,




 Id. at 265.
3" Id.
3" 282 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Minn. 1979).
3" Id. at 539-40.
10 Id.
1" See, e.g., Schutt, 256 N.W.2d at 262 n.2 (noting "that courts have generally failed to
distinguish between such terms as 'good will,"going concern,' 'efficiency value,' and 'going-
business,'" and adopting the term "going-concern" to cover all of appellant's business damages
claims).
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to relocate can be seen as a valid mitigation requirement, its concern
that the going-concern value be actually destroyed ignores the very
real losses that a diminution in going-concern value may inflict.
3. Michigan
Michigan also allows limited recovery of business losses. The
rationale expressed in the Michigan cases is similar to that espoused
in the Minnesota ones, although in Michigan the modern business
losses rule has evolved primarily in the courts of appeals, rather
than in the supreme court.
Under Michigan law, just compensation requires placing the
property owner "in as good a position as was occupied before the
taking."312 The courts have not interpreted this language as mean-
ing that even consequential and incidental damages are recovera-
ble. 313 Specifically, the general rule in Michigan is that the goodwill
or going-concern value of a business operated on condemned realty
is recoverable only if the business is taken for use as a going con-
cern.314 The rationale is that generally a business can be relocated;
therefore, if the government does not take the business for use as
a going concern, it has not taken anything from the owner, and no
compensation is required, at least not for any loss of business
value.313
As early as 1888, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that
some exceptions should apply to this general rule. In Grand Rapids
& Indiana Railroad v. Weiden, 316 the supreme court suggested that
business losses are compensable where a taking destroys a business
3 " City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions, 143 Mich. App. 808, 811, 373 N.W.2d 219,
220-21 (1985) (citing State Highway Comm'r v. Eilender, 362 Mich, 697, 699, 108 N.W.2d
755, 756 (1961); In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich. 20, 28, 97 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1959);
In re Widening of Bagley Ave., 248 Mich. 1, 5, 226 N.W. 688, 689 (1929)). MICH. CoNsT. art.
10, § 2 provides, in relevant part: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law."
313 Some courts have interpreted such language differently. See infra note 431 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how Louisiana courts interpret similar language to
allow recovery of consequential and incidental damages.
' 14 See In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Hous. Project, 306 Mich. 638, 651, 11 N.W.2d
272, 276 (1943) (citing Banner Milling Co. v. State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668, cert. denied,
269 U.S. 582 (1925)); In re City of Lansing v. Wery, 68 Mich. App. 158, 163, 242 N.W.2d
51, 54 (1976).
315
	 Prescriptions, 143 Mich. App. at 811-12, 373 N.W.2d at 221 (citing Com-
munity Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976)).
316 70 Mich. 390, 38 N.W. 294 (1888).
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because it is unable to find a suitable site for relocation. 317 Over the
next eighty years, however, the Michigan courts restricted the Wei-
den holding, establishing that losses of goodwill or going-concern
value were not generally compensable, but rather were available
only where the taking of the land destroyed the business altogether
because of the lack of other suitable locations. 318
The Michigan Court of Appeals set forth the progenitor of the
modern rule in State Highway Commission v. L & L Concession Co. 319
in 1971. L & L Concession had an exclusive right under a lease to
operate a grandstand food and souvenir concession at a race track
for a specified period of time. 32" The entire race track was con-
312 The Weider court noted:
Both of the appellants were using their property in lucrative business, in
which the locality and its surrounding had some bearing on its value. Apart
from the money value of the property itself, they were entitled to be compen-
sated so as to lose nothing by the interruption of their business and its damage
by the change. A business stand is of some value to the owner of the business,
whether he owns the fee of the land or not, and a diminution of business
facilities may lead to serious results. There may be cases when the loss of a particular
location may destroy business altogether, for want of access to any other that is suitable
for it. Whatever damage is suffered, must be compensated. Appellants are not legally
bound to suffer for petitioner's benefit. Petitioner can only be authorized to
oust them from their possessions by making up to them the whole of their
losses.
Id. at 395, 38 N.W. at 295-96 (emphasis added).
Fifty years later, the Michigan Supreme Court also stated that: "'An established trade or
business connected with a location clearly enhances the value of a leasehold interest, and just
compensation contemplates this fact.'" In re Widening of Michigan Ave., 280 Mich. 539, 550,
273 N.W. 798, 803 (1937) (quoting with approval Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of
Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 1090, 198 N.W. 486, 490 (1924)).
3,, In post-Weiden cases:
the Court has said that damages may not be recovered, on the authority of
Weiden, for "loss of profits" due to interruption of business and that in the case
of "interruption of business" the recovery will be limited to the amount of the
"expenses" attributable to the interruption. Such statements cannot properly be
read as precluding recovery of damages in the kind of case alluded to in the
Weiden opinion, where the "loss of a particular location may destroy business
altogether, for want of access to any other that is suitable for it."
State Highway Comm'n v. L & L Concession Co., 31 Mich. App. 222, 236 n.17, 187 N.W.2d
465, 472 n.17 (1971) (emphasis in L & L Concession Co.) (citing In re Grand Haven Highway,
357 Mich. 20, 31, 97 N.W.2d 748, 753 (1959)). In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Hous. Project,
306 Mich. 638, 651, 11 N.W,2d 272, 276 (1943), seems to be inconsistent with Weiden: "The
loss of good will is not an element of compensation where the business is not taken for use
as a going concern." (citations omitted). Jeffries did not overrule Weiden, however, and the
facts suggest that the condemnee, a plumber, had a very weak claim. As the court stated, the
evidence did not show the plumber's business could not be relocated. Jeffries, 306 Mich. at
651, 11 N.W.2d at 276.
312 31 Mich. App. 222, 187 N.W.2d 465 (1971).
324 Id. at 225, 187 N.W.2d at 466.
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demned. L & L Concession argued that its business had a saleable
value which, because of the monopoly position it enjoyed at the
track, could not be transferred to another location. 32 '
The court of appeals, relying on Kiniball522 and Saugen,323 found
that L & L Concession was entitled to compensation because the
going-concern value of its business was related to its "locational
advantage" and "monopoly position". at the race track, rather than
"conventional customer goodwill." 324 The court concluded that
these factors made the case more analogous to cases in which the
condemned property could not be valued separately from the busi-
ness conducted thereon than to typical cases seeking going-concern
value. 525
 L & L Concession Co. thus established that recovery of going-
concern value was possible, at least under some circumstances.
Two subsequent cases, City of Detroit v. Whalings, hic. 326 and City
of Lansing v. Wery,327 further elucidated the rule regarding recovery
of going-concern value. The condemnee in Whalings had operated
a men's clothing store on Woodward Avenue in Detroit for over
100 years.528 When the building it leased was condemned, Whalings
sought to show that no other site was available in downtown Detroit
to which it could relocate. The business thus made a claim for loss
of goodwill.s29
The court of appeals rejected Whalings's claim, distinguishing
L & L Concession Co. on its facts. First, the court noted that, unlike
52, Id. at 232-33, 187 N.W.2d at 470.
322 See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kimball.
329 See supra notes 281-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of Saugen.
329 The court of appeals noted:
The going-concern value of L & L's business is not related to customers L
& L cultivated but to the patronage of the race track; the concession gives I &
L a monopoly on food and souvenir sales at the Speedrome. The value of the
concession flows from locational advantage and L & L's monopoly position at
that location, not conventional customer goodwill. The value flows from an
"adaptation" of the grandstand to a use for which it is suited. Viewed from that
perspective, allowing compensation for the value of the concession is consistent
with the case law which recognizes that in valuing real estate for condemnation
purposes it is proper to include value attributable to a use for which the real
estate is adapted.
L & L Concession Co., 31 Mich. App. at 232-33, 187 N.W.2d at 470 (footnote omitted).
3" Specifically, the court stated: "In a large number of cases owners and lessees have
recovered going-concern value where the condemned property could not be realistically
valued apart from the business there conducted, or, as it is sometimes said, the business for
which the property is best 'adapted.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
323 43 Mich. App. I, 202 N.W.2d 816 (1972).
327 68 Mich. App. 158, 242 N.W.2d 51 (1976).
323 Whalings, 43 Mich. App. at 2, 202 N.W.2d at 817.
329 Id. at 3, 202 N.W.2d at 817.
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L & L Concession, Whalings did not enjoy a monopoly position and
its customers were not a "captive audience.""° Whalings's going-
concern value therefore was not based primarily upon its location,
as was L & L Concession's."'
Second, in L & L Concession Co., no suitable alternative location
was available because the concession stand would have had to re-
locate within the race track, but the entire race track had been
condemned, The Whalings court noted that "if Whalings [was] un-
able to relocate, that inability [was] caused by the fact that all suitable
locations [were] occupied by other businesses, not because all suit-
able locations [had] been condemned."" 2 Thus, "the possibility of
finding a suitable location nearby with the same or nearly the same
convenience factors is not foreclosed by reason of the condemnation
herein."333 Although the court admitted that the effect on Whalings
might be the same, 334 it determined that the distinction nonetheless
had an important effect on proof of damages. Where all suitable
locations have been condemned, proof of destruction of a business
dependent on location is certain. Where the business is unable to
relocate because other businesses have preempted all suitable relo-
cation sites, the business owner would have to show that none of
them would move or go out of business before the owner could
show total destruction of his or her business. 335 The court deter-
mined that although Whalings should be compensated for its relo-
cation expenses, it was unrealistic to grant the business owner loss
of goodwill as wel1. 336
Wery affirmed the limitations enunciated in Whalings, but held,
under the facts presented, that recovery of goodwill was justified. 337
The owner in Wery had leased prerhises on which it had operated
a restaurant shop since 1924. The trial court found that the restau-
rant was "'a unique hamburger shop" and a "'downtown institu-
tion,'" which enjoyed close proximity to the state capitol, the Lan-
sing commercial center, and Lansing Community College.""
"D Id. at 9, 202 N.W.2d at 820.
55 ' Id.
'" Id. at 10, 202 N.W.2d at 821.
'" Id. at 10, 202 N.W.2d at 820; see also State Highway Comm'n v. Gaffield, 108 Mich.
App. 88, 94-95, 310 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1981) (no recovery allowed for going-concern value
of residential property occasionally used in photography business).
3" Whalings, 43 Mich. App. at 10, 202 N.W.2d at 821.
5" Id.
3" Id. at 11, 202 N.W.2d at 821.
"' See City of Lansing a. Wery, 68 Mich. App. 158, 164-65, 242 N.W.2d 51, 54 (1976).
"" Id. at 160, 242 N.W.2d at 52 (quoting trial court's opinion).
346	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:283
Although the restaurant owner made several attempts to relocate
after his leased premises were condemned, he was unable to find a
location even "remotely comparable" to the one he had lost." 9
 Thus,
the restaurant "was a unique operation in a unique location. It
depended greatly on that location, and any significant move would
so greatly impair its business as to nearly destroy it." 54() More im-
portantly, "Wile premises were adapted for a particularly highly
productive use no way dependent on ownership by these particular defen-
dants.'"34 ' Under such circumstances, the court of appeals con-
cluded, compensation for going-concern value was warranted. 342
The most recent statement of the business losses rule by the
Michigan Court of Appeals came in 1985, in City of Detroit v. Michael's
Prescriptions. 343
 In holding that a pharmacist was entitled to going-
concern value where an extensive redevelopment project 344 had
eliminated an entire residential and business community and had
deprived the condemnee of his unique locational monopoly,345
 the
court offered the most comprehensive summary of the business
losses rule in Michigan to date:
[R]ecovery of the going concern value of a business lost
to condemnation will depend on the transferability of that
business to another location. If the business can be trans-
ferred, nothing is taken and compensation is therefore
not required. Whether a business is transferable will be
decided on a case by case basis inasmuch as a specific
factual analysis is required. Generally, however, recovery
will be allowed where the business derives its success from
a location not easily duplicated or where relocation is fore-
closed for reasons relating to the entire condemnation
project. 346
If the business, then, is not transferable, the business owner may
recover for loss of going-concern value. If the business is transfer-
able, the business owner may not recover for any loss of going-
"9 Id. at 165, 242 N.W.2d at 55.
"° Id.
'' Id. (quoting trial court's opinion) (emphasis in trial court's opinion).
"2 Id.
"3 143 Mich. App. 808, 373 N.W.2d 219 (1985).
'44 See supra notes 6 & 7 for a discussion of the Poletown Project.
9" Michael's Prescriptions, 143 Mich. App. at 820-21, 373 N.W.2d at 225. The pharmacy,
which had operated in the neighborhood for over 40 years, was located directly across from
a hospital, was in a building occupied by two doctors, and generated "phenomenal" gross
sales. Id. at 820, 373 N.W.2d at 225.
"6 Id. at 819, 373 N.W.2d at 224-25 (footnote omitted).
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concern value, although certain business interruption expenses may
be allowed."'
Michigan thus affords fairly generous recovery of business
losses. The Michigan courts have recognized that large-scale con-
demnation projects that destroy or disrupt entire neighborhoods
can effectively bar businesses, particularly smaller ones, from relo-
cating, The loss or scattering of the client base strikes a blow so
hard to the business that it often cannot recover.
4. Wisconsin
In 1970, the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Luber v. Milwaukee County. 348 Commentators hailed this opin-
ion as "a landmark decision," 349
 and predicted that it would have a
"profound influence""° on recovery of incidental losses under Wis-
consin law. The dearth of case law on this topic since Luber, and an
anomalous recent opinion of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,"'
however, make uncertain the current status of the business losses
rule in Wisconsin.
Luber was actually a condemnation blight case, although the
court's sweeping language suggests that it was to have broader
application. The condemnees, the Lubers, owned a building, two-
thirds of which was leased to a retail furniture business."' The
remaining one-third had been leased since 1944 to a company that
bottled and sold at wholesale liquor products. When its lease expired
in July 1964, the liquor company decided not to renew, because it
had learned that the Expressway Commission intended to condemn
347 See In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich. 20, 31-32, 97 N.W.2d 748, 754 (1959);
In re Park Site, 247 Mich. 1, 3, 225 N.W. 498, 498 (1929); City of Detroit v. Hamtramck
Community Fed. Credit Union, 146 Mich. App. 155, 158, 379 N.W.2d 405, 406 (1985)
("[D]amages resulting from business interruption are compensable in condemnation cases
provided the damages can be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.") (citing Grand
Rapids & I.R.R. v. Weiden, 70 Mich. 390, 38 N.W. 294 (1888); see also Michael's Prescriptions,
143 Mich. App. at 819 n.2, 373 N.W.2d at 224 n.2 ("It should be clear that recovery for
business interruption damages and recovery for going concern value are mutually exclusive
since one assumes the continuation of the business and the other assumes its loss.").
348 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
345 4 NICHOLS, supra note 14, § 128.17[6], at p. 12B-248.
"a Note, Eminent Domain—Compensation for Lost Rents, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 657, 662; see
also 4 Nicnots, supra note 14, 12B.17[6], at p. 12B-251 ("Although it dealt specifically with
the recovery of lost rentals and expenses caused by condemnation blight, it has implications
regarding lost profits, goodwill, [and] moving expenses . .").
351 Hasselblad v. City of Green Bay, 145 Wis. 2d 439, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988). See infra notes 366-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hasselblad.
352 Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 272-73, 177 N.W.2d at 381.
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the property. The Lubers tried unsuccessfully to obtain a new ten-
ant, but the space sat empty until the building was actually taken
by the Commission in February 1967. The Lubers requested com-
pensation of $350 a month for thirty-two months as rental loss, or
a total of $11,200.the amount of rent the liquor company would
have paid had it renewed its lease. 353
The Expressway Commission, however, offered only $2,100 as
rental loss. Its offer was based upon a Wisconsin statute that set a
twelve-month limit on rental losses caused by a condemnation. 354
The Lubers filed suit, contending that the statutory rental loss
provision was an arbitrary and unreasonable limitation on the right
of recovery granted by the Wisconsin constitution. 355 In a four to
three decision, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed.
The Luber court acknowledged that, under the general rule in
the United States, such damages are damnum absque injuria, but it
also noted that this rule was slowly being eroded by courts and
legislatures.356
 The court had no difficulty in finding that a land-
owner's interest in rental income is a compensable property right
under the state constitution,357 noting that the test for determining
damages is not what the government has gained, but rather what
the owner has lost. 358 The court further noted that because rental
loss implicates a valid property interest, payment for such loss is
constitutionally required. The state statute providing for restricted
compensation thus operated not as "a matter of legislative charity
but [as] 'an unauthorized limit upon recovery."359
 The court there-
fore explicitly renounced the rule making such damages damnum
ass
	 at 273, 177 N.W.2d at 381.
33* WIS. STAT. § 32.19(4) (1965). This section provided:
(4) Net rental loss. Net
 rental losses resulting from vacancies during the
year preceding the taking of the property, provided that: 1) such loss is limited
to the amount that exceeds the average annual rental losses caused by vacancies
during the first 4 years of the 5-year period immediately preceding the taking;
and 2) such rental loss was caused by the proposed public land acquisition.
Id. (quoted in Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 275 n.1, 177 N.W.2d at 382 n.1). This section was revised
by 1971 Wis. LAWS ch. 103, §§ 1-4, to eliminate any time restriction on losses. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. 32.19(4)(c)(6) (West 1971) (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. 32.195(6) (West
1989)).
3" Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 275, 177 N.W.2d at 382.
356 Id. at 278, 280, 282, 177 N.W.2d at 384, 385, 386. The changing face of the American
landscape means that takings today increasingly result in large incidental losses, which wreak
far more havoc on property owners than was true in the past. See 177 N.W.2d at 384-85.
335 See id. at 279, 177 N.W.2d at 384.
333 Id. (citing Volbrecht v. State Highway Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 640, 647, 143 N.W.2d
429, 432 (1966)).
359 Id. at 280, 177 N.W.2d at 385.
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absque injuria, and invalidated the statute insofar as it limited corn-
pensation. 36°
The three dissenting judges based their argument on the word-
ing of the Wisconsin constitution, which provides only for compen-
sation for property "taken."36 ' In the dissent's view, "[t]he majority,
by equating loss of rent with a taking, are construing the constitu-
tional provision as if it read: The property of no person shall be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation there-
for"—a development they regarded as an "unfortunate" and "im-
permissible" judicial extension of the constitution."' The majority
had noted that many states had amended their constitutions to
provide recovery for "damage" to property, but apparently believed
that the distinction between the presence or absence of the term
was a minor one. 363
In 1971, the Wisconsin legislature redrafted the statutory pro-
vision at issue in Luber, eliminating the unconstitutional language. 564
Since that time, the supreme court has had little occasion to reex-
amine Luber. 365
 However, a recent Wisconsin court of appeals de-
cision, Hasselblad v. City of Green Bay,366
 casts a threatening shadow
on Luber.
The condemnees in Hasselblad had incurred $126,000 in ex-
penses in replacing their business after a condemnation action by
56° id. at 283, 177 N.W.2d at 386.
36
 WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 13, provides: "The property of no person shall be taken for
public use without just compensation therefor."
362 Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 285, 177 N.W.2d at 387 (Wilkie, J., dissenting). It is interesting
to note that at least two states whose constitutions do have an "or damaged" clause have
rejected the Luber approach. See Chicago Hons. Auth. v. Lamar, 21 111. 2d 362, 365-68, 172
N.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1961); Uvodich v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 9 Ariz. App. 400, 405-06,
453 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1969).
365 See Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 280, 177 N.W.2d at 385. The court stated these amendments
were undertaken to "avoid difficulties" with the issue of whether such compensation was a
matter of constitutional requirement or legislative grace. Id.
364 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 103, § 1-4.
363 In Roller v. Milwaukee County Expressway & Transportation Commission, the court ad-
dressed the right of a business to recover for duplicate rental expenses, rental loss, and
moving expenses incurred when it had to relocate because of a condemnation. 72 Wis. 2d
553, 556, 558, 560, 241 N.W.2d 440, 492, 493, 444 (1976). The court rejected the business's
claim on procedural grounds, stating that Luber "did not create a new category of Incidental'
or 'consequential' damages which could be brought directly to court without regard to the
statutory procedure as to claims and without meeting the requirement of filing a claim with
the commission or public body involved in a taking before going to court." Id. at 562, 241
N.W.2d at 495. The Ratter court thus held that constitutional challenges to limits on recovery
of incidental losses must be raised first before the condemning authority. Id. at 564, 241
N.W.2d at 446.
366
 145 Wis. 2d 439, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
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the City of Green Bay.367
 The city offered $50,000, the maximum
amount allowed for replacement costs under statute. 368
 The Hassel-
blad court construed Luber very narrowly in denying the condem-
nees the additional recovery they sought. The court indicated that
because Luber was a four to three decision and represented a "rad-
ical departure" from the prevailing rule on incidental or conse-
quential damages, it should be limited to its factual setting, absent
direction otherwise from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 369
 The
Hasselblad court also determined that replacement costs were similar
to moving costs which, in its view, lacked the direct relationship to
fair market value that the rental losses in Luber had. 37° Yet the court
ignored the Luber court's endorsement of a Florida case holding
that full or just compensation did require recovery of moving ex-
penses."'
The Hasselblad court's crabbed reading of Luber seems at odds
with Luber's sweeping rejection of the damnum absque injuria rule.
Because the condemnees in Hasselblad did not appeal to the supreme
court, it is difficult to predict the effect of this decision on recovery
'°' Id. at 441, 427 N.W.2d at 141.
363 Id.; see Wis. STAT. ANN. 32.19(4m)(a) (West 1989).
360
 Hasselblad, 145 Wis. 2d at 442-43, 427 N.W.2d at 141-42. It is curious that the court
of appeals concluded that the Luber court's acknowledgment that the prevailing view that
incidental or consequential damages are not recoverable somehow signalled its intent that
the holding in Luber be construed narrowly and limited to its farts. See id. It would seem that
Luber's statement that "Mlle rule making consequential damages damnum absque injuria is,
under modern constitutional interpretation, discarded," Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 283, 177 N.W.2d
at 386, would, when preceded by its recognition of the majority view to the contrary, indicate
instead its intent that the holding have bioad application. In addition, the Hasselblad court's
statement that Roller suggests that replacement costs are not constitutionally required mis-
construes the narrow holding of Rutter. See Roller, 72 Wis. 2d at 564, 241 N.W.2d at 446.
37°
 See Hasselblad, 145 Wis. 2d at 444, 427 N.W.2d at 142 (quoting Klopping v. City of
Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 54 n.7, 500 P.2d 1345, 1357 n.7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13 n.7 (1972)).
371
 Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Free Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 291, 292
(Fla. 1958),
We feel our constitutional provision for full compensation requires that the
courts determine the value of the property by taking into account all facts and
circumstances which bear a reasonable relationship to the loss occasioned the
owner by virtue of the taking of his property under the right of eminent domain.
Although the contention that moving costs have no bearing on the fair
market value of the premises may be meritorious in other jurisdictions, it has
no merit in Florida, where an owner is constitutionally guaranteed full or just
compensation. The theory and spirit of such a guarantee require a practical
attempt to make the owner whole. A person who is put to expense through no
desire or fault of his own can only be made whole when his reasonable expenses
are included in the compensation.
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of business losses in Wisconsin. Wisconsin statutory law does permit
generous recovery of certain incidental and consequential losses. 372
The provisions often contain statutory caps, however, and some
types of business losses are not specifically provided for under the
statute.373 Thus, the extent of recovery for a business owner in
Wisconsin remains uncertain.
5. Alaska
Of all of the state courts addressing the business losses rule to
date, the Alaska Supreme Court has presented the most analytical
and comprehensive reasoning for rejecting the rule. In 1976, the
court first faced the issue of compensation for business losses, in
State v. Hammer, where it held that such losses were recoverable,
even where the losses were suffered by a lessee. 374 In Hammer, one
of the appellees had leased the first floor of a building for use as a
bar. 575 The state condemned the entire building, which was in the
path of the proposed Petersburg Highway. Although the lessee was
eventually able to reopen his bar, it took him nine months to find
a new location. The issue presented to the court was a narrow one:
"whether temporary loss of profits due to business interruption
directly resulting from a state's taking of the land on which the
business operated is a damage to property compensable under [the
Alaska] constitution."376
The court examined the rationales traditionally presented for
denying recovery of business losses, and found them lacking. 877
First, the argument that damage to personal property need not be
compensated was clearly inapplicable, for Alaska law explicitly
makes the loss of such property compensable. 378 Second, the Ham-
572 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 32.19(3)(a)—(c) (West 1989) (allowing actual or fixed
moving expenses, or optional fixed payment for the business); id. § 32.19(4m)(a)(2) (allowing
payment for increased interest and other debt service costs).
373 For example, the statute makes no explicit provision for recovery of loss of profits
or loss of goodwill. These losses arguably would be recoverable under Luber, See Note, supra
note 350, at 662-63.
3" 550 P.2d 820, 826 (Alaska 1976).
5" Hammer, 550 P.2d at 822. The court saw no reason to distinguish between tenants
and owners of real property in condemnation actions. Id. at 823 n.3.
376
 Id. at 823.
"' Id. at 823-26. See supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of
theories of noncompensability.
378 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 823 & n.6 (citing ALASKA STAT. 01.10.060 (1982) ("In the laws
of the state, unless the context otherwise requires ... 'property' includes real and personal
property."); State v. Ness, 516 P.2d 1212, 1214 n.9 (Alaska 1973); Stroh v. Alaska State nous.
Auth., 459 P.2d 480, 483 (Alaska 1968)).
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mer court found the reasoning articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Mitchell that the condemnor takes only the land,
not the business, 379
 equally unpersuasive. 38° Third, the Hammer
court rejected the theory that business losses, particularly lost prof-
its, are too speculative and uncertain in amount to award. 38 ' The
court noted that damages for loss of profits are awarded in a variety
of other civil contexts, 382
 provided the loss is supported by sufficient
evidence. 383
 If the aggrieved party can prove its damages with rea-
sonable certainty, it can recover them; if the proof is lacking, the
damages are not allowed. The court found it "incongruous that
courts allow proof of loss of profits damages in most types of actions,
on a case by case basis, and yet in eminent domain cases bar all such
claims as inherently speculative." 384




 rejecting the business losses rule, the Hammer court
"9
 Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 346 (1925). See supra notes 110 & 111  and
accompanying text for a discussion of Mitchell.
"0 The Hammer court noted:
This approach has several serious flaws. First, it conflicts with our principle of
compensation, which, instead of looking at the benefit to the condemnor as a
measure of compensation, looks to the loss to the owner, as measured by an
objective standard . . . . Secondly, Mitchell . was decided under the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution, which unlike the Alaska Consti-
tution, does not expressly require compensation for damage to property. Finally,
the reasoning of Mitchell is unacceptable because it fails to provide a realistic
measure of what has been taken. The court simply ignored, for the purposes
of compensation, the destruction of Mitchell's business, characterizing it as "an
unintended incident of the taking". This court would poorly serve the law if it
were to so blind itself to the realities of condemnation.
550 P.2d at 824 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). The Alaska constitution provides:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18.
5 " ,
 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 824.
382
 Id. The court noted that damages for loss of profits have been awarded in tort
actions, both personal and business, breach of contract actions, antitrust suits, and actions
for infringement of patents or trademarks. Id.
999
 The court noted: "In any case seeking loss of profits, such damages must be 'reason-
ably certain': the trier of fact must be able to determine the amount of lost profits from
evidence on the record and reasonable inferences therefrom, not from mere speculation and
wishful thinking." Id. at 824-25 (footnote omitted).
994 Id. at 825. Moreover, the parties in Hammer had stipulated the amount of profits lost,
eliminating any problems of proof. Id.
995 Id. at 825-26 (reviewing Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d
380 (1970) (discussed supra notes 348-63 and accompanying text)),
599 Id. at 826 (reviewing Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108
So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1958)).
3" Id. (reviewing Bowers v, Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966) (discussed
supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text)). The court also noted that Minnesota and
California allow recovery of some business losses. Id.
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turned to the Alaska constitution."8 The supreme court concluded
that the language of the Alaska constitution mandated recovery for
temporary loss of profits. 389 A business is "property," the court
noted, and the taking of a leasehold can directly damage that prop-
erty interest. 390 According to the Hammer court, "[do deny compen-
sation for such damages would contravene the policy behind the
constitutional provision, that the condemnee should not pay a
higher price for a public improvement than do other members of
the public." 891 The court had little concern for the possibility that
allowing such relief might strain the public coffers. 592
The Hammer court thus held that a temporary loss of profits
during relocation resulting from the taking of property on which a
business was conducted was a "damaging" of property for which
the Alaska constitution mandates compensation Interestingly, of
the courts that have mandated recovery of business losses in recent
years, the Alaska Supreme Court is the only one to have relied upon
the presence of an "or damaged" clause in its state constitution. 594
Of the four other states in which business losses are judicially rec-
ognized, two—Georgia 395 and Minnesota398—also have state consti-
tutions requiring that compensation be paid for the "damaging," as
well as the "taking," of private property. Yet only the Alaska Su-
preme Court cited this phrase as a factor in its decision to reject
the traditional rule."' The courts of the two remaining states,
Michigan398 and Wisconsin,399 have found a constitutional require-
385 Id. at 826-27.
599 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 826.
3" See supra note 380 for the language of the Alaska constitution applicable to takings.
391 Hammer, 550 P.2d at 826.
592 The Hammer court stated:
The amount of such damages is a matter largely within the state's control; by
giving precise and early notice of the date when the property must be vacated
it can keep the loss of profits due to necessary business interruption to a
minimum. Since such loss of profits is an item of special damages, the condem-
nee has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the amount
of profits lost as a direct result of the state's taking; such proof must meet the
requirement of reasonable certainty as indicated,
Id. at 827 (footnote omitted).
393 Id.
'9' See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of "or damaged"
clauses.
395 See supra notes 259-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Georgia law.
396 See supra notes 281-311 and accompanying text for a discussion of Minnesota law.
"7 See Hammer, 550 P,2d at 824.
399 See supra note 312 for the language of the Michigan constitution applicable to takings.
'99 See supra notes 361 & 362 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language
of the Wisconsin constitution applicable to takings.
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ment for the payment of business losses even absent such a provi-
sion. Thus, unlike what one might have expected, the presence of
an "or damaged" clause does not greatly broaden the scope of
recovery for property owners whose land has been taken.
The Hammer court's systematic rejection of the traditional ra-
tionales for finding business losses damnum absque injuria, and its
approbatory discussion of other states' rejections of the business
losses rule, suggest that the court intended the impact of this deci-
sion to be broader than its narrow holding would imply. The court
emphasized, however, that it was not making "as sweeping a pro-
nouncement of law" as was found in the decision of the other state
courts rejecting the rule.400
 Yet, given the expansive reasoning set
forth by the court, it is hard to imagine how the Alaska courts might
limit the application of Hammer in the future.
Since Hammer, the Alaska courts have had little to say about
the business losses rule. 4" Alaska's relative lack of commercial and
industrial development undoubtedly makes takings involving busi-
ness losses comparatively more rare in Alaska than they are in more
densely-populated states. The clear and comprehensive opinion is-
sued by the Hammer court, however, must also contribute to the lack
of litigation over this topic.
C. Constitutional Reform: Louisiana
Historically, the Louisiana courts denied compensation for
"consequential" losses, such as business losses. Their oft-repeated
refrain was that "[m]ere consequential injuries to the owners arising
from discomfort, disturbance, injury to business and the like, re-
main, as they were, damna absque injuria" 402—or, in the unsym-
pathetic words of one court, "particular sacrifices which society has
the right to inflict for the public good."'" In calculating compen-
sation, courts considered such losses only to the extent that they
diminished the fair market value of the property being con-
demned. 404
40°
 550 P.2d at 826.
10 ' See, e.g., Triangle, Inc. v. State, 632 P.2d 965, 967-69 (Alaska 1981) (holding that
landowner must detail business losses with reasonable certainty and establish causation).
4°2
 McMahon v. St. Louis, A. & T. R.R., 91 La. App. 827, 830, 6 So. 640, 641 (1889)
(quoted in Rapides Parish School Bd. v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 228-29, 94 So. 2d 40, 44 (1957));
see also State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Mason, 254 La. 1035, 1047, 229 So. 2d 89, 93
(1969); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 219, 85 So. 2d 260, 270 (1955).
40 McMahon, 41 La. App. at 830, 6 So. at 641 (quoted in Nassif, 232 La. at 228-29, 99
So. 2d at 44).
"4
 See, e.g., Mason, 254 La. at 1047, 229 So. 2d at 93 ("the replacement cost of a building
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In 1974, however, the Louisiana legislature redrafted the state
constitution. Its predecessor, the 1921 constitution, had merely re-
quired payment of "just and adequate compensation" for a tak-
ing.405 The new constitution 406 made an explicit attempt to afford
property owners greater rights in condemnation actions. For ex-
ample, the new provision limits the power of certain entities to
condemn"' and guarantees the property owner the right to a jury
trial for determination of compensation. 408 The most dramatic
change, however, was the replacement of the provision that the
owner receive "just and adequate compensation" with a new re-
. . . may be considered in determining consequential damages, but only as a factor which
may directly affect the reduction of market value as a result of the partial taking"); Texas
Pipe Line Co., 229 La. at 219,85 So. 2d at 270 ("damages ... resulting from expropriation
of property rights are the difference between the market value of the property for sale or
rental purposes, immediately before and immediately after the expropriation").
405 LA. CoNsr. of 1921, art. 1, § 2 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just
and adequate compensation is paid."
4" LA. CONST. art. I, 4 provides:
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and
dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restric-
tions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdi-
visions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner
or into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any
private entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary
purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings,
whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question. In
every expropriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine compen-
sation, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. No
business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the purpose of operating
that enterprise or halting competition with a government enterprise. However,
a municipality may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction. Personal effects,
other than contraband, shall never be taken.
This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property necessary for
levee and levee drainage purposes.
Id. See generally 7 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CON-
VENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 13,1973, at 1241-42 [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS]; Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1974);
Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9,19-27 (1975) (discussing article 1, section
four of the Louisiana constitution of 1974). (Representative Jenkins is a member of the
Louisiana House of Representatives, a delegate to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention,
and the author of this provision of the constitution.)
07 Although the state and its political subdivisions can continue to take property for
"public purposes," private entities authorized by law to expropriate may take property only
for "public and necessary purposes." LA, CONST. art. 1, § 4 (quoted in supra note 406); see also
Hargrave, supra note 406, at 16-17; Jenkins, supra note 406, at 21-22.
401 LA. CONST. art. 1, 4 (quoted in supra note 406). See generally Hargrave, supra note
406, at 14-15; Jenkins, supra note 406, at 23.
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quirement that "the owner shall be compensated to the full extent
of his loss."409
 This new phrasing was not merely a random choice
of words; rather, the terms were selected with care and were in-
tended to have a significant and substantial impact on condemnees'
rights.410
This new Louisiana provision was patterned after the Montana
constitution, which requires compensation to the "full extent of the
loss."411 The Louisiana constitution, however, deliberately requires
that the owner be compensated "to the full extent of his 1055. '412
According to Representative Jenkins, the author of the provision,
the replacement of the article "the" with the possessive "his" was
intended to indicate that "compensation is to be determined sub-
jectively with emphasis on the value placed on the property by the
owner instead of on its so-called market value or replacement
cost."'" Although the constitution may not mandate recovery of
subjective damages, 414
 the delegates to the constitutional convention
certainly intended that the recovery available under the 1974 con-
stitution be greater than that available under the 1921 constitu-
tion,4 i 5
 and that intangible and incidental losses to the owner un-
related to the value of the property be compensable.
The comments and debate by the delegates reveal that they
anticipated that the compensation provision would result in exten-
sive changes in the law. The Committee Report stated that "[t]he
term 'full extent of the loss' is intended to permit the owner whose
property has been taken to remain in equivalent financial circum-
stances after the taking."416
 The phrase was intended to include
4°9 LA. Corvs -r. art. 1, 4 (quoted in supra note 406).
410 See infra notes 416-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of
this phrase.
" MONT. CONST. art. II, 29 (emphasis added). The Montana Constitution states:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid
into court for the owner. In the event of litigation, just compensation shall
include necessary expenses of litigation to be awarded by the court when the
private property owner prevails.
Id.
412 LA. CONST. art. I, 4 (emphasis added) (quoted in supra note 406).
413
 Jenkins, supra note 406, at 24.
414
 Louisiana's third circuit has rejected the notion that landowners are entitled to recover
for what they subjectively believe to be their losses. E.g., State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v.
Johnson, 369 So. 2d 191, 194 (La. Ct. App. 1979); State ex ret. Dep't of Highways v.
Champagne, 356 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
411 Jenkins, supra note 406, at 23-24.
'Ha 1 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: JOURNAL OF
PROCEEDINGS, July 6, 1973, at 86 (citation omitted).
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items "which, perhaps, in the past may have been considered dam-
num absque injuria, such as cost of removal," 417 costs of litigation
and attorneys fees,4 t 8 costs of reestablishing a business,'" inconven-
ience,420 or loss of business profits. 421 To facilitate this comprehen-
sive measure of damages, the delegates intended that "owner" and
"property" be defined in their "broadest sense."422 For example, one
delegate suggested during the debate that a tenant farmer with an
unrecorded lease whose crops are damaged by a pipeline would be
compensated as "the owner of a real right." 423 Likewise, a tenant
could recover the full costs of relocating a business, without regard
to the value of the landlord's property being taken. 424
The delegates intended that this new provision revolutionize
Louisiana condemnation law and expand property owners' rights.
The new constitutional provision has achieved these goals. As pre-
dicted, however, it also gave rise to litigation almost immediately. 425
The Louisiana appellate courts, when faced with the new compen-
sation requirement, found its meaning unclear. 426
1 " Lanier, 7 TRANSCRIPTS, Supra note 406, Sept. 13, 1973, at 1240-41.
41, According to Jenkins:
[S]uppose a highway comes across the corner of your property. You are offered
Five hundred dollars for it; it's worth a thousand. At present, there is no way
you can get what it's worth because if you go to court and challenge that offer
and try to get your thousand dollars, and even if you win, you are going to
lose, because of the cost of going to court, hiring an attorney, which you'll have
to pay. So this would be an attempt to take into account that fact.
Jenkins, 6 TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 406, Aug, 30, 1973, at 1031.
.41 `s 7 TRANSCRIPTS, Sept. 13, 1973, supra note 406, at 1241.
42° In a Memorandum from East Baton Rouge City-Parish Attorney Joseph Keough to
Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, on behalf of himself and seven other attorneys
representing the City-Parish government, the Louisiana Department of Highways, the City
of New Orleans and several utility and pipe line companies, June 6, 1973 (quoted in Jenkins,
supra note 406, at 22 n.69):
[T]he addition of the words "for the full extent of the loss" suggests that the
amount should be something more than the courts presently allow for just
compensation .... [Under the 1921 Constitution] the courts have ... disallowed
compensation for such items as inconvenience, loss of aesthetic value (unless
resulting in loss of monetary value of the property), loss of business profits, and
the like, and it seems probable that the additional language proposed will be
construed as a mandate to the courts to include compensation for those items.
Id.
421 7 TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 406, Sept. 13, 1973, at 1240-41; 6 TRANSCRIPTS, supra
note 406, Aug. 30, 1973, at 1031, 1032, 1063-66.
422 Lanier, 7 TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 406, Sept. 13, 1973, at 1240 ("Owner of property,
and the word 'owner' and ['property' here, is intended to be used in its broadest sense.").
422 Id. at 1241.
42,4
4” Hargrave, supra note 406, at 16.
.tats The Louisiana third circuit recognized that the new provision was intended to
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State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Constant427 provided the
Louisiana Supreme Court with its first opportunity to construe the
new provision on compensation. In Constant, the state highway de-
partment had expropriated an improved parking and loading area
used by a marina serving oil field contractors and suppliers. 428 The
condemnee argued that it was entitled to the amount needed to
construct a replacement parking and loading facility on the opposite
shore of the bayou. The state protested, pointing out that the
amount needed to reconstruct the facility at the new location was
in excess of the market value of the tract being taken. The supreme
court acknowledged that the condemnation of the loading and park-
ing area had effectively destroyed the marina's business operations
on the entire parent tract. 429
 Despite the destruction of business
operations, however, the appeals court had agreed with the state
that the compensation for a partial taking could not exceed the
market value of the entire parent tract prior to the taking. 4"
The supreme court began its review of the appellate court's
decision by endorsing the lower court's finding that the new con-
stitutional provision enlarged the measure of damages in condem-
nation cases, and was intended to allow the property owner "'to
remain in equivalent financial circumstances after the taking. "'431
broaden the measure of compensation. It thus interpreted the requirement that the owner
"be compensated to the full extent of his loss" as meaning that, in addition to receiving the
market value of the property taken and severance damages to the remainder, the owner
must be placed "in as a good a position pecuniarily as he would have been, had his property
not been taken." State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Champagne, 356 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La.
Ct. App. 1978); State ex ret. Dep't of Highways v. Alexandria Volkswagen, Inc., 348 So. 2d
176, 178 (La. Ct. App. 1977). The first circuit, on the other hand, initially held that the
measure of compensation under the 1974 constitution remained the same as it was under
the 1921 constitution: market value. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Caldwell, 353 So. 2d
371, 375 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[T]he test remains 'market value, based on the most recent
comparable conventional sales of similar property, and the highest and most profitable use
to which the property may be put in the foreseeable future, excluding remote and speculative
value.'") (quoting City of New Orleans v. O'Krepki, 162 So. 2d 76, 78 (La. Ct. App. 1964)),
rev'd, 360 So. 2d 848 (La. 1978). When faced with the issue a second time just five months
later, however, the first circuit, after reviewing the legislative history, reversed itself and held
that the constitutional provision did, in fact, "broaden[] the scope and concept of the measure
of damages recoverable in expropriation cases." State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Constant,
359 So. 2d 666, 672 (La. Ct. App. 1978). The court now held that "the provision envisions
recovery for business losses, moving expenses and other intangibles in a proper case and
upon adequate proof of such losses," though it found no such proof present in the instant
case. Id.
427
 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979).
428 Id. at 701 .
422 Id.
4" Constant, 359 So. 2d at 672.
4' 1 369 So. 2d at 701 (quoting Constant, 359 So. 2d at 671).
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Because the constitution does not require that the compensation be
calculated by any particular method, the court rejected the state's
contention that business losses can be calculated only by applying a
capitalized-income approach. 432
 Rather, once the condemnee had
established a reasonable measure of its loss, the burden shifted to
the condemnor to show that replacement was not justified by the
income potential of the business. 4" The court concluded that, "con-
sidering the unique value of the loading area" to the condemnee's
commercial operations, "perhaps[] the most direct and sensible
means" of calculating the compensation was the replacement cost
of constructing a new facility. 434
The supreme court in Constant justified its holding in terms of
the new constitutional provision. The court noted that it was "not
constitutionally significant" that the award would exceed the market
value of the entire tract. 435
 The condemnee had suffered "substan-
tial pecuniary business damage," 436
 which required, in addition to
compensation for the "surface value of the land and improvements
taken,"4" compensation for the "loss occasioned their business op-
erations by the taking of the loading area indispensable to them."438
Thus, the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 mandates that busi-
ness owners receive sufficient compensation to restore their business
facilities to their pre-condemnation condition, even where the com-
pensation so required exceeds the market value of the entire parent
tract.43° The Constant court emphasized that "[t]he very purpose of
the constitutional language was to compensate an owner for any
loss he sustained by reason of the taking, not restricted . . . to the
market value of the property taken and the loss of market value of
the remainder. "440
432 Id. at 705.
433 Id.
4 '34 Id. Expert testimony revealed no comparable sales of marina facilities or marine
businesses by which to estimate value. Id. at 703.
433 Id. at 702.
433 Id. at 704. The court stated:
[The taking] virtually destroyed the commercial usefulness to them of their
boat slip, and it was indispensable to them in their commercial loading and
boat-launching activities—and these economic activities, directly serviced by the
loading and parking area which were expropriated, substantially contributed to
the economic success of their other economic activities conducted at the site,
primarily their crewboat rental and gasoline sales businesses.
Id,
437 Id.
438 Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).
439 See id. at 702.
410 Id. (citation omitted). Constant did not mandate exclusive use of the replacement cost
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However, this opinion left open several questions regarding the
precise scope of the compensation required. For example, as one
commentator noted, even though the court emphasized that the
landowner was entitled to recover any loss he or she incurred, the
award included only those incidental losses that were inherent in
the value of the property ; 44 1 the court did not address other dam-
ages, such as loss of profits while the marina was being rebuilt. 442
The opinion did not indicate whether such losses were not recov-
erable, or whether the condemnee simply failed to present proof
of such damages. Likewise, the opinion did not specify whether
damages are to be measured in subjective terms, as urged by Rep-
method of calculating compensation. Moreover, even though the court found that a deduction
for depreciation was not warranted under the facts of that case, it did not hold that depre-
ciation should never be considered. Id. at 706. Rather, the Constant court found that replace-
ment cost was an appropriate means of determining compensation under the circumstances
because of the condemned facility's "unique and indispensable value" to the condemnee's
business operations. Id. at 707. The court stated:
We do not, by these rulings, announce any general principle that replace-
ment cost is always the most appropriate measure of awarding a landowner
compensation for the taking of a physical asset used in his business, nor that
the depreciation of the former asset should never be considered.
Generally, we assume, the landowners may be compensated fully by other
approaches than by awarding them the replacement cost of the improvement
taken, especially where (unlike the present instance) the property is not shown
to be both unique in nature and location and also indispensable to the conduct
of the landowners' business operations on the site from which a part is taken.
Likewise, in the usual situation the depreciated value of the asset taken will
have some lessening effect on the award to the landowner, since he may be fully
compensated by the actual pecuniary value of the asset taken. For instance, the
full compensation constitutionally provided does not require that the owner
receive a new building to replace a dilapidated one which is expropriated.
In the present case, however, the depreciation theories are of an essentially
theoretical nature insofar as their effect upon the actual serviceability and
economic value of the nature of the property (the loading strip) taken. Its
replacement cost is appropriate, because of its unique and indispensable value
to the defendants' business operations conducted at the site.
Id. at 706-07.
Although, generally, replacement cost is reduced for depreciation, the depreciation
referred to is not the theoretical depreciation used for accounting purposes, but rather
"functional and economic obsolescence." See Monroe Redev. Agency v. Kusin, 398 So. 2d
1159, 1161 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 405 So. 2d 530 (La. 1981). The nature of the facility
and the condemnee's regular program of maintenance meant that there was no actual
depreciation present in Constant, so no depreciation deduction was appropriate. Constant, 369
So. 2d at 706. ("More probably than not, despite its theoretical 30-year life expectancy, the
expropriated loading strip at the end of thirty years would have still been as serviceable to
them as on the date of taking.").
441 Note, Expropriation: Compensating the Landowner to the Full Extent of His Loss, 40 LA. L.
REV. 817, 824 (1980).
442 Id.
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resentative Jenkins, 443
 or objective terms. The court's repeated use
of phrases such as "economic loss "444 "substantial pecuniary busi-
ness damage,"445 and "equivalent financial circumstances" 446 sug-
gests that the latter interpretation should prevail. 447
Subsequent interpretation and development of the business
losses rule in Louisiana has occurred at the appellate court level.
Courts now have determined that property owners can recover for
the loss of future rental income under a lease, 448
 and lessees can
recover for the loss of a business interest. 449
 Loss of business profits,
4" See supra note 413 and accompanying text for a discussion of Representative Jenkins's
statements.
444 Constant, 369 So. 2d at 703.
149 Id. at 704,
446 Id. at 701 (quoting Constant, 359 So. 2d at 671, with approval).
447 See Note, supra note 441, at 826-27. The three traditional methods of estimating fair
market value in expropriation cases—comparable sales, capitalization of income, and replace-
ment cost less depreciation—continue to apply. See id. at 819-20. The comparable sales
method remains the preferred technique, however, and is used wherever it will give an
adequate measure of damages. See State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Sonnier, 503 So.
2d 1144, 1146 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 506 So. 2d 1230 (La. 1987). The lower courts have
steadfastly maintained that replacement cost is available only where the property taken is
unique in nature and location and is indispensable to the business operations conducted at
the site. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dept of Transp. v. Campisi, 509 So. 2d 618, 620-21 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that replacement cost was not available because property was not unique
and indispensable); Sonnier, 503 So. 2d at 1148 (holding that replacement cost was not
available because property was not unique and indispensable); State ex rel. Dep't of Transp.
& Dev. v. Hecker, 493 So, 2d 125, 129 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 494 So. 2d 325, cert. denied,
494 So. 2d 326 (La. 1986) (allowing use of replacement cost because property was unique
and indispensable); State ex rd. Dept of Transp. & Dev. v. Shannon-Page Inv. Co., 478 So.
2d 702, 705, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that replacement cost was not appropriate
where property was rental property and condemnee did not have ongoing business on
property that would be disturbed); Monroe Redev. Agency v. Kusin, 398 So. 2d 1159 (La.
Ct. App.) (holding that replacement cost was available because property was unique and
indispensable), cert. denied, 405 So. 2d 530 (La. 1981). The burden of proof remains on the
property owner to establish the compensation due by a reasonable preponderance of the
evidence. According to the Louisiana Court of Appeals, "speculation, conjecture, mere pos-
sibility, and even unsupported probability are not sufficient to support a judgment." State ex
rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Jacob, 491 So. 2d 138, 140-41 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
State ex rd. Dep't of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So. 2d 35 (La. 1961); State ex rel.
Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Estate of Clark, 432 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 1983)). Thus, for
example, the condemnee in Campisi did not receive compensation for his lost rental income
because the court found that the lack of proof made the amount speculative. Campisi, 509
So. 2d at 620. Likewise, the court in State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development v.
Manuel refused to allow compensation for future profits because the month-to-month lease
that the business was operating under made the amount speculative. 451 So. 2d 659, 662
(La. Ct. App. 1984).
4" See, e.g., State ex rel. Dept of Transp. & Dev. v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 926, 928 (La. Ct.
App.) (overruling City of New Iberia v. Yeutter, 307 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App. 1975)), cert.
denied, 406 So. 2d 611, cert. denied, 409 So. 2d 611 (La. 1981).
449
 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v.. Sheridan, 517 So. 2d 415, 418 (La.
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which were not compensable under the 1921 constitution, are com-
pensable under the 1974 constitution.450 However, the Louisiana
courts will not compensate every business loss flowing from a taking.
For example, when awarding replacement cost to the owners of a
bulk oil distribution facility, the appeals court found no authority
for awarding the costs.of financing, even though it recognized that
"the cost of financing is a real and valid expense of replacement." 45 '
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, and the opinions inter-
preting it, afford property owners in Louisiana greater protection
than they would receive virtually anywhere else in the United States.
This provision rejects the notions that the public fisc cannot support
full and complete compensation for takings, that public projects
would be thwarted by increased costs if such compensation were
allowed, and that individuals should be forced to endure a loss for
the sake of a public gain. 452 This new constitutional provision is the
clearest acknowledgment to date that takings can inflict significant
losses on business owners, and that equity dictates that such losses
be compensated.
V. REJECTION OF THE BUSINESS LOSSES RULE: THE NEED FOR
CONTINUING REFORM
As Justice Douglas once noted: "The law of eminent domain is
fashioned out of the conflict between the people's interest in public
Ct. App. 1987); State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Exxon Corp., 430 So. 2d 1191, 1195
(La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 437 So. 2d 1156 (1983). The Exxon court stated:
The right to use property for business pursuits in hope of generating a profit
is clearly one of the rights which flows from property ownership. When this
right is separated from the actual ownership of the property as in the instant
case by lease, the lessee becomes an owner of a private property right and is
entitled to protection from having the property taken without compensation
just as the owner of property in full ownership has this right.
Exxon Corp., 430 So. 2d at 1195.
45° Id. at 1194-95.
45 ' Hecker, 493 So. 2d at 130. The Hecker court stated:
We recognize that the cost of financing is a real and valid expense of replace.
ment, particularly in this case where at time of trial the defendants' personal
assets had already been liquidated and the proceeds spent on the [replacement]
plant. However, we find no authority in the jurisprudence for awarding lost
investment income or interest paid to a lender to finance replacement of an
expropriated property. We believe that the legislature intended to compensate
landowners at least partially for the loss of use of money by providing interest
from the date of taking to the date of payment on the award of an excess over
the state's deposit.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4" Cf. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Sonnier, 503 So. 2d 1144, 1145-46 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 506 So. 2d 1230 (La. 1987).
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projects and the principle of indemnity to the landowner." 453
 The
business losses rule brings this fundamental conflict into sharp fo-
cus. The essential question is how we, as a society, should balance
our need and desire for economic progress and public works against
our duty and desire to protect the sanctity of private property.
Though we have embraced, through our federal and state consti-
tutions, the notion that private ownership must succumb to public
use when a public purpose intervenes, few citizens would be likely
to agree that the private citizen must simply donate his or her
property, or any portion thereof, to the government for the public
good. Rather, where the public weal demands the confiscation of
private property, the public fisc must compensate for its loss.
Our system of eminent domain is founded, in fact, upon pre-
cisely that principle—that just compensation is required when pri-
vate property is taken for public use. Yet courts have interpreted
the compensation equation narrowly and have limited its compo-
nents so that most of the incidental and consequential injuries in-
flicted by a taking are not compensable. Instead, restrictive and
anomalous doctrines, such as the business losses rule, deny property
owners full and fair recompense for the damages they have suf-
fered. Both the legal and economic environments have undergone
dramatic transformations in the two centuries since this injurious
legal doctrine was created. The time is ripe, therefore, for reex-
amining the historical antecedents of the business losses rule and
its continuing relevance.
The historical antecedents of the business losses rule are self-
evident; the rule sprang naturally from the context of the economic
environment in which it arose. Early exercises of the eminent do-
main power did not create significant business losses. Condemna-
tions were undertaken for purely public purposes and for specific,
discrete projects, such as roads or mills, unlike the mass takings of
entire areas and neighborhoods that we find today. 454 Land was
plentiful, and displaced property owners found it relatively easy to
relocate to similar property within the vicinity. Businesses were few,
and business owners rarely suffered business losses. 455
The physical setting of the nation thus provided the impetus
for the narrow definitions of "property" and "taking" that first
453 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
4" See supra notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nature of
early exercises of the eminent domain power.
"5 See supra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of early
takings on businesses.
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emerged in the law. "Property" referred only to tangible items; 456 a
"taking" required a physical invasion of that tangible property and
an appropriation of it by the government to public use. 457 The
business losses rule itself was black-letter law, a per se rule that was
administratively convenient for the courts. It enabled courts to avoid
the difficult question of whether goodwill and going-concern value
actually were taken in a particular case, and the even more difficult
question of how to value those interests if they were taken. Given
the simple economic circumstances and relatively unsophisticated
legal system in which the rule emerged, the doctrine was an efficient
judicial response to what would have been a fairly minor, fairly rare
problem.
Times changed, however, and the law changed to meet the new
circumstances. The definitions of "property" 458 and "taking"459 ex-
panded to meet the new needs of a modernizing society and an
industrializing economy. Property came to refer not only to the
physical res, but also to the bundle of rights that an owner possesses
with respect to the res,46° and a "taking" was recognized as an
interference with that bundle of rights. 46 '
One would have expected that the modern definitions of "prop-
erty" and "taking" would have rung the deathknell for the business
losses rule. Indeed, the broad definitions of these terms that have
evolved over the last two centuries should mandate recognition of
business interests, such as goodwill and going-concern value, as
property rights, just as other types of intangible rights are now so
recognized.462
The United States Supreme Court's most recent examination
of the business losses rule, in Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse
Co. v. United States, 465 provides a frustrating example of the manner
in which business losses are still treated in a majority of jurisdictions
today—as somehow less-than-real losses, unworthy of compensa-
436 See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a narrow definition of "property" as
including only tangible property.
4" See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a definition of "taking."
4" See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text for a definition of "property."
4" See supra notes 96-119 and accompanying text for a definition of "taking."
4 (11) See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expanded
definition of,"property."
44 ' See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expanded
definition of "taking."
482 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of various types of
intangible property interests.
483 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
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tion. Almota illustrates the hands-off approach that most courts have
taken to the business losses rule, as well as the common failure of
courts to articulate reasoned, .reasonable rationales for their con-
tinuing adherence to this outmoded legal tradition. Yet Almota also
provides an intriguing glimpse of the future of the business losses
rule, as courts begin to recognize the property rights inherent in
intangible assets such as goodwill and going-concern value.
Almota had conducted grain elevator operations on land ad-
jacent to a railroad track under a series of successive leases. 464 It
had built extensive structures and other improvements on the land
based upon its expectation that the lease would continue to be
renewed as it had been in the past. At the time the government
sought to condemn the land, the then-current lease had seven and
one-half years yet to run. The government contended that just
compensation should include only the fair market value of the
remaining lease term. The government had no need for the im-
provements and therefore felt Almota was entitled only to the right
to remove the structures, rather than compensation for their loss.
This result, of course, would have left Almota with only the slight
salvage value associated with the buildings.
Almota, on the other hand, contended that it was entitled to
receive the amount a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller
in an open market for the leasehold and improvements. Because of
the expectancy of continued renewal of the lease, this amount would
include the value of the improvements in place over their useful
life.465 The district court agreed with Almota, but the circuit court
reversed, accepting the government's argument that a tenant's ex-
pectancy in a lease renewal was not a compensable legal interest
and therefore no award for the use of the improvements beyond
the current lease term was available.466
The Supreme Court reversed again, 467 noting that just com-
pensation "means the full monetary equivalent of the property
taken."468 Thus, the court must look at what a willing buyer would
pay for the improvements 469 and, given the unbroken pattern of
lease renewals for almost fifty years, that figure would include pay-
ment for the continued ability of the buyer to use the improvements
464 Id. at 471.
465 Id.
466 Id. at 472.
467 Id. at 473.
461/ Id.
4 89 Id. at 474.
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over their remaining useful life. 470 The majority clearly regarded
the improvements as "private property" that had been "taken" by
the government and so was deserving of compensation. 471 The
Court was careful to note, however, that although Almota might
have also suffered lost profits or loss of going-concern value, it was
not seeking, nor receiving, recovery for such. 472 The Court acknowl-
edged that Mitchell v. United State?" had held that the government
need not pay for business losses, "[Nut it assuredly did not hold
that the Government could fail to provide fair compensation for
business improvements that are taken—dismiss them as worth no
more than scrap value—simply because it did not intend to use
them."474
The majority also attempted, with less success, to distinguish
United States v. Petty Motor Co.,475 a 1946 opinion in which the Court
had held that because an expectation of a lease renewal was not a
compensable interest, a leasehold should be valued only in terms of
its use and occupancy during the remainder of the lease term. The
difference in outcome, the Almota Court stated, arose because in
Petty the Court was not dealing with the fair market value of im-
provements.476 In Almota, on the other hand, the condemnee had
constructed the improvements and sought only their fair market
value, The Court explained that "there is no question here of cre-
ating a legally cognizable value where none existed, or of compen-
sating a mere incorporeal expectation." 477 Thus, the majority's dis-
tinction, hints at a physical definition of "property"—an approach
which, as we have already seen,478 has long-since been abandoned.
475 Id. at 475. The Almota Court noted:
If there had been no condemnation, Almota would have continued to use the
improvements during a renewed lease term, or if sold the improvements to the
fee owner or to a new lessee at the end of the lease term, it would have been
compensated for the buyer's ability to use the improvements in place over their
useful life.
Id. at 474.
471 Id. at 475 n.2.
472 Id. The Court added: "Almota may well be unable to operate a grain elevator business
elsewhere; it may well lose the profits and other values of a going business, but it seeks
compensation for none of that."
475 267 U.S. 341 (1925). See supra notes 110 & 111 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mitchell.
474 Almota, 409 U.S. at 476 n.2.
475 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
4" Almota, 409 U.S. at 476.
4" Id. (footnote omitted).
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Almota was a five to four decision. As the dissent, written by
Justice Rehnquist, points out, the majority opinion is inconsistent
with the Court's existing rule denying compensation for loss of
goodwill and going-concern value. 479 Though the government did
not want the improvements, the taking of the leasehold interests
did prevent Almota from using the improvements as intended over
their useful life. The dissent expressed concern that although the
"property" interest would have expired in seven and one-half years,
at the end of the lease term, the fair market value of the interest
was computed based upon "expectancies that do not rise to the level
of a property interest under the Fifth Amendment." 4" The dissent
felt that this would have unsettling repercussions on the rule pro-
hibiting recovery of goodwill or going-concern value. 48 '
The majority logically could reconcile its decision with previous -
holdings denying recovery of business losses only by saying that the
expectation of realizing income from the use of the leasehold im-
provements is "property," but that business interests, such as good-
will or going-concern value, are not. And that is perhaps the most
frustrating legacy of Almota—the failure of either the majority or
the dissent to indicate why business interests should not be recog-
nized as property interests for purposes of eminent domain law.
The common refrain that goodwill and going-concern value
are not property interests in the "constitutional sense" 482 has never
been adequately explained or justified by a court adopting it. It is
"9 See Almota, 409 U.S. at 483-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex rel.
T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 283 (1943); Mitchell v, United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345
(1925)).
189 Id. at 984 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 ' Justice Rehnquist stated:
If permissible methods of valuation are to be thus totally set free from the
property interest that they purport to value, it is difficult to see why the same
standards should not be applied to a going business. Although the Government
does not take the going business, and although the business is not itself a
"property" interest within the Fifth Amendment, since purchases on the open
market would have paid an added increment of value for the property because
a business was located on it, it may well be that such increment of value is
properly included in a condemnation award under the Court's holding today.
And it will assuredly make no difference to the property owner to learn that
destruction of a going business is not compensable, if he be assured that the
property concededly taken upon which the business was located may be valued
in such a way as to include the amount a purchaser would have paid for the
business.
Id. at 484-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
482 See supra notes 140-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory of
noncompensability.
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difficult to understand why "property" can include intangibles such
as goodwill or going-concern value for purposes such as taxation
or private litigation, 483 but not for purposes of just compensation
under the Constitution, without resorting to the twisted logic
Humpty Dumpty gave to Alice: "When I use a word, it means just
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."484 As Alice aptly
noted in response, "The question is, whether you can make words
mean so many different things." 485 Goodwill and going-concern
value either are property interests or they are not; their status
should not change to meet the purposes of the government in a
given situation. Given the expanded definitions of "property" and
"taking," goodwill and going-concern value surely must be recog-
nized as compensable interests under state and federal constitutions.
In fact, many of the state courts that have rejected the business
losses rule have focused upon the type of property interest inter-
fered with by the government. They have evinced a willingness to
look beyond the intangible nature of goodwill or going-concern
value and to reconsider the definitions of "property" and "taking"
under their state constitutions. 486
The other rationales given for the business losses rule are sim-
ilarly flawed. It is ludicrous to state that goodwill and going-concern
value are not compensable because they have not been "taken." 487
Though the government may have only wanted the land and not
the business, condemnation actions often result in a destruction or
damaging of the underlying business interests as wel1. 488 As several
courts have recognized, the large-scale condemnations that mark
many redevelopment projects today can result in a destruction of
the surrounding neighborhood and clientele base such that the
business and its accompanying goodwill or going-concern value are
unavoidably and irreparably damaged or destroyed. 489 In such cir-
488 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the valuation of
goodwill for purposes of taxation or private litigation.
484 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 274 (Penguin Books 1983).
485 Id.
486 See, e.g., State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976) (discussed supra at notes 374-
400 and accompanying text); Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966)
(discussed supra at notes 259-67 and accompanying text); State v. Saugen, 283 Minn. 402,
169 N.W.2d 37 (1969) (discussed supra at notes 281-99 and accompanying text).
487 See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory of
nonrompensability.
488 The Almata Court hinted at this in the context of business improvements, but refused
to extend this argument to business interests such as goodwill or going-concern value. See
supra note 470 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of Altnota.
489 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions, 143 Mich. App. 808, 821, 373
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cumstances, the business owner may well find it impossible to trans-
fer the goodwill or going-concern value to a new location without
a loss in value. Thus, it can scarcely be argued that the possibility
of a business loss occurring is speculative because there is only a
"remote possibility"490
 that the owner will not be able to relocate.
Even if the business can be relocated, a diminution in patronage
or recombination of the assets at a new site can cause a reduction
in the underlying goodwill or going-concern value, thus inflicting a
loss upon the business owner which, in most jurisdictions, will not
be compensated. Moreover, to say that the owner can simply relo-
cate and rebuild his or her goodwill or going-concern value else-
where:
begs the whole rationale underlying the right to damages.
For example, one could with equal force tell a plaintiff in
a personal injury case that his wounds will heal and even-
tually he will do as well as before, which may be perfectly
true, but it ignores the damages arising out of the wound-
ing and the cost of healing. Obviously, business too, can
be "wounded" and their "healing" too, has economic con-
sequences which are harmful, notwithstanding that the
business may ultimately survive:49 '
It may be true in some instances that no compensable loss exists
because the goodwill or going-concern value was not injured or
could have been moved, but the inquiry is fact-specific and should
be made on a case-by-case basis. If the goodwill or going-concern
value was not damaged or could have been moved, at least in part,
then the amount of the recovery should be adjusted downward
accordingly. There is no defensible reason to create a per se rule
denying all business owners recovery simply because a few business
owners suffer little or no loss. A mitigation requirement is valid; a
blanket rejection of all recovery is not.
Nor can it legitimately be said that business losses are so difficult
to value and so speculative and uncertain in amount that the courts
cannot award recovery for them. First, the Supreme Court has
established that uncertainty as to the exact measure of damages is
N.W.2d 219, 225 (1985) (citing Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 825-
26, 543 P.2d 905, 914, 126 Cal, Rptr. 473, 482 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976); Luber
v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 279-80, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384-85 (1970)).
49° See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory of
noncompensability.
491 Kanner, supra note 1, at 73 n.80.
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no basis for denying recovery altogether. 492 Second, as pointed out
earlier, courts can value goodwill and going-concern value in other
contexts and, in fact, have little difficulty in valuing even more
nebulous types of damages. 493 The question is simply an evidentiary
one; if the condemnee is able to prove his or her damages with
reasonable specificity, recovery should be forthcoming. 494 And in-
deed, the Supreme Court was able to value a temporary taking of
going-concern value in Kimball Laundry495—a much more difficult
calculation, surely, than a permanent taking of the same.
Fiscal concerns also play a large role in the judiciary's perpe-
tuation of the business losses rule. Many of the courts that have
denied recovery for business losses have expressed concern about
the strains that would be placed upon the public purse if every
business loss created by a taking had to be compensated. 496 They
worry that some public projects might not be undertaken if the
scope of recovery were broadened. 497
Yet this concern is precisely why the courts should require
compensation for business losses. As governmental entities increas-
ingly focus on redevelopment, takings that result in incidental in-
juries, such as business losses, are bound to increase. As these tak-
ings become more and more common, we run the risk of becoming
immunized to their often disastrous effects on property owners. 498
As Justice Holmes stated over half a century ago, "We are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
492 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,379 (1927).
493 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the valuation of
goodwill for purposes of taxation or private litigation.
494 That is precisely the approach adopted by state courts that do allow recovery for
business losses. See, e.g., supra notes 381-84 and accompanying text (Alaska); supra note 447
(Louisiana).
493 See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kimball.
496 E.g., O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187,189-90 (1851) (overruled on different grounds
in Ma* v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 403,388 A.2d 718 (1978)).
Cf. Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the Human Disruption, 46 J. Una. L 1,
34 (1988) ("The obvious•question which springs to the fore is: How do the courts know?
Having never afforded compensation for most consequential injuries arising from eminent
domain, it becomes clear that the courts can not 'know.") (footnote omitted).
40 This point was made over three decades ago by the Fifth Circuit, during the era of
the great highway constructions: "This is a period of great governmental expansion, with
enormously stepped up numbers of takings of private property for public use by expropri-
ation, a streamlining of procedures for taking, and because familiarity breeds contempt, a
consequent growing and, therefore alarming attitude of complacency." Slattery Co. v. United
States, 231 F.2d 37,41-42 (5th Cir. 1956).
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cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 4" The
fact that the loss is not compensated does not render it any less real
an injury. Rather, courts that engage in this type of reasoning make
uninformed, unwarranted assumptions about what society can or
cannot afford to pay for, and in so doing, they impermissibly insert
themselves into the planning process. The judiciary's role should
be to protect private citizens from the rampages of public projects;
the laudable goal of economic development (or redevelopment),
and the extensive costs associated therewith, should not blind the
law to the rights of the individual. 50° The judiciary should simply
ensure that the property owner receives just compensation for all
of the losses inflicted by a taking. The difficult decisions as to which
projects should go forward given our undeniably limited resources
should be left to the legislature.
Moreover, economic efficiency concerns demand that the busi-
ness losses rule be abandoned. If condemnors are not forced to
bear every loss associated with their takings, but rather are allowed
to shift some of these costs to business owners, they undoubtedly
will make economically inefficient decisions. Economic efficiency is
achieved when the government is able to take economic resources
and put them to a more productive use. 50 ' Government planners,
499
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
") See Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 293
(Fla. 1958) (Drew, J., concurring). This concurring justice stated:
The fact that the sovereign is now engaged in great public enterprises
necessitating the acquisition of large amounts of private property at greatly
increasing costs is no reason to depart from the firmly established principle that
under our system the rights of the individual are matters of the greatest concern
to the courts. The powerful government can usually take care of itself; when
the courts cease to protect the individual—within, of course, constitutional and
statutory limitations—such individual rights will be rapidly swallowed up and
disappear in the maw of the sovereign. If these immense acquisitions of lands
point to anything, it is to the continuing necessity in the courts of seeing to it
that in the process of improving the general welfare, individual rights are not
completely destroyed.
Id.
*I See W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 46 (1974),
which states:
(T]he basic justification for taking the land at all is that it is more valuable to
the community (including the owner) in the new public use than it is to the
community in the privately profitable use to which the owner would put it. If
this justification is truly available with respect to a given parcel, then it follows
that the community can afford to pay the owner the market value of the land.
For by assumption, the aggregate benefits that the community has received are
greater in amount than are the marketable benefits which he could have pro-
duced by the alternative use, and those marketable benefits determine the
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however, tend to consider only those costs associated with projects
for which they are required to pay. 502 As long as the 'just compen-
sation" formula allows the exclusion of any of the components of
the loss suffered by the property owner, government bodies will
engage in inefficient decision-making. 503 Thus, denying recovery
for business losses skews the cost-benefit analysis and encourages
projects to go forward which, in true economic terms, are not
rational.504
Commentators have criticized the current standard of measur-
ing just compensation by the market value of the property taken as
promoting inefficiency in eminent domain actions, because it en-
courages the government to ignore some of the real costs of the
taking. 505 Professor Durham has argued that the losses suffered by
owners whose lands have been taken fall into five categories: "re-
placement of the land and improvements taken; relocation, includ-
ing moving costs, and the termination and startup costs of utilities
and other services; lost current business revenue; lost business good-
will or value; and any specific demoralization costs." 506 He defines
the first four categories as the "opportunity costs" suffered by the
owner, 5°7 and contends that economically efficient just compensa-
market value of the land. The requirement of compensation therefore imposes
a test on the good faith of members of the community: do they really believe
that the value of the land, when put to the public use, is greater than its private
value? If they do, they gain by condemning it, even though they must pay. If
they do not, they should not condemn it.
Id.
5°2 See Blume Be Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L
REV. 569, 620-22 (1984); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977).
MI7 As Durham points out, we also cannot rely upon the political system to promote
efficient results because of problems of inadequately informed electorates and legislatures,
and corrupt decision-making processes. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1293-1300 (1985).
504 As Professor Michelman stated, we need to resist the notion:
that compensation payments must be limited lest society find itself unable to
afford beneficial plans and improvements. What society cannot, indeed, afford
is to impoverish itself. It cannot afford to instigate measures whose costs, in-
cluding costs which remain "unsocialized," exceed their benefits. Thus, it would
appear that any measure which society cannot afford or, putting it another way,
is unwilling to finance under conditions of full compensation, society cannot
afford at all.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
• s°5 See, e.g., Durham, supra note 503, at 1300-01; Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent
Domain, 84 J. Pot.. ECON. 473, 479-80 (1976).
506 Durham, supra note 503, at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
107 See id. at 1305 n.171 ("The fact that the condemnor in an eminent domain proceeding
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lion would mandate that these costs be factored into the govern-
ment's cost-benefit analysis and that compensation be provided."
The problem, of course, is that the traditional rule excludes business
losses from the compensation equation.
Denial of recovery of these losses not only renders the taking
decision economically inefficient, it also increases the demoralization
costs associated with the project. Professor Michelman defined "de-
moralization costs" as:
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutil-
ities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specif-
ically from the realization that no compensation is offered,
and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future
production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social
unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated los-
ers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by
the thought that they themselves may be subjected to sim-
ilar treatment on some other occasion."
As Professor Michelman noted, the problems inherent in attempt-
ing to put dollar values on factors such as "outrage" or "loss of
incentive" make it difficult to ascertain the demoralization costs
engendered by specific projects or action. 51 ° Thus, we must "frame
the question about demoralization costs in terms of responses we
must impute to ordinarily cognizant and sensitive members of so-
ciety."5 "
The demoralization costs associated with business losses are
obvious. As the cases brought by outraged business owners indicate,
business interests are perceived by the public as legitimate and real
property interests, and damage to them is likewise perceived as a
is not required to show that his use of the land will be more valuable than the present
owner's, but only to render compensation, will result in inefficient land uses if required
compensation is not equal to the opportunity costs of the land seized."') (quoting R. POSNER,
EcoNomic ANALYSIS OF LAW 42-43 (2d ed. 1977)).
5°8 Id, at 1305-06.
" Michelman, supra note 504, at 1214 (footnote omitted).
slo Id, at 1215. Professor Michelman further stated that:
it obviously will not do to interview every potential compensation claimant and
ask him how demoralized he expects to be if a given measure is adopted without
provision for compensation .... The interviewee probably will not himself
know the answer to the question (putting aside the difficulty of his attaching a
dollar value to his outrage and his loss of incentive even if he could appraise
those subjectively) and, for strategic reasons, would not reveal the true answer
if he knew it.
Id.
5" Id. at 1215-16.
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real injury. Members of the public expect to receive compensation
when such an injury is inflicted upon them.
Government officials should be concerned with the effect that
these perceptions may have on property owners. For example, if
business owners perceive that their property can be taken and their
business destroyed, with only partial compensation being paid, their
incentives to continue devoting capital and labor to those businesses
are accordingly diminished. This disincentive can have particularly
disastrous effects in inner-city neighborhoods where many busi-
nesses may be only marginally viable. if the business owner believes
that the property is likely to be taken in the near future, he or she
may abandon it prematurely, further spurring urban decay. Perhaps
if the property is actually taken, the government does not care about
this waste of resources."' But what if the business owner has
guessed incorrectly about the government's intentions to take the
land? A business that would otherwise contribute to the economic
stability and vitality of the area will have been destroyed.
The arbitrary excluding of some of the very real components
of the value of property from the compensation equation creates
an inconsistency and unfairness in the law that cannot help but
result in public perceptions of illegitimacy. This is perhaps the
strongest reason for rejecting the business losses rule. Refusing to
compensate the landowner fully for the costs of condemnation by
denying him or her recovery for business losses shifts some of the
costs of that project to the owner. if the public desires a project, it
should be willing to pay for all of the costs associated with that
project. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Almota,
the "constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as
much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it
does from technical concepts of property law." 513
Although the current rationale for the business losses rule is
often unarticulated, and its historical basis has been discredited, the
rule remains, an anachronism with the power to inflict great injury
on business owners. Few Americans would agree with a statement
made by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1930 to the effect
that "any incidental loss or inconvenience to the business [resulting
512 In fact, it could be argued that such a result would promote economic efficiency.
513 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S.
488, 490 (1973)); see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
Public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
March 1991]	 GOODWILL & GOING-CONCERN 	 375
from a taking of the underlying land] must be borne by the owner
in the interest of the general public." 514
 Yet that is precisely the
result we find. A legal rule that has been vilified even by the very
judges enforcing it as being "an immoral, illogical concept" that
"should be declared illegal" 515
 can hardly foster respect for the law
among the general populace.
VI. CONCLUSION
The past two decades have seen several reforms in the business
losses rule, emerging at both the state legislative and judicial levels.
We should now be attempting to identify the lessons that can be
drawn from the progress made in these states. Further reform is
necessary; how should it be fashioned?
The legislative reforms enacted to date are inadequate. They
tend to be piecemeal and inconsistent, affording recovery to certain
favored property owners, and denying it to others. Often, the avail-
ability of recovery depends upon the purpose to which the taken
property will be put or upon whether the taker was a government
entity—considerations that should be irrelevant to the just compen-
sation equation. Either a taking of a recognized property interest
has occurred or not; neither the use to which the property will be
put nor the identity of the taker matters. Moreover, the legislative
reforms we have seen do not address the normative problems of
denying recovery for a real, but nonphysical, loss. How can the
legislature logically justify denying recovery to most business own-
ers, while simultaneously granting it to a few?
Although legislative reform may prove beneficial to certain
aggrieved landowners, true reform must come from the judicial
level. Yet the judicial reforms we have seen also tend to be unsat-
isfactory. The courts are uncomfortable with giving relief, largely
because of their concern over the public fisc, but they are uncom-
fortable with denying it as well. As a result, no coherent judicial
State Airport Comm'n v. May, 51 R.I. 110, 112, 152 A. 225, 226 (1930); see also
Buckhannon & N. R.R. v. Great Scott Coal & Coke Co., 75 W. Va. 423, 446, 83 S.E. 1031,
1040 (1914) ("Incidental loss or inconvenience in business, resulting from removal or changes
made necessary upon the taking of the property, • . must be borne by the owner for the
sake of the general good; and are not the subject of damages in condemnation.") (citations
omitted).
" 5
 In re Park Street (Lido Blvd.), Town of Hempstead, 71 Misc. 2d 554, 562, 336
N.Y.S.2d 566, 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 43 A.D.2d 45, 349 N.Y.S.2d 422, aff'd sub
nom., Colony Beach Club, Inc. v. County of Nassau, 39 N.Y.2d 958, 386 N.Y.S.2d 886, 353
N.E.2d 849 (1976).
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theme is emerging from the reforms we do see. The courts adhere
to a common pattern—they grant recovery in one opinion, and then
systematically limit the availability of that recovery in subsequent
opinions.
The repeated attempts by courts unwilling to reject the rule to
pass responsibility for the problem to the legislature result only in
the perpetuation of an illegitimate legal rule—a rule originally ar-
ticulated by the courts themselves and not by the legislatures. It is
not unreasonable, then, to expect that change to come from the
judiciary. 516
 Such a radical step as Louisiana's constitutional reform
is not necessary. If the courts would simply reexamine the continu-
ing relevance of the per se rule prohibiting recovery of business
losses in view of the economic and legal developments that have
occurred since the rule's origin, they would be compelled to achieve
the same result.
516
 As the former Chief Justice of California stated:
If the court adheres to stare decisis, as it is wont to do, with an aloof statement
that the question is one for the legislature—although it is one created by judicial
decision—it creates not only a new halo for the old precedent but a rule that it
is not within the province of the court to make a change. Thus doubly haloed
such precedents become judicially untouchable, surviving more grandly than
ever in the headnotes. They are grotesque tokens of the triumph of magic
words over judicial responsibility.
Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 622 (1961).
